The Response of Hope to the Crisis of Identity: The Theological Anthropologies of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch by Domínguez Munáiz, Alberto
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:108064
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2018
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
The Response of Hope to the Crisis of
Identity: The Theological Anthropologies
of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch
Author: Alberto Domínguez Munáiz
   
Alberto Domínguez Munáiz 
Licentiate in Sacred Theology Thesis 
Mentor: Dr. Rafael Luciani 
Co-mentor: Dr. Casey Beaumier, S.J. 
April 25th, 2018 
 
The Response of Hope to the Crisis of Identity 
The Theological Anthropologies of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch 
1 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction.................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1. Thesis ....................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2. Prior Considerations .............................................................................................................. 3 
1.3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 2: Status Quaestionis: On Identity, Modernity, and Postmodernity ............................ 12 
2.1. What We Assume by Identity ............................................................................................. 12 
2.1.1. Psychoanalysis Perspective ............................................................................................. 14 
2.1.2. Psychosocial Perspective: Erik H. Erikson ..................................................................... 16 
2.1.3. Cognitive Psychological Perspective: Lawrence Kohlberg ............................................ 25 
2.1.4. Philosophical Perspective: Mary Warnock ..................................................................... 29 
2.1.5. Evaluation ....................................................................................................................... 41 
2.2. On Modern and Postmodern Identity ................................................................................ 45 
2.2.1. Status of Individual Identity ............................................................................................ 45 
2.2.2. The Place of Weakness .................................................................................................... 53 
2.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 59 
Chapter 3: The Role of Hope in Metz and Lynch’s Theological Anthropology ........................ 63 
3.1. Johann B. Metz: The Place of Hope in His Theological Anthropology ........................... 63 
3.1.1. Mystical-Political Theology or Practically-Oriented Fundamental Theology ............... 66 
3.1.2. Theological Anthropology: Memory, Narratives, and Compassio in Hope .................... 68 
3.2. William F. Lynch: Imagination as Grace to Go through the Human Valley ................. 86 
3.2.1. Christian Realism: A New Sensibility and Spirituality to Build the Human City ............ 89 
3.2.2. Anthropological Theology: Imagination to Go through the Human Valley .................... 94 
Chapter 4: Rethinking Identity in Hope ..................................................................................... 109 
4.1. Hope a Fundamental Element of a Vulnerable Human Being: Disposition to Trust and 
the Communitarian Dimension of Hope ................................................................................. 109 
4.2. Hope a Dynamism to Endure in Life (and History): through Hopelessness to Hope .. 113 
4.3. Hope Invites the Person to Integrate Time and History ................................................. 117 
4.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 118 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 120 
 
  
2 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Thesis 
We take for granted the sequentiality of days and seasons: Spring follows Winter, 
Summer follows Spring, and Autumn follows Summer. Likewise, we expect the sun to rise 
every morning and to set at night to make room for darkness. We believe in the axioms of 
geometry and logic on which mathematics and physics depend; and scientific observation 
and experimentation seems to prove that they work. As children learn to walk, they explore 
their “unbelief” (insecurities and fears) until at last they believe in themselves enough to put 
one foot in front of the other -- a process that will become so automatic as to be unconscious. 
Similarly, when adults drive a car, they believe in the continuity of the road. It seems that the 
human person needs to believe in the regularity of nature and in the regularity (read: stability) 
of relationships. Otherwise, he/she will be neurotic. That is what Freud and Erikson highlight 
from infancy: infants have to learn to believe/trust in relationships through being loved and 
protected by their parents, relatives, or community; attachment forms their first identity. In 
fact, the absence of such attachment will problematize their integration in society. Is this 
capacity of trusting and expecting something merely circumstantial? There should be an inner 
disposition toward trusting-in/hoping-from the living world. Otherwise a failed personhood 
results, whether neurotic or apathetic or isolated from communitarian joy. 
But how does hope contribute to our identity? Is hope an abstract knowledge? Is it 
only for a time of despair? Only for Christians? We propose that hope plays a critical role, 
not only in enduring hard circumstances, but also in growing to full maturity as a person. 
That is our thesis: the virtue of hope and its activation contribute to the rehabilitation of a 
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person, both subjectively and communally, in overcoming the crisis of identity, resulting in 
healing, purpose, and gratitude. 
In effect, we want to explore what some authors, such as Charles Taylor, Michael 
Paul Gallagher, Zigmunt Bauman, or Gille Lipovetsky, call soft/weak identity or the false 
confident subject.1 However, we do not want only to articulate how things stand at the 
moment, particularly in the West, but also to propose a way of rethinking human identity in 
the context of hope. That is why we intend to study the theological anthropology of Johann 
B. Metz and William F. Lynch, both of which are grounded in the virtue of hope. 
1.2. Prior Considerations 
Our research is focused on the “Western world.” Charles Taylor understood the term 
“West” in his acclaimed book, A Secular Age, as follows: “Almost everyone would agree 
that in some sense we do: I mean the ‘we’ who live in the West, or perhaps Northwest, or 
otherwise put the North Atlantic world.”2 
“Identity” is a complex term which has long been a subject of study. It is a notion 
related to the individual’s formation and his behavior. In this work, the term will be regarded 
as the notion of humanism, particularly Christian humanism.  
The term “identity crisis” is a technical one in Developmental Psychology that was 
coined by Erik H. Erikson. Erikson’s study on completing the cycle of life  suggests that the 
development of the human being goes through gradual stages.3 In each stage, the person must 
                                                          
1 Cf. Michael P. Gallagher, Clashing Symbols: An Introduction to Faith and Culture, New and rev. ed. 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2003), 147. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 38. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and Its Discontents (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997), 127-47, 130. 
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), EBSCOhost, 1. 
3 Erik. H. Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998). 
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resolve tension to move forward. Identity crises refer to the struggles between identity and 
confused identity. Erikson will also use the term “completed,” but does not mean by this 
either a perfect cycle or a finished human being. He is aware that the human being is always 
developing and can never complete the vital cycle before he ends.4 
But is there in fact hopelessness today? We must confirm that there is; otherwise there 
is no warrant for this study. We can look, first of all, at sociological data including drug 
addiction, alcoholism, the increasing instances of depression, the number of suicides, the rate 
of divorces, decreasing birthrates in developed countries, consumerism, and the focus on 
individualism. Some authors suggest, as does William F. Lynch, that some behaviors or 
cultural patterns -- if they belong to the sociological imagination5 -- can be fairly enough 
considered symptoms of hopelessness. 
On October 27th, 2017 the White House made public the battle against the now-
blazing opiate crisis affecting the U.S.A.6 In 2016 around 64,000 people died because of an 
opiate overdose, an increase of 4% from 2010.7 Similarly in Spain, the government has grown 
                                                          
4 Erikson uses this term, “completed,” but it does not mean either a perfect cycle or a finished being. He is 
aware that a human being is always on a journey and can never complete the vital cycle before it ends. Cf. Erik. 
H. Erikson, El Ciclo de la Vida Completado (México: Paidós, 1988), 12. 
5 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, A Galaxy Book ; GB 204 (London--New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967). This book, launched in 1959, was a turning point in Sociology. Sociological 
imagination is a new perspective and method, which takes into account all at once the three dimensions of a 
life: biography, society, and history. Sociological imagination represents the self-conscious view of a 
contemporary person, within its sociological and historical context. “It is the capacity to range from the most 
impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self -- and to see the relations 
between the two.” Ibid. 6. To give an example: the rate of divorce is no longer considered a personal crisis but, 
rather, a structural, cultural pattern, because divorce belongs to the sociological imagination. Cf. Ibid. 9.  
6 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Taking Action on Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis” 
(Washington, D.C., 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-
action-drug-addiction-opioid-crisis/. (Consulted, Mach 2018.) 
7 Josh Katz, “Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever,” The New York Times, January 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-overdose-deaths-are-rising-
faster-than-ever.html. (Consulted, March 2018.) 
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alarmed at this silent increase among its people.8 Moreover, the state of Massachusetts 
recently legalized the use of marijuana for medical reasons, principally as an antidote to 
anxiety.9 This raises the questions: is there indeed a social problem with anxiety? A recent 
study in the U.S. links depression and anxiety with risky behaviors including excessive 
alcohol use and drugs, as well as obesity and stress. The data reveal that 8.7%  of the 
population suffer from depression in the U.S.10 When this is broken down according to key 
indicators, such as profession, the percentage of people suffering from anxiety is even higher 
in some categories. 
Another mental health concern is suicide. According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), suicide is a global phenomenon which constitutes the seventeenth 
highest cause of mortality. “Suicide occurs throughout the lifespan and is the second leading 
cause of death among 15-29 year olds globally.” The report continues, “there are indications 
that for each adult who died of suicide there may have been more than twenty others 
attempting suicide.”11 The European continent had the worst average in 2015.12 It is 
remarkable that there were 22.3 suicides per 100,000 population in Poland; 15.4 and 15.2 per 
100,000 population in Sweden and Switzerland respectively; and 13.1 in Germany. In North 
                                                          
8 Barbara Ayuso, “El Nuevo Perfil Del Adicto a La Heroína,” El País, August 2016, 
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/08/14/actualidad/1471195572_998082.html. (Consulted, March 
2018.) 
9 Joshua Miller, “It’s Official: Marijuana Is Legal in Massachusetts,” The Boston Globe, December 2016, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/14/official-marijuana-legal-midnight-massachusetts/10Rl2inZQ 
MjSPrNAMSBkCJ/story.html. (Consulted, March 2018.) 
10  Tara W. Strine and et al., “Depression and Anxiety in the United States: Findings from the 2006 Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System,” Psychiatric Services 59 (December 2008): 1383–90. See also, Alexander S. 
Young and et al., “Persistent Depression and Anxiety in the United States: Prevalence and Quality of Care,” 
Psychiatric Services 59 (December 2008): 1391–98. In the conclusions the author states: “Persistent depressive 
and anxiety disorders are remarkably common in the U.S. population and are associated with substantial 
morbidity.” 
11 Cf. http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/ (Consulted, March 2018.) 
12 The next data refer to WHO statistics. http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.sdg.3-4-viz-2?lang=en. (Consulted, 
March 2018.) 
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America the data are similar: 14.3 suicides per 100,000 population in the U.S. and 12.3 per 
100,000 population in Canada. What prompts someone to commit suicide? There are many 
factors involved, which are related to the story of the person and its context. We now know 
that not every person who commits suicide is mentally ill. Suicidal thoughts are extreme 
internal struggles which concern dissatisfaction with the way we are living. The person longs 
for expansion and liberation. However, these ideas may not accurately represent our reality 
or maybe only part of the reality. We should deal, therefore, with the process of falling into 
despair. 
In Spain, young people cannot buy alcohol until eighteen years of age. However, the 
typical way of going out on the weekend involves alcohol. Teenagers start hard drinking at 
13 years. The typical wine culture has gradually been replaced with consumption habits 
aimed at achieving disinhibition and euphoria more quickly.13 It is true that behavior changes 
after the teenage years, but those who used to drink heavily have a higher probability of 
becoming alcoholic. A report by at the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services states 
that 23% of adults and teenagers reported heavy episodic drinking in the past month.14 The 
second chapter of that report referred to the neurobiological effects provoked by misuse and 
addiction. We should wonder, therefore, whether Western culture is nourishing healthy 
people. What kind of image of human development does the West promote? 
                                                          
13 Cf. Javier Elzo, Joan Pallarés, and María T. Laespada, “Más Allá del Botellón: Análisis Socioantropológico 
del Consumo de Alcohol en los Adolescentes y Jóvenes” (Agencia Antridroga, 2003). 
14 See Figure 1.2: Trends in Binge Drinking and Past 30-Day Use of Illicit Drugs among Persons Aged 12 Years 
or Older, 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, “Facing Addiction in America. The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health,” 2016, 
https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf. (Consulted, March 2018.)  
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In the U.S., the average divorce rate of opposite sex couples is 41% for first 
marriages; 60% second marriages; and 73% third marriages.15 In the E.U., the data show that 
the number of marriages has decreased, while the number of divorces has increased: in 2013 
there were 4.1 marriages for every 1,000 persons and 1.9 divorces.16 For instance, in Spain 
there has been a surprising decrease in married life: from 7.8 marriages per 1,000 persons in 
1960, the rate dropped to 3.6 marriages per 1,000 by 2015. We know divorce is a sad and 
complex phenomenon, which involves economic autonomy, social expectations, levels of 
education, physical and psychological violence, and social context in general, but it is worth 
reflecting on why a man and a woman can no longer live together. This puzzle points to the 
communitarian dimension of human identity.  
The birth rate in Spain was 1.33 per woman in 2015, but 18.67% of births were to 
non-Spanish women. In the U.S. the birth rate was 12.4 per 1,000 population in 2016, a slight 
decrease from 14 per 1,000 in 2005.17 Some would attribute these declines to the costs, in 
terms of both time and finances to raise children, but we might wonder whether it is not also 
due to a reluctance to bring children into this tough world. 
An anthropological point of view, may be able to shed light on the phenomenon of 
consumerism in at least two respects. (1) Consumerism in a globalized and market-oriented 
world valorizes the experience of freedom and the desire for liberation. We experience 
something similar to freedom when quasi-infinite options are set before us, such the choice 
                                                          
15 Cf. McKinley Yrvin, “32 Shocking Divorce Statistics,” https://www.mckinleyirvin.com/Family-Law-
Blog/2012/October/32-Shocking-Divorce-Statistics.aspx. (Consulted, January 2018.) 
16 Cf. Euroestat, “Marriage and Divorce Statistics,” June 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained 
/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics. (Consulted, March 2018). 
17 Cf. “Number of Births in the United States from 2000 to 2016,” The Statistics Portal (blog), May 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/195908/number-of-births-in-the-united-states-since-1990/. (Consulted, 
March 2018). 
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of beverages (light, zero, orange, lemon, tea), the diversity of clothing (color, branch, size), 
news (The Boston Globe, Die Welt, the ABC, Science), or travel destinations (Rome, Tokyo, 
Nairobi, New York City), etc. This experience conveys a profound sense of power -- the 
power of free will. (2) Consumerism suggests that, more or less consciously, the human being 
needs “to do” in order to satisfy a longing of being or identity. Action, what philosophy 
discusses as the moment of praxis, plays a crucial role in the construction of our truth and, 
thus, in our identity.18 Consumerism turns out to be an incomplete mechanism that manages 
to satisfy and entertain certain human needs, but fails to build an ideal person. In this sense, 
we must study what our investigation can tell us about hope and about the value or nature of 
our actions. 
Beyond that, hope is a theological virtue along with faith and charity.19 These three 
virtues are, indeed, interrelated in the Christian experience, however, we need to speak 
separately about them to clarify and nourish the human experience.20 Moreover, as they are 
distinguished from one another, we can say that faith is primarily related to knowledge, 
charity to the will (actions), and hope to the holistic and dynamic power of imagination. 
Finally, some people understand hope to be an extraordinary thing, applicable in case 
of emergency or despair, when there is no “human” solution. Therefore, paradoxically hope 
                                                          
18 In our work, praxis constitutes a critical moment of human identity. Metz and Lynch propose that the subject 
is built, not merely found as a result of searching for meaning. Thus, to find an epistemological foundation of 
the praxis see Clodovis Boff, Theory and Praxis. Epistemological Foundations (New York, NY: Orbis, 1987), 
159-220. 
19 To find a systematic explanation on hope see Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope. On the Ground and the 
Implications of a Christian Eschatology (New York--Evanston, NY: Harper & Row, 1967). Pages 15-36 
provide us with a good framework for our work. It is particularly interesting that Moltmann’s explanation of 
despair and presumption as a sin, follow mainly Joseph Pieper. Cf. Ibid., 22-6.    
20 Dominic Doyle, “‘A Future, Difficult, Yet Possible Good’: Defining Christian Hope,” Hope: Promise, 
Possibility, and Fulfillment edited by Richard Lennan and Nancy Pineda‐Madrid, (Mahwah NJ, Paulist Press, 
2015), 16-27, 19. 
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means despair. Saint Paul says: “Hope that is seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he 
already sees?” (Rom 8:24). This transcendental hope dimension is, indeed, essential. 
However, it does not mean that an easy future solution is at hand or has already been 
achieved. The transcendental feature of hope is only part of its truth because, if this part is 
absolutized, it will underlay a denial of reality (time, context, and liability). On the contrary, 
an ordinary life-giving understanding of hope can nourish regular life: “[Hope as an] 
imagination that ... imagines the real.” “Hope is indeed an arduous search for a future good 
of some kind that is realistically possible but not yet visible” (Rom 8:24). In sum, hope 
implies a transcendental and a committed incarnational dimension that embraces reality. 
1.3. Methodology 
Our method will be as follows: In Chapter Two we study the notion of identity. If our 
thesis refers to identity and its crisis, we will have to define two things: the ideal mature 
identity (section 2.1.), and the current state of identity in the Western world (section 2.2.). 
However, it is convenient to clarify the term “ideal mature identity.” On the one hand, 
identity is a process that lasts a lifetime, because our longing to be continues throughout life. 
But we can say that the human being reaches a moment in which his identity is somehow 
defined; in fact, biology confirms that our physiology, especially the brain, is more flexible 
and moldable at early ages. At some point people (must) define their selves sufficiently well 
to live in peace and “maturity” refers to that moment. On the other hand, we do not want to 
set up a theoretical ideal that is impossible to achieve or to live, because it generates anguish. 
That is, we do not want to develop something abstract that sets us apart from reality. On the 
contrary, we believe in the saying of Irenaeus of Lyon: “the glory of God is a living human 
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person.”21 That is why we want to ground our study in psychology and biology so that our 
findings can help the person to live with hope in this world. Therefore, we will try to establish 
a notion of identity by comparing different perspectives: psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, 
Erikson Erikson), cognitive psychology (Lawrence Kohlberg), and philosophy (Mary 
Warnock). It should be noted that the psychologists Erikson and Kohlberg deploy their theory 
in longitudinal studies, hence they have the credibility to speak with authority about human 
development. Mary Warnock provides us with a reflection on identity that philosophy has 
made over many centuries and incorporates contemporary knowledge of biology into the 
study of memory and the function of the imagination in the constitution of identity. 
Once we have defined the ideal mature identity, we will analyze the state of the 
identity of the Western subject, which some authors say remains in the identity-crisis stage. 
We argue that this crisis has to do with the weakness of their hope. We will firstly study what 
sociology says, mainly through the Polish-American Zigmunt Bauman but also with 
references to the French Gille Lipovetsky. Also, we discuss the study of the Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor. Secondarily, we will analyze the place and cause of the Western 
subject’s crisis. Michael P. Gallagher and Nicholas Boyle place it, not merely at the 
sociological level, but anthropological and cultural as well. To put it another way, they argue 
that it is not enough to better organize our societies or to make more laws; we need to 
rehabilitate a fallen anthropology and that involves the images, symbols, and narratives of 
our culture. In this section, it is necessary to discuss the contribution of the economy in the 
                                                          
21 Irenaeus, Contra haereses 4.20.7 (Patrologia graeca 7:1037) quoted by Dominic Doyle, The Promise of 
Christian Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope (New York: Crossroad Pub, 2011), 5. Doyle reminds us of the 
second part of Irenaeus’s statement: “the life of the human person, however, is the vision of God.” To explain 
this statement, intimately related with hope, is one of the goals of his book. See also Irenaeus, Contra haereses 
3.20.2 and 5.3. 
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configuration of the contemporary subject, given the omnipresent role of economics in this 
globalized world. Nicholas Boyle provides the essential contributions for this discussion. 
Next, in the third chapter, we will study the theological anthropologies of the German 
Johann B. Metz (section 3.1.) and the North American William F. Lynch (section 3.2.). (Since 
we talked about the West we wanted to bring along the two centers of the West, the European, 
embodied in the work of Metz, and the North American, represented by Lynch; also 
previously Bauman and Taylor, Erikson and Kohlberg.) Metz and Lynch find in hope a 
fundamental element of the human subject. Metz and Lynch claim that the individual is a 
vulnerable subject threatened with escaping from reality, alienated by ideologies (echoing 
Metz) or by fantasies (echoing Lynch) that come to justify him, to save him, or to free him. 
Metz and Lynch argue that the humanness of the subject is built, not given, despite the fact 
that humanness comes from outside. That is why their theologies are a reflection on the 
person and God with a strong practical and political dimension. Both theologians intend to 
offer ways to liberate the human being from ideologies and fantasies, and thus rehabilitate it 
and reintroduce it to “the valley of the human,” echoing Lynch. 
Nevertheless, Metz and Lynch approach from theologically different points of view. 
Metz develops a fundamental theology that is politically oriented while Lynch depicts, with 
regard to his theological anthropology, a phenomenology of hope. This divergence will allow 
us to put them in conversation and in some moments view one author through the eyes of the 
other. We will undertake that conversation in the fourth chapter with the intention of 
presenting our conclusions. Likewise, we will reinforce these conclusions with the 
contributions of the results of Chapter Two. 
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Chapter 2: Status Quaestionis: On Identity, Modernity, and Postmodernity 
Modernity in the Western world has given way to Postmodernity, characterized by 
uncertainty and skepticism. Modernity, apart from the positive aspects that it introduced 
(autonomy, independence of science, the industrial revolution, secularization, modern 
nation-state, human rights), brought about a displacement of human individuality, which led 
the individual into a sort of “isolation, fragmentation, and narcissism, where life is an 
indifferent game and individual options are merely aesthetic and provisional.”22  
Postmodernity arises as a reaction and -- still focused on the subject -- asks for 
liberation and turns into a humbler understanding of the human being. This crisis of 
humanism and identity cannot be explained only in sociological terms, but has a deeper 
anthropological root at the level of imagination, according to Michael P. Gallagher the level 
of disposition, sensibility and horizon, domains in which are elucidated the possibility of 
faith, hope, and gratitude. 
As we discuss identity, in order to study the roots which currently reduce or weaken 
people’s lives, we should make clear what we assume by identity in a mature person -- with 
all difficulties involved in this relative term of maturity. Thus, first, we will discuss the notion 
of a mature identity and then we will present its current situation in the West. 
2.1. What We Assume by Identity 
From the philosophical point of view, modernity brings what is called the subjectivist 
shift or the anthropological shift. This supposes that, in general, we turn our gaze toward the 
                                                          
22 Michael P. Gallagher, Clashing Symbols: An Introduction to Faith and Culture, New and rev. ed. (Mahwah, 
NJ: Paulist Press, 2003), 116. 
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subject and, thus, we move from the theocentrism of the Middle Ages to the anthropocentrism 
of Modernity.23 
Along the same line, the studies of the English naturalist Charles Darwin (1809 –
1892) and his theory of Darwinism, internationally known after the publication of The Origin 
of Species (1859), reinforced this anthropocentrism.24 Also, the application of the modern 
scientific method to study how the mind works and how human behavior is developed, 
corresponded with the emergence of a new independent science, psychology. Therefore, it is 
not by chance that the studies of the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939) 
which gave birth to Psychoanalysis, happened alongside the revolutionary theory of Darwin. 
Darwinian naturalism is comparable to the determinism of psychoanalysis because of the 
deterministic language they use.25 
We should start this discussion with psychoanalysis for three reasons. Firstly, 
psychoanalysis has been widely influential in many fields: pedagogy, social sciences, art, and 
religion. At present, it is not in force, but the presence of its results is unquestionable.26 
Secondly, both interlocutors in this work deal with this psychological perspective, Metz by 
analyzing its effects on religious experience and Lynch by thinking from this perspective. 
                                                          
23 Cf. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 143-207, particularly Charles Taylor, “Descartes’s Disengaged Reason,” in Sources of 
the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 143–58. See also, Bertrand Russell, A History of 
Western Philosophy (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), and Giovanni Reale and Dario Antiseri, 
Historia del Pensamiento Filosófico y Científico, vol. II (Barcelona: Herder, 2010). 
24 In the first part of the book Elizabeth A. Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (London; New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2014) can be found a contemporary study of Darwin’s major book, The Origin of Species 
and Neodarwinism theories. Johnson’s theological interpretation, depicted in the second part, is based on a 
theological interpretation of Darwin’s results and proposes a change of mentality almost as great as that which 
prevented the naturalists of Darwin’s time from realizing that species mutated. The human being is primarily a 
co-creature, one who enters creation and depends on it not only functionally to survive but also for a community 
to be part of a “we.” Thus, the misunderstood paradigm of domination should be changed to consider our 
“ecological vocation,” which refers to be conscious and moral “struggle for existence.” 
25 Cf. Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 15-24. 
26 Cf. Carlos Domínguez, Creer después de Freud (Madrid: Ed. Paulinas, 1992), 9-27. 
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Finally, my notion of a mature identity is highly influenced by Erik H. Erikson, who develops 
a wider psychosocial approach to the psychoanalysis. 
Thus, we are going to discuss select theories of identity, starting with psychoanalysis, 
then progressing through other post-psychoanalytic versions, and finally discussing a 
philosophical point of view, in order to integrate the very human existential experience of 
time within the self. 
2.1.1. Psychoanalysis Perspective 
This psychological perspective argues that who I am now is intimately related to 
human childhood and to our relations with our parents. Freud suggested the existence of a 
powerful sexual energy (libido) through which to interpret human motivations and thus, as 
we will see, identity. Libido forces can be either forces of pleasure and love, so called Eros, 
or forces of aggression and hate, so called Thanatos.27    
According to psychoanalysis, this sexual energy had been “denied by human 
consciousness, repressed by the dominant morality, and ignored by science”28 before Freud. 
Prior to Freud, sexuality appeared at puberty without previous childhood stages. Whereas 
Freud argues that there is a continuity with previous childhood stages which explains human 
behavior and neurosis.29 Freud establishes two main stages from which to comprehend the 
                                                          
27 Here we follow Carlos Domínguez, Los Registros del Deseo. Del Afecto, el Amor y Otras Pasiones (Bilbao: 
DDB, 2001) and also  Domínguez, Creer después de Freud. The latter work is divided into four parts: The first 
corresponds to a seventy-pages summary of his previous work, El Psicoanálisis Freudiano de la Religión 
(Madrid, 1991). This book discusses the possibility of faith in dialogue with psychoanalysis. In the second part, 
Prof. Domínguez offers a response from the perspective of religion. In the third, the author discusses particular 
issues of a religious being, sex, power, and money. Finally, he discusses ecclesiastical relationships. 
28 Erik. H. Erikson, “Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations,” in The Life Cycle Completed (New York, 
NY: W. W. Norton, 1968), 26. 
29 Neurosis and dream are the hermeneutical models of Freudian theory and regarding neurosis and religion, 
Freud considered two aspects: on the one hand, he argues that religion is an individual and collective neurosis, 
a response of the risk involved in facing the experience of freedom. On the other hand, religion is a neurosis 
which helps in the growth of the person as well as represents one of the ways that culture has to protect against 
obsessive neuroses. Freud’s confidence in reason affirms that those who reach maturity will abandon religion, 
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process of human identity: pregenital and genital.30 In fact, during infancy, the child, 
overcoming the phases of the pregenital stage (anal, oral, and phallic), attains critical learning 
about how to organize its world of impulses-wishes (Ger. Wunsch, according to Freud), 
emotions and desires in relation with the outerworld (people, food, things, culture).31  
While in the womb a child is not separated from its mother; only after being birth 
does the experience of lacking something begin. Then follows the individuation process,32 
which helps the child to understand what “I” and “You” mean. This emotional-sexual game 
of lacking (erotic experience, according to Freud) is again the manifestation of the libido.33 
Yet Freud argues that impulses, cognition, and behavior cannot be fully understood because 
they are ambivalently determined by irrational drives, which are rooted in the unconscious. 
Both conscious and unconscious constitute our psychological identity depicted through the 
terms Id, Ego, and Superego and performance in personal behavior.34 
As people grow up through the game with the outerworld, they establish a 
compromise among these three elements -- Id, Ego, and Superego -- which are called to be 
harmonized within us, but struggle. Thus, depending on how this compromise has been 
                                                          
although “not everyone ... is equally capable, in his [Freud’s] eyes, to be an unbeliever and atheist.” Carlos 
Domínguez, “Religión y Neurosis,” in Creer después de Freud (Madrid: Ed. Paulinas, 1992), 30–50, 40. 
(Translation is ours.) 
30 Human sexuality reaches the primacy of genitality in adolescence, this is why he refers to erotic experiences 
in childhood as pregenital. Cf. Erikson, “Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations,” 29.  
31 Nuances among these three terms, impulses, desires, and emotions are still controversial. Dominguez thinks 
that impulses may be understood as the broader category of embracing emotions and desires. Nowadays, 
psychoanalysis speaks about desires rather than Wunsch. Cf. Carlos Domínguez, “Ese Obscuro Objeto del 
Deseo,” in Los Registros del Deseo. Del Afecto, el Amor y Otras Pasiones (Bilbao: DDB, 2001), 31–58, 31-2. 
Cf. Carlos Domínguez, “El Largo Camino del Deseo,” in Los Registros del Deseo. Del Afecto, el Amor y Otras 
Pasiones (Bilbao: DDB, 2001), 67–88.  
32 The term individuation process was coined by the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Gustave Jung (1875 – 1961) to 
refer to the struggle for clarifying our interiority. 
33 Domínguez, “Ese Obscuro Objeto del Deseo,” 32-35. 
34 Ego is “a concept denoting man’s capacity to unify his experience and his action in an adaptive manner.” 
Erik. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), 15. The Id is the 
unconscious and the Superego is our expected ideal of ourselves. 
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reached, we can assess the maturity of the person. Following Domínguez in his Freudian 
studies, we can say that mature identity has been reached when the Ego has achieved a 
healthy balance in tension with the Id and the Superego in its relation to the external world.  
However, it should be noted that this relation is not just any balance, but a healthy 
one.35 The healthy relation of the Ego and the Superego supposes the handling of the drive 
dimension’s impulses by rational control and adaptation to reality, rather than by unconscious 
defense mechanisms upon the Ego, the Id; repression, above all. This apparently theoretical 
result corresponds to the observation of the behavioral patterns of the individual, especially 
in relation to the two main behavioral spheres of human life: personal relationships and work. 
Therefore, a mature identity converges both the ability to establish stable and trusting 
relationships, as well as the capacity to work in a reliable and committed manner. 
2.1.2. Psychosocial Perspective: Erik H. Erikson36 
Until the 1940’s, Psychoanalysis seemed not to be refuted by different psychological 
perspectives, however, since then Erikson has complemented the predominant psychosexual 
explanation with psychosocial development.37 He says “Freud could take certain 
fundamental principles for granted; and with morality, cultural identity.”38 
Erikson assumes the main results of psychoanalysis: every human being is equal 
because they have the same internal conflicts; libido is the driving energy that explains 
continuity and configures the human structures in the psychological development of human 
                                                          
35 Carlos Domínguez, “Místicos y Profetas: Dos Identidades Religiosas,” Proyección 48 (2001): 339–66. Here 
Prof. Domínguez discusses these two dimensions with the two religious modes of life, mystical and prophetical. 
36 Erik H. Erikson (1902 – 1994) is a German American psychologist who studied human psychosocial 
development. Here we follow Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed. This book is a further synthesis of what had 
mainly been published in Childhood. 
37 Cf. Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 15. 
38 Erikson, Childhood, 281. 
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identity; and he also admits the ambivalence of the conscious and unconscious world to 
explain human behavior. However, Erikson observed that psychoanalysis is oriented toward 
“an ego-synthesis only for the individual.”39 Psychoanalysis’ main object of study is the 
internal battle, while the external reality -- whether social or material, is treated as an alien 
element (“outerworld”) with which to struggle for adaptation.40 Nor does he agree with the 
understanding of the human being as the one who adapts through gratification to compensate 
for anxieties and for transforming their drives.41 By comparison, Erikson devotes a 
“systematic attention to the role of the self in the relationship between individuality and 
communality.”42 For him, pregenitality is not only a function of genitality -- as Freud thought 
-- but has a psychosocial dimension “in the ecology -- both healthy and sick -- of the 
individual life cycle -- and in the cycle of generations.”43 
 There are three fundamental principles to understand Erikson’s theory: The first is 
found in his studies on the breeding of the Indian Sioux and of the Yurok. The former tribe 
used to hunt across the prairie but now apathy evidence of social failure can be observed 
among the children in the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in Nebraska (South Dakota).44 The 
latter is a tribe of fisherman based along the Klamath River which flows the Pacific coast of 
                                                          
39 Erik. H. Erikson, El Ciclo de la Vida Completado (México: Paidós, 1988), 27. “It is shifting its emphasis 
from the concentrated study of the conditions which blunt and distort the individual ego to the study of the ego’s 
roots in social organization.” Erikson, Childhood, 15-6. 
40 “Thus, our proud ego, which Freud calls ‘frontier creature,’ ‘owes service to three masters and is consequently 
maned by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-
ego.” Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id,” in Standard Edition (London--New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 
12–66, 19, quoted by Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 18-9. Cf. Erikson, Childhood, 277-84. 
41 In particular, Erikson refers to the theory of Anna Freud and cites one of her major works, Anna Freud, The 
Ego and the Mechanism of Defense (New York: International Universities Press, 1966). “The ego is victorious 
when its defensive measures enable it to develop the development of anxiety and so transform the instinct that, 
even in difficult circumstances, some measures or gratification is secure, thereby establishing the most 
harmonious relation between the id, the super-ego and the forces of the outside world.” Idid., quoted by Erikson, 
The Life Cycle Completed, 18, (Erikson does not refer to the page.) 
42 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 16. 
43 Erikson, El Ciclo de la Vida, 27. 
44 Cf. Erikson, Childhood, 114-65. 
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California.45 By reflecting on an apathetic disposition observed in both tribes, Erikson 
observed that the environment of their children, especially the way in which maternal care 
was exercised in the early years, was what oriented their identity to be able to adapt to the 
habitat, the Sioux as hunters and the Yurok as fishermen. Likewise, the balance of the 
community, which is inevitably “subjected to changing technological and historical 
conditions,”46 is critically dependent upon children’s adaptation. This is the reason why 
Erikson affirms that there are three fundamental organizational processes: the soma, the 
psyche, and the ethos.47 These contribute at all times to the unique psychosocial development 
of the individual. The soma is what experiences the libidinal forces and it needs to reach an 
internal hierarchical order; the psyche is the cognitive center subjected of the conscious and 
the unconscious and it needs to organize the experiences to find an “existential identity”; 48 
and the ethos refers to what is inscribed within the rhythms and sociocultural forms that make 
the human experience possible. Each of these organisms must evolve in a proper relation to 
reach an identity, however, when they are subjected to failure they suffer accordingly 
“somatic tension, individual anxiety, or social panic.”49 
The second fundamental principle corresponds with Erikson’s hermeneutic. He 
named it the epigenetic principle; a name that was taken from embryology. This 
hermeneutical principle must be latent at any time when we are approaching his theory. As 
Erikson does, we will explain the epigenetic principle with the next table (Table 1)50: 
                                                          
45 Cf. Ibid., 166-94. 
46 Erikson, El Ciclo de la Vida, 27. 
47 Cf. Ibid., 29-30. 
48 Erik H. Erikson, “Major Stages of Psychosocial Development,” in The Life Cycle Completed (New York, 
NY: W. W. Norton, 1998), 55–82, 73. 
49 Erikson, “Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations,” 28-9. 
50 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 28. 
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Stage III 1III 2III 3III 
Stage II 1II 2II 3II 
Stage I 1I 2I 3I 
 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
Table 1: Epigenetic principle 
Stages I, II, and III correspond to the gradual and sequential ascension through which 
the process must be evolving to accomplish a cycle of life, for instance. However, Stage II is 
not reached in a neat way, by isolating itself from Stage I and without aspiring to Stage III, 
but rather it is reached gradually in time, in parts (Part 1, 2, and 3), and without ceasing to be 
related to the other states, earlier or later. According to Erikson, this relationship between 
states and parties is known as “relativity.”. The diagonal in bold (1I, 2II y 3III) indicates the 
stable or culminated states of the expected cycle. This cycle (1I, 2II y 3III) is gradually 
achieved over time, when the necessary and critical relativities of the whole set necessary to 
advance to the next state is reached. According to this, 2I -- which is below the diagonal -- 
represents that effort: with the predominance of 2II upwards and with the 3I horizontally, the 
critical level necessary for achieving the stable state 2II is not ready yet.  
Third, a community (it depends on the stage: family, school, society -- see below) 
contains the minimum ethos which nourishes the ego. This means that there are innate 
patterns inscribed within that community, which are acting more or less unconsciously on 
the individual. Erikson calls these patterns or mechanisms of ritualization. For Erikson, in 
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the uses of language are found the highest level of ritualization.51 And this is why he reflects 
on those uses, for instance between trust and fidelity.52 
Beyond this, Erikson’s psychosocial theory states that the cycle of life is completed 
in eight stages: infancy, early childhood, play age, school age, adolescence, young adulthood, 
adulthood, old age.53 Each stage corresponds with a struggle between two opposite forces in 
order to reach a capacity. For instance, in infancy, the capacity that emerges from the 
resolution of the conflict between basic trust and basic mistrust is hope. This conflict is what 
Erikson designates by psychological crisis. The next table (Table 2)54 shows us the epigenetic 
representation of these eight crises. Capital letters mean the strength resulting from the 
correspondent conflict: 
                                                          
51 “If we accept the proposition that ritualization is one link between developing egos and the ethos of their 
communality, living languages must be considered one of the most outstanding forms of ritualization in that 
they express both what is universally human and what is culturally specific in the values conveyed by ritualized 
interplay.” Erikson, “Major Stages,” 58. 
52 Cf. Ibid., 60. He even says: “Thus, trust and fidelity are linguistically as well as epigenetically related.” 
53 Cf. Erikson. The author explains the eight stages of life in pursuing the capacities correspond to the accurate 
one. Cf. Erikson, Childhood, 247-74. The great novelty between these two books is that in the former Erikson’s 
explanation begins from old age, whereas in the latter it begins from infancy. As he says: “La adultez es, después 
de todo, el vínculo con las nuevas generaciones.” “Comienzo mi tratamiento por el ultimo, la vejez, para 
averiguar en qué medida el ciclo vital completado puede dar sentido a toda la trayectoria de la vida.” Erikson, 
El Ciclo de la Vida, 11.  
54 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 57-8. 
Old Age (VIII) 
       
Integrity 
vs. 
Disgust 
WISDOM 
Adulthood (VII) 
      
Generativity 
vs. 
Stagnation 
CARE 
 
Young Adulthood 
(VI) 
     
Intimacy 
vs. 
Isolation 
LOVE 
 
 
Adolescence (V) 
    
Identity vs. 
Identity 
Confusion 
FIDELITY 
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Table 2: Epigenetic Representation of Psychological Crises 
According to the epigenetic hermeneutic, when a capacity is reached it becomes, in 
turn, a condition to sustain the next one. Also the capacity is widened and perfected in hoping 
for the next. Thus, as the first capacity is hope, for Erikson, every next capacity will be rooted 
in hope.55 Hope means “expected desire”56 and “seems to be related even to ‘hop’ which 
means leap.”57 He devotes some beautiful lines to explain the presence of hope in every stage, 
from the seeking of integrity in the last stage passing through expectation of intimacy in 
young adulthood, and so on.58 For instance, the basic community in infancy is the maternal 
figure through which attachment is nurtured. Attachment, in turn, constitutes the basis for 
good self-esteem, the future capability of industry, and intimacy. In adolescence the capacity 
is fidelity: 
[Fidelity] maintains a strong relation both to infantile trust and to mature faith. As it transfers 
the need for guidance from parental figures to mentors and leaders, fidelity eagerly accepts 
                                                          
55 To say it the other way around, “infant’s hope already has some ingredient that will gradually grow to become 
faith [under the form of will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom].” Erikson, “Major Stages,” 
78. 
56 Ibid., 59 
57 Ibid., 60. 
58 Ibid. Cf. Erikson, Childhood, 247-74. 
School Age (IV) 
   
Industry vs. 
Inferiority 
COMPETENCE 
   
 
Play Age (III) 
  
Initiative 
vs. Guilt 
PURPOSE 
    
 
Early Childhood 
(II) 
 
Autonomy 
vs. Shame, 
Doubt 
WILL 
     
 
Infancy (I) 
Basic Trust 
vs. Basic 
Mistrust 
HOPE 
      
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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their ideological mediatorship -- whether the ideology is one implicit in a “way of life” or a 
militantly explicit one.59 
Erikson says: “hope connotes the most basic quality of ‘I’-ness, without which life 
could not begin or meaningfully end.”60 However, in order to fully grasp the understanding 
of this assertion, we need to bring into the scene the three organisms which entail the shaping 
of the ego: the soma, the psyche, and the ethos. These three organizational processes work 
on the already mentioned system. In Table 361 (page #24) we can see the connections: row A 
with the soma; rows C, F, G and H with the ethos; and rows D and E with the psyche. Each 
process is subject to being distorted toward a failure or a pathology. To give an example, 
Erikson defines adolescence as “the age mediating between childhood and adulthood”62 
when crisis of identity takes place. In adolescence, fidelity emerges as a result of the conflict 
between identity and identity confusion.  
[‘The core concept of individual psychology’ is the self’ that is] a pervasive sense of identity 
[which] brings into gradual accord the variety of changing self-images that have been 
experienced during childhood (and that, during adolescence, can be dramatically 
recapitulated) and the role opportunities offering themselves to young persons for selection 
and commitment. On the other hand, a lasting sense of self cannot exist without a continuous 
experience of a conscious ‘I’ which is the numinous center of existence: a kind of existential 
identity, then, which […] in the ‘last line’ must gradually transcend the psychosocial one.63 
The process of the self does not always happen in ascending fashion; there may be 
some semi-intentional regressions in order to regain some essential hope from previous 
stages.64 Also, the antithesis of fidelity, role repudiation, is a possibility: “an active and 
selective drive separating roles and values that seem workable in identity formation from 
                                                          
59 Erikson, “Major Stages,” 73. 
60 Ibid., 62. 
61 Erikson, “Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations,” 32-3. 
62 Erikson, “Major Stages,” 60. 
63 Ibid., 73. (Italics in the original.) 
64 Ibid., 60. 
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what must be resisted of fought as alien to the self.”65 In this line, a partially negative identity 
is always present but this may become pathologic under “the form of systematic defiance.”66  
In summary, the process of identity formation emerges as an evolving configuration -- a 
configuration that gradually integrates constitutional givens, idiosyncratic libidinal needs, 
favored capacities, significant identifications, affective defenses, successful sublimations, 
and consistent roles. All these, however, can only emerge from a mutual adaptation of 
individual potentials, technological world views, and religious or political ideologies.67 
Erikson at some point makes the relation between his theory and the three theological 
virtues:   
If developmental consideration lead us to speak of hope, fidelity, and care as human strength  
or ego qualities emerging from such strategic stages as infancy, adolescence, and adulthood 
it should not surprise us  (though it did when we became aware of it) that they correspond to 
such major credal values as hope, faith, and charity.68
                                                          
65 Ibid., 73. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 74. Cf. Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 83-120. 
68 Erikson, “Major Stages,” 58. 
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Table 3: Three Organism on the Self 
 
Stages 
A 
 
Psychosocial 
Stages and Modes 
B 
 
Psychosocial 
Crisis 
C 
Radius of 
Significant 
Relations 
D 
 
Basic Social 
Strengths 
E 
Core-Pathology 
Basic 
Antipathies 
F 
Related 
Principles of 
Social Order 
G 
Binding 
Ritualiza- 
tions 
H 
 
 
Ritualism 
I  
Infancy 
Oral-Respiratory, 
Sensory- 
Kinesthetic 
(Incorporative 
Modes) 
Basic Trust 
vs. Basic 
Mistrust 
Maternal 
Person 
 
Hope Withdrawal Cosmic Order Numinous Idolism 
II  
Early 
Childhood 
Anal-Urethral, 
Muscular 
(Retentive- 
Eliminative) 
Autonomy vs. 
Shame, Doubt 
Parental 
Persons 
Will Compulsion 
“Law and 
order” 
Judicious Legalism 
III Play Age 
Infantile-Genital, 
Locomotor 
(Intrusive, 
Inclusive) 
Initiative vs. 
Guilt 
Basic Family Purpose Inhibition 
Ideal Proto- 
types 
Dramatic Moralism 
IV  
School Age 
“Latency” 
 
Industry vs. 
Inferiority 
“Neighbor- 
hood,” 
School 
Competence 
 
Inertia 
Technological 
Order 
Formal 
(Technical) 
Formalism 
V 
Adolescence 
Puberty 
 
Identity vs. 
Identity Con- 
fusion 
Peer Groups 
and 
Outgroups; 
Models of 
Leadership 
 
Fidelity Repudiation 
Ideological 
Worldview 
Ideological Totalism 
VI  
Young 
Adulthood 
Genitality 
 
Intimacy vs. 
Isolation 
Partners in 
friendship, 
sex, 
competition, 
cooperation 
Love 
Exclusivity 
 
Patterns of 
Cooperation 
and 
Competition 
Affiliative Elitism 
VII 
Adulthood 
(Procreativity) 
 
Generativity 
vs. Stagnation 
Divided 
Labor 
and shared 
household 
Care Rejectivity 
Currents of 
Education 
and 
Tradition 
Generational Authoritisrn 
VIII  
Old Age 
(Generalization of 
Sensual Modes) 
Integrity vs. 
Despair 
“Mankind” 
 
Wisdom 
 
Disdain Wisdom Philosophical Dogmatism 
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2.1.3. Cognitive Psychological Perspective: Lawrence Kohlberg 
Another refutation to psychoanalysis came from cognitive psychology in the 
1960’s.69 Jean Piaget (1896 — 1980) is one of the initiators of this new predominant school.70 
Piaget studied the intellectual and mental development of children from a biological and 
empirical point of view, but he did not accept the psychoanalytic line. He displayed a genetic 
epistemology.71 Piaget considered that the moralization process of the individual does not 
consist only of “a process of internalizing culturally given by external rules through rewards, 
punishments, or identification, [as psychoanalysis states. But] internal moral standards are 
rather the outcome of a set of transformations of primitive attitudes and conceptions.”72 
Accordingly, Piaget set up the theory of cognitive development in conjunction with a new 
methodology based on flexibility and personalization -- this means that depending on 
students’ answers, the interview is led in one direction of another. This was compiled in his 
acclaimed book The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932).  
Our interest, however, focuses on one of his followers, Lawrence Kohlberg.73 This 
Harvard scholar studies the states of moral development of the person using Piaget’s method 
                                                          
69 Barry J. Wadsworth, Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive and Affective Development: Foundations of 
Constructivism, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1996). This book offers a guide to Piaget’s studies, as well 
as some implications and application of Piaget’s theories. For a brief history of childhood development theories 
see Naomi J. Petersen, “Child Development Theories,” ed. Fenwick W. English, Encyclopedia of Educational 
Leadership and Administration (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Reference, 2006). To find a related explanation 
on Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories see Ronald Duska and Mariellen Whelan, Moral Development. A Guide to 
Piaget and Kohlberg (New York: Paulist Press, 1975), chapters one and two. 
70 The psychology of cognitive development is a branch of experimental basic psychology which studies 
cognitive processes, such as learning, intelligence, memory, attention, perception, reasoning, and motivation 
among others. Cf.  Wadsworth, Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive. 
71 Piaget was neither focused on behavior, as psychology does, nor on teaching, as pedagogy does. For him, the 
aim was “the growth and development of intellectual structures and knowledge.” “Genetic epistemology is the 
science of how knowledge is acquired.” Ibid., 1. 
72 Lawrence Kohlberg, “The Development of Children’s Orientations Toward a Moral Order,” Vita Humana 6 
(1963): 11–33, 11. Also, Erikson casts doubts on the Freudian moralization process which forgot cultural 
contribution to identity: “Freud could take certain fundamental principles of morality for granted; and with 
morality, cultural identity.” Erikson, Childhood, 281. 
73 L. Kohlberg is professor of social psychology at Harvard University. He has not yet written a book but has 
published his work through articles and we will follow Kohlberg, “The Development of a Moral Order.” Here, 
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of intervention, but whereas Piaget was interested in general intellectual stages of 
development, Kohlberg studies moral stages and also revises some of Piaget’s conclusions.  
Kohlberg states that there are six stages of development in moral thought, which in 
turn are classified into three moral levels: pre-moral level, morality of conventional role-
conformity, and morality of self-accepted moral principles. This classification is based on 
two criteria, the cognitive aspect of morality and motivations.74 The next table (Table 4) 
summarizes his theory: 
Level III: Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles (Explicitly Moral: Beyond Egoistic Impulse) 
Type 6. Morality of Individual 
Principles of Conscience 
Rational Decisions Based on Moral Principles 
Type 5. Morality of Contract and 
of Democratically Accepted Law 
Rational Decisions According to Social Sanctioned Realities 
Level II: Morality of Conventional Role Conformity (Preadolescents: Social-Material Role-Taking ) 
Type 4. Authority Maintaining 
Morality 
Autonomous Morality: Right, Assigned Duties, and Rules 
Type 3. Good-boy Morality of 
Maintaining Good Relations, 
Approval of Others 
Autonomous Morality: Mutual Respect and Intentionality 
Level I: Pre-Moral (Childhood: Lack of Cognitive Resources in Differencing Moral Concepts from 
Punishment) 
Type 2. Naïve Instrumental 
Hedonism 
Beginnings of Autonomous: Conscious Hedonism: Ego-need and 
Reciprocity 
Type 1. Punishment and 
Obedience Orientation 
Heteronomous and Hedonism: Following Classified and Fixed Rules 
Table 4: Kohlberg’s Six Stages of Moral Development (Personal adaptation) 
  Level I meets with Piaget’s heteronomous state, where rules are fixed by an 
authority, but Kohlberg disagrees with Piaget’s explanation. Piaget, similar to Freud’s 
understanding of morality as superego, states that children follow commandments because 
of their “strong idealized moral respect for adult authority.”75 In contrast, Kohlberg argues 
                                                          
Kohlberg explains his theory by making a comparison with Piaget’s developmental states theory. Kohlberg first 
presents the group of children studied (fifty interviewed every three years for a period of eighteen years), the 
method, and the tabled results. We are not going to focus on that but rather on the understanding his theory.  
74 “The typology rests upon 30 different general aspects of morality which the children brought into their 
thinking.” Ibid., 14. However, these 30 aspects can be then grouped in two main categories, cognitive 
development and motivation.  
75 Ibid., 21. 
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that “good or bad [is set] according to the reward or punishment,”76 which is expected from 
an older figure.  The difference between Type 1 and Type 2 lies in the reasoning -- still 
focused on the ego, rather than on other’s teachings or value itself. Type 2 performs a more 
conscious hedonism. In this way of thinking: “(Why should someone be a good son?) ‘Be 
good to your father and he’ll be good to you.’”77   
Level II is reached once the cognitive development is able to understand moral 
concepts differently from mere rewards or punishments, around preadolescence (8-12-years-
old). On the other hand, level II is favored by a larger and more communal interaction, which 
makes egocentrism decline by realizing the value of otherness -- mutual respect. Thus, while 
Type 1 and Type 2 act to avoid the painful effects of disapproval by authority, Type 3 and 
Type 4 try to guess what will be the reaction of a legitimate authority, disapproval or not. It 
should be remarked that “the preadolescent is bothered only by disapproval if the disapproval 
is expressed by legitimate authorities [‘but not by peers’].”78 There is intentionality and a 
sensitivity to self-guidance by role-taking judgments,79 but not yet within the explicitly moral 
domain. It is a material decision mainly determined by shared social attitudes.80 Finally, the 
difference between Type 3 and Type 4 comes from the matter of justification. Type 3 judges 
based on natural affections of social shame; for instance, “[if you did that,] people would 
think you came from a family that didn’t care about what you did.”81 In comparison, Type 4 
                                                          
76 Ibid., 22. 
77 Ibid., 23. 
78 Ibid., 25-6. 
79 Role-taking judgment means that the person makes a moral decision, putting on the shoes of the victim. 
Kohlberg uses role-taking terms in the section related to Level II. Cf. Ibid., 24-7. 
80 Cf. Ibid., 25 
81 Ibid., 27. 
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judges based on “rights, assigned duties, and rules”82; for instance, consider “if you worked 
for something and someone just came along and stole it.”83 
Level III overcomes some psychological assumptions, which consider that there is no 
room for moral decisions beyond the conflict of community-egotism. Thus, this possibility 
of distance from egoistic impulse is the main difference between Type 3 and Type 4. Type 5 
and Type 6 want to make rational decisions and assume that one must choose between 
conflicting norms. Type 6 judges according to moral principles,84 such as “the utilitarian 
principle (the greatest good for the greatest number) and Kant’s categorical imperative,” 85 
whereas Type 5 judges according to social sanctioned realities -- different from social ideals 
which constitute moral principles -- such as “legal or institutional rules.”86 
In conclusion, Kohlberg suggests that there is an invariable sequence of six states for 
the moral development of the person. Type 1 corresponds to a child whereas Type 6 
corresponds to people like Sir Thomas More, Mahatma Gandhi, or Martin Luther King Jr.87 
Moreover, the progress through this moral sequence depends, on the one hand, on the growth 
of the individual, especially in terms of cognitive development and interaction with others. 
On the other hand, there must be a gradual transformation of attitudes, as well as an 
understanding of moral concepts -- it is not enough to learn a number of moral principles. 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 “A moral principle is an obligatory or ideal rule of choice between legitimate alternatives, rather than a 
concrete prescription of action.” John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, American Science Series (New York: 
Holt, 1932), quoted by Kohlberg, “The Development of a Moral Order,” 28 (the author does not mention the 
page). 
85 Kohlberg, “The Development of a Moral Order,” 28. 
86 Ibid., 59. 
87 Cf. Duska and Whelan, A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg, 78-9. 
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Let us recap a little. One of the key words we have used up to this point has been 
development: psychosexual development in Freud, psychosocial development in Erikson, 
and moral development in Kohlberg. The temporal and evolutionary dimension of the human 
being and, in particular, of identity in the conquest of maturity is clear, however, we have not 
yet talked about how time itself, or human’s relation with time affects its existential level, 
that is, at the level of conscience, sensitivity, and disposition toward life and the living world 
(echoing Martin Heidegger). Mary Warnock will address this issue. 
2.1.4. Philosophical Perspective: Mary Warnock 
The British scholar Mary Warnock (1924 —) is interested in ethics and philosophy 
of the mind. Regarding the theory of knowledge, she has three main books Imagination88 
(1976), Memory89 (1987), and Imagination and Time90 (1994). In the latter, she implements 
the results of Imagination and Memory to explain the formation and nature of human identity. 
For Warnock, the notion of identity is biological essential and linked to the memory 
which, in turn, has been formed in a concrete space-time continuum. Memory and, therefore, 
identity is not a specifically human property, but is shared by all animals. However, in 
evolution, the human being reached a physiology and a cerebral level and language that allow 
him to access the intelligibility of things; in particular, the intelligibility (self-consciousness) 
of its permanence in time. This gives human identity a special complexity that must be 
revealed by narrating our autobiography. 
                                                          
88 Mary Warnock, Imagination (London: Faber and Faber, 1976). 
89 Mary Warnock, Memory (London: Faber and Faber, 1987). 
90 Mary Warnock, Imagination and Time (Oxford--Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994). The ultimate goal of 
this book is to reflect on the notion of personal immortality. However, she also develops the notion of personal 
identity and the role that imagination plays in its life through a magnificent journey on “the history of ideas” -- 
as she refers to her book -- in seven out of nine chapters. 
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But before going further in the explanation of Warnock’s understanding of identity, 
it is necessary to explain this philosopher’s theory of knowledge in which imagination, 
sympathy, value, and common sense play key roles. 
2.1.4.1. Theory of Knowledge: Imagination 
Warnock’s theory of knowledge is not a pure realism,91 but she does maintain a 
continuum with reality that allows us to access the truth of “things.” It is not a pure realism 
because Warnock assumes our singularity in our process of knowing things, due to our 
genetic and historical-experiential identity. However, it is not a singularity that exaggerates 
the “for me” that leads to a relativism or skepticism and Warnock believes that such 
exaggeration would hinder the possibility of dialogue -- since we do not understand the same 
way, nor can we accept the other’s opinion -- and would lead to isolation.92 There are two 
main arguments: 
First, there is no inner-outer dualism, as was collaterally held by Descartes through 
his soul-body anthropological division.93 “Things” do not exist because “I” think them; they 
are not a function of my thought, but, following Merleau-Ponty, in perception there is a 
continuum with the thing,94 and this perception occurs in our mind as thought through 
                                                          
91 This theory holds that we know the thing itself. For instance, David Hume states that we receive pure 
impressions from outside. Warnock devotes the four chapters of Imagination and Time to discuss with 
Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, among others, her theory of knowledge.  Cf. 
Warnock, Imagination and Time, 1-86.   
92 She even claims it as a “destructive relativism.” Ibid., 94.   
93 Warnock claims “that imagination can dissolve what had seemed to Descartes and his successors the insoluble 
problem of the relation between the inner and the outer, the mental and the corporeal.” Ibid., 21. 
94 “The significance of a thing inhabits that thing, as the soul inhabits the body: it is not behind the appearance.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 
Humanities Press, 1962), 31, quoted by Warnock, Imagination and Time, 69. Warnock says: “According to 
Merleau-Ponty, the apprehension of this significance is an integral part of perception. We have no need to 
ascribe it to any particular intellectual faculty. There is no need to invoke, as Hume did, the concept of 
imagination to fulfil this function.” Ibid., 67. However, she objects to the latter because Merleau-Ponty leaves 
a vagueness when he speaks about “interpretation,” and “grasping a meaning” in order to explain personal views 
of things or happenings. Cf. Ibid. 70-1. 
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imagination, following Kant. Imagination is that which accesses things, whether they are in 
front of ourselves, in the past (i.e. memories), have never existed (fantasy) or not yet existent 
(hopes). She even argues that human knowledge can access, in a particular way, the rest of 
human beings as an object of knowledge, because of the affinity of their own species and 
here, Warnock follows Wittgenstein.95 She refers to perceiving, for example, when the other 
person is tired or feels afraid. That is why she calls this imagination disposed toward the 
intelligibility of reality “sympathy” which includes the other human beings with whom we 
share this intelligence.96 
The problem that the history of philosophy encounters with imagination is the need 
to distinguish truth from fantasy. Warnock does not settle the question, since she objects that 
the next criterion from Hume is insufficient: “The only difference lies in their relative force 
or vivacity.”97 Nevertheless, she does delimit the issue when referring to the rationality and 
the plausibility of events. Following John Casey, Warnock sets the example of water in a 
lake: How is water preserved? Because of the underground flow of the waters or because of 
a spaceship that comes at night to fill the lake? We do not see either of them, but one is “far-
                                                          
95 Warnock follows Wittgenstein in his discussion on “seeing an aspect” and “seeing as.” Wittgenstein reflects 
on the difference between “It is a cat” and “he is sad.” Warnock says: “The concept of an aspect is akin to the 
concept of an image. In other words: the concept ‘I am now seeing it as…’ is akin to ‘I am now having this 
image.’ Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one is 
perceiving something in so hearing it.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1963), 193-214, 212, quoted by Warnock, Imagination and Time, 71. 
96 In the same line, but from the study of evolution theory, Elizabeth Johnson argues that according to 
Darwinism, the living creature is a result of the cumulative history of creation. Living creatures are the 
embodied memory of this gradual, interconnected, physical-chemical, and historical process. The human being 
is a co-creature, but different from other creatures. Human uniqueness lies in being a conscious being. Human 
beings are, therefore, subjects of responsibility for what surrounds them. Their uniqueness makes them no less, 
no more (in terms of nature) than other creatures, but capable of consciously living life as a “brother/sister,” as 
a people. This deployed capacity is what Johnson calls “ecological vocation.” Cf. Johnson, Ask the Best, 281-
4. 
97 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 20. 
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fetched,” to use Casey’s term, whereas the first is more credible and belongs to a shared 
presumption referred to as common sense.98 
The second argument comes from the philosophy of language (Wittgenstein) and 
existentialism (Sartre). The human being not only perceives things, but can communicate 
them to others in such a way that they are understood; for example, when we say “red table” 
or “headache” we access a shared common schema. This happens because things are 
identified in a symbolic reality, not only materiality.99 That is, reality is given in an 
intelligible way. Symbols are mediated through cultural context, although there are natural 
and arbitrary symbols with the latter requiring certain teaching, as is the case with a crucifix, 
whereas the former are grasped “because of something in their own intrinsic nature.”100 But 
still more, there are objects of knowledge that are natural symbols and overcome the temporal 
context; Warnock calls them values. There are moral values (honesty, good and evil, etc.) 
and other values, “such as love and hatred, fear and confidence, creativity and intellectual 
excitement, curiosity and the wish of truth.”101 Values are encapsulated in stories and 
transmitted through them, whether fantastic (i.e. The Odyssey) or with historical narratives, 
including history itself. That is why Warnock states that values remain over generations and, 
thus, they are universal.102 
To end this section and, because of its importance for this work, let us recap 
Warnock’s assumptions on imagination: 
                                                          
98 Warnock refers to John Casey, The Language of Criticism (London: Methuen, 1966). Cf. Warnock, 
Imagination and Time, 75-7. 
99 Warnock restates Samuel T. Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual (Burlington: C. Goodrich, 1832) by saying: 
“The symbol cannot be entirely separated from that which it symbolizes.” Warnock, Imagination and Time, 81. 
100 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 79. 
101 Ibid., 188. 
102 Cf. Ibid., 87-108, 87. 
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Firstly, imagination is a function of the brain that involves the whole body and transforms 
impressions into living ideas: 
[Imagination] is a power in the human mind which is at work in our everyday perception of 
the world, and is also at work in our thoughts about what is absent; which enables us to see 
the world, whether present or absent as significant, and also to present this vision to others, 
for them to share or reject. And this power, though it gives us “thought-imbued” perception 
(it “keeps the thought alive in the perception”), is not only intellectual. Its impetus come from 
the emotions as much as from the reasons, from the heart as much as from the head.103  
Meanings spring up round us as soon as we are conscious [different from animals].104 
Secondly, it has a “role both in perception and in understanding” 105 to acquire real 
knowledge: 
Imagination is the image-forming faculty; but even if it is conceded that interpreting the 
world, seeing it one way rather than another, involves this very images-forming faculty, it 
does not follow that what we see is an image, rather than the real thing.106 
Thirdly, it is a universal human capacity but personalized by each one through life-time-
experience107: 
According to Kant’s theory, there are functions of the a priori imagination which ... are shared 
by all rational creatures, and are fixed and unalterable; they determine the application of the 
categories in the light of which we parcel up the world to make it intelligible and predictable. 
There is also, for each rational creature, an empirical imagination which will vary from one 
                                                          
103 Warnock, Imagination, 196. 
104 Ibid., 207. 
105 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 45. 
106 Warnock, Imagination, 198-9. (Italics in the original.) 
107 Warnock follows the theoretical explanation reached by Kant in what she will later explain empirically. She 
mainly goes through Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant sets out to study the limits of human knowledge. He argues that, although all human knowledge 
begins with experience, not all of it comes from experience. Thus, he identifies a priori knowledge that helps 
explain why human beings possess knowledge that is universal and necessary even if it refers to experience. 
The Critique of Judgment is Kant’s attempt to reconcile the results of the first two critiques (Critique of Pure 
Reason and Critique of Practical Reason). His strategy to do so is through the study of two kinds of judgments, 
namely, the aesthetic judgment and the teleological judgment which in turn involves the function of 
imagination. Although Kant deals with other topics related to the faculty of judgment, it is his treatment of 
aesthetics that has remained more interesting for the history of philosophy. Cf. Ibid., 13-71; also, Warnock, 
Imagination and Time, 1-64. 
34 
 
individual to another, according to what he has actually experienced in the course of his life. 
For each, it will be different from all others.108 
Finally, imagination needs to be educated in order to protect it from certain enemies: 
Besides its universal employment, the imagination has emerged, in addition, as necessarily 
connected with our emotions. And this is of the greatest importance. For if we think of 
imagination as a part of our intelligence, universally, then we must be ready to admit, that, 
like the rest of human intelligence, it needs educating; but this will now entail, if we are right, 
an education not only of the intelligence, but, going along with it, of feelings.109  
The great enemies of the imagination, in whatever field it is exercised are, on the one hand 
literalness, that is, a narrow and limited idea of the truth, and on the other hand a failure of 
historical sense -- what the historian Keith Thomas, following Lord Acton, called ‘present-
mindedness.’110 
2.1.4.2. The Nature of Our Identity: Memory and Autobiography 
Having said that, with regard to the notion of identity, Warnock begins from a 
fundamental biological observation: there is an “I” that perceives and creates a persisting 
self, a self that is capable of recognizing itself in the experiences of the past and capable of 
projecting itself into the future in order to guide itself in life. Consider the memory of the 
loss of our mother when we were seven years old; how is it possible that a person can access 
an “object” which belongs to the past and is no longer before him/her, but affects him/her as 
if she [the object which represents the mother] was really present? Another example, the case 
of a football player who is excited by imagining a play to train hard during the week in order 
to win Sunday’s game; how can we access a future which does not yet exist but is experienced 
as a real emotion? 
Warnock believes that this process involves imagination because we create a thought 
or an image of something that is not before ourselves. In the second example, imagination is 
                                                          
108 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 114. 
109 Warnock, Imagination, 202. Cf. Warnock, Imagination and Time, 187-90. 
110 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 151. 
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clearly involved, since the Sunday game does not yet exist, but this is different from a fiction 
or fantasy that has nothing tangible to do with the player’s life. (A contrast would be writing 
a story about Martians.) This imagination is associated with a self that has gestated in time 
and come in the present to experience emotions by thinking about the next football game. 
Moreover, different players will have distinctly different ways of envisioning the game, e.g. 
Tom Brady (N.E. Patriots’ quarterback) will differ from Nick Foles (Philadelphia Eagles’ 
quarterback). 
 If we now think of remembering the death of our mother, who died when we were 
seven years old, we notice that it is an event of the past; therefore, our imagination draws 
upon a kind of memory associated with our biology, since it is not a static or quantitative 
memory (e.g. the number of coins in a box), but a stored, and recreated (reimagined) “object” 
which moves our emotions, affects our reactions, and determines our way of seeing, hearing, 
and understanding. Thus, personal identity may be considered a memory related to our 
biology. In fact, Warnock believes that neither memory nor identity are exclusive aspects of 
the human being. A dog has developed a memory when it has learned the habit of faithfully 
bringing his master’s shoes in return for a caress; a parrot can be taught to repeat “Hello, how 
are you?” when it perceives the presence of a tall-moving-figure, a human; and a horse will 
have learned to avoid damage when jumping by checking for obstacles in front of him. In 
these animals there is, therefore, a continuity between the experiences lived (the first master’s 
caress, the imitation of a human sound -- “Hello…,” and the damage received when the horse 
did not avoid the obstacle) and the reactions in the present. That is what Warnock and other 
scholars call “habit” memory.111 Therefore, we can say that animals are aware of their 
                                                          
111 Ibid., 111. 
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continuity in time; they have identity. However, neither the dog, nor the parrot, nor the horse 
elaborate thoughts about themselves, though someone could object that what we hitherto 
know is limited by the fact that we cannot enter into the mind of an animal. But we can still 
assert that no animal can narrate autobiographically its identity to others and this is possible 
only in the human species.112 
In effect, in the history of evolution113 the human being reached a physiology (larynx, 
epiglottis, and the oral cavity in general) and a cerebral development (according to the theory 
of the three brains, the neo-cortex is the one that makes peculiar the homo sapiens) such that 
“the brain became capable of passing comment on its own activity. And from concepts grew 
language, and from language consciousness.”114 This, in conjunction with the possibility to 
communicate to one another, enables the appearance of an unusual complexity of body-
consciousness, regardless of persisting in time; which, in turn, results in a more complex 
identity. Such concepts and thoughts allow self-consciousness to grow and access the 
meaning of “things.” In fact, when areas of the brain’s neo-cortex or the language area  are 
injured, we observe a limitation on the human condition and although, by our affinity with 
the intelligibility of things (sympathy and common sense as above), we still recognize in 
him/her a human being, we say that he/she is “damaged.”115 
                                                          
112 Ibid., 116. 
113 This argument had its apex moment with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: 
Collins, 1960). His main biological thesis is that evolution happens in a teleological way: the gradual ascension 
of conscience of matter, from inorganic to organic matter, from it to life (bacteria), and from life to more 
complex forms of life along with more complex forms of consciousness (larva, fish, reptile, etc.) until the 
emergence of the human self-conscious. See also, Johnson, Ask the Best, 122-53. 
114 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 117. 
115 “Though his sense of identity belongs with his memory, he need not be thought to remember everything that 
he has done in order that we may ascribe his actions to him, for we can identify him as a single continuing 
member of the species without his being able consciously to remember anything at all ... If he is so totally 
amnesiac, we regard him as a damaged human.” Ibid., 126 
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Yet common sense makes us understand that the memory of human beings and that 
of animals are different. This does not mean that we do not share the basic memory of 
animals, rather that human memory becomes more complex than the previous one,116 a so 
called conscious memory, according to Warnock and other scholars.117 The new physiology, 
self-consciousness, and language make us perceive reality, wanting to order it and catch/find 
the meaning of things. Our author follows Sartre, who says: “We will not look for images, 
but rather will seek to explain the meanings which really belong to things.’”118 
Furthermore, while common sense leads us to understand that human memory (and 
animal memory in general) is different from that of the computer; Warnock does not accept 
any reductionism. Some authors believe that the “brain is a computer or that a computer could 
be constructed which would fully replicate the human brain.”119 (Warnock discusses artificial 
intelligence when dealing with Daniel Dennett.120) They argue that computers have memory 
and some a logical-mathematical calculation power and storage capacity higher than the 
human being. Also, they state that “artificial intelligence is real intelligence (though produced 
in an artificial way).”121 Warnock agrees with the latter but argues that the difference between 
an animal’s memory and a computer’s lies neither in being a place of storage, nor in the 
                                                          
116 “There are not two distinct kinds of memory; but rather that memory, being essential to any individual animal 
of whatever species, may develop in the course of evolution into something more sophisticated, as animals 
themselves develop. What we are talking about is physiology or morphology; and physiology, unlike physics, 
is an essentially historical subject.” Ibid., 112 
117 “Conscious memory or something specially allocated to the past, which is purely mental, which belongs to 
the inner life of humans and of them alone, and which is a matter of thoughts, images and, perhaps, meanings.” 
Ibid., 111. 
118 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London: Routledge, 
1969), 600, quoted by Warnock, Imagination and Time, 63. 
119 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 118. 
120 Warnock deals with reductionism and artificial intelligence in Warnock, Imagination and Time, 117-24. The 
main reference is Daniel Dennett, “Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain,” in Brainstorms: 
Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, 1st ed. (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), 190–223.  
121 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 121. 
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power of calculation, but in biology: an animal’s memory is affected and somehow modified 
(see Kant’s theory below) by the exercise of knowledge itself.122 Not only are cognitive 
structures affected, but also the self itself.123  
The issue of pain management provides a good test example. Dennett argues that it 
would be possible to design a machine capable of feeling pain, but Warnock replies that the 
key is not creating a machine that can react “when kicked” by measuring the force of impact, 
but the significance that pain is given in our self-memory. Warnock is surprised when 
Dennett argues that the problem is that we have a wrong concept of pain and that machines 
will help us better understand its meaning.124 
In sum, Warnock develops a “kind of empirical theory [‘biological theory’] of brain-
function [‘suggested theoretically by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason’]” and states that: 
It is the developing categorizing function of the brain that, in humans, develops so highly that 
it gives rise to self-awareness and to language, in terms of which the universe of each 
individual is recognized as a shared and universally intelligible universe, intelligible, that is, 
to all members of the same species … Kant distinguished the a priori self, the “vehicle of all 
concepts” about which nothing could be said, from the empirical self, who in the already 
                                                          
122“It is quite possible to agree with this [‘artificial intelligence is real intelligence, though produced in an 
artificial way,’], but still to be dubious about reductionism. For intelligence in a human, or any other animal, is 
not and cannot be an isolated function. We exercise our intelligence on that which we perceive and then reflect 
upon. But none of these perceptions or reflections are without emotional concomitants. Categories are framed, 
and applied, in conjunction with values.” Ibid., 121. 
123 Warnock makes the comparison with the way that the immune system functions and takes this example from 
Gerald Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1992). 
“The importance of such a model of the brain is that it does not require that information should be fed from 
somewhere into a pre-existing fixed system. Rather as antibodies are formed, even when quite unexpected and 
new viruses enter the body, if the immune system is working properly, and the system thus changes itself, so 
the system that is the brain itself develops ways of adapting to new events.” Warnock, Imagination and Time, 
113. 
124 “If and when a good physiological theory of pain is developed a robot could in principle be construed to 
instantiate it. Such advances … would probably bring in their train wide-scale changes in what we found 
intuitive about pain … in the meantime, thoughtful people would refrain from kicking such a robot.” Daniel 
Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, 1st ed. (Montgomery, VT: Bradford 
Books, 1978), 229, quoted by Warnock, Imagination and Time, 122. 
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perceived and ordered world had a particular history, and had acquired a particular set of 
concepts.125 
Romanticism tried to break Kant’s distinction and, although it was not possible to 
eliminate his theory, as we have discussed above, it did help to think about the nature of ideas 
or thoughts. Romanticism maintained that thoughts were images that had been impressed on 
our memory in such a way that they captured a new concept-meaning “for me,” the 
individual, which, in turn, is universalized as a shared human idea. Nevertheless, “the forms 
determined not only [our] aesthetic world but [our] moral sensibilities.”126 That is why 
Warnock states: “The existence of such persistent images, recollections which can in 
principle be described, is precisely what makes us inclined to say that memory is a species 
of imagination.”127 
Finally, Warnock takes one step further to describe our identity. It is not enough to 
have an identity, an animal also has one; it is not enough to be aware of it, a baby and a child 
also are; but we must know it. Warnock maintains that, since our identity is a memory -- a 
species of imagination, it is possible to narrate it as an autobiographical story.128 Even more, 
autobiography may be the natural form of our identity, given the special role that language 
played in the emergence of homo sapiens and human identity -- language is for 
communication with other homo sapiens.129 For Warnock, this autobiographical narrative not 
                                                          
125 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 132. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 “When I speak of autobiography in this connection, I mean that kind of autobiography, not especially 
common, which attempts to tell the truth about how things were, and what they were like, not in a spirit of 
boastfulness, nor in order to set the record straight about events in the public arena, but simply because the 
enterprise seems worth doing for itself.” Ibid., 127 
129 “Both space and time constitute the point of view that each of us, inevitably, adopts. The ‘I’ who perceives 
occupies a world in which continuity with past and future is part of this perception, that part contributed by 
imagination. Thus, narrative is a natural mode of thought. The instinct to impose order on chaos is immensely 
important to us, and is an essential element in the control we can exercise over the world we live in.” Ibid., 92. 
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only contains our identity, but also helps us to know ourselves better because, along the way, 
we access shared values, and thus our nature. Shared nature, as we have already said when 
talking about sympathy, values, and common sense, are inscribed in the way in which the 
human being knows. 
However, Warnock is not proposing a radical change in the understanding of identity, 
so that it diffuses into a kind of timeless metaphysical belonging to each other, with which 
to justify our moral duty with our contemporaries and even with those of the future 
generations.130 Nothing like that; such diffusion leads us to a depersonalization that would 
weaken our identity.131 Warnock was clear at the beginning and also now at the end: “What 
I will have meant all along when I used the pronoun ‘I’ was this complete living entity, body-
including-brain.”132 However, she does believe in a continuity with all human beings, 
including future generations, saying: 
We can interest ourselves in it [our assertion of continuity with the future] only by reflecting 
that those who suffer or who benefit will be, like us, human. They will then be in the same 
boat that we now are in; in this sense humanity is, as a whole, all in the boat together, 
                                                          
130 That is stated in Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1984). Parfit 
suggests changing the idea of identity to incorporate the future dimension that goes beyond the principle of 
utilitarianism that reaches only ones’ family and neighbors during the time that the body lasts. For him, future 
dimension means mainly our actions. Thus, we can incorporate a “new sense of personal responsibility” into 
our psychology by thinking about ourselves in terms of “connectedness and continuity.” “So personal identity 
…, according to Parfit, must not be thought of as a narrowly a one to one relation which, (if this makes sense), 
a relation which, as it were, confines me to my single identical body. It is rather a one/many relation, a 
connectedness between different phases of a human’s physical and psychological life, but holding equally 
between one human and many others.” “[According to Parfit,] to identify myself with a single member of the 
human species is both metaphysically naïve and morally deplorable.” Cf. Warnock, Imagination and Time, 152-
7, 154-5. Parfit’s suggestion might be thought of as an isolated idea but is not. The political idea of 
cosmopolitanism tries to conceive a new global citizenship-identity in an era of interconnectedness and 
pluralism. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, For Love of Country?, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
2002). Notice the difference between Nussbaum and Anthony Appiah, and the little platoons from Michael W. 
McConnell. See also, Kwame A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, 1st ed. (New York, 
NY: W. W. Norton, 2006). 
131 Cf. Warnock, Imagination and Time, 160. 
132 Ibid., 156 
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regardless time. The crucial factor here is that we, being human, are unique in being able to 
think in these terms.133  
In conclusion, identity is a conscious memory acquired personally during our time-
span of development, within the intelligibility of the reality that we share with mankind. This 
faculty of the brain (conscious memory) allows us to project ourselves into the future in order 
to guide ourselves in life. By narrating this self-memory in the form of autobiography, which 
by definition entails looking for the truth, we are contributing to a better personal and human 
understanding of history, which, accordingly, will transform both ourselves and history. 
2.1.5. Evaluation 
 First, with Freud we have discussed the radical experience of being separated beings 
from the moment we leave womb (I am “I” because “you” are different from me). This 
separation is experienced through a psychosexual force (libido) which appears as a frustration 
of not being able to fuse with a desired object. Moreover, the shaping of this force is rooted, 
prolonged, and lived in the critical context of the maternal-paternal care of the infant which 
configures a superego and a subconscious. Both will be manifested in our “behavioral 
identity,” to highlight the determinism which embraces psychoanalysis. 
Then, we have incorporated, with Erikson, the contribution of the social dimension 
to the formation of human individuality. (Pregenitality is not only in order to genitality; that 
is not the whole picture of becoming adult.) In Erikson’s psychosocial approach, we have 
seen how maturity is reached through a “natural” sequence of conflict resolution (hope, will, 
competence, … and wisdom). This sequence is cumulative, based on the resolution of the 
                                                          
133 Ibid., 160. 
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previous conflict and, at the origin of everything, the basic trust that something is expected 
(basic faith in hope). 
Third, we have looked at the development of the mind (Piaget), particularly aimed at 
the moral development of the person (Kohlberg). Kohlberg affirmed that there is a sequence 
of moral states which the human being must ascend so that his/her actions are not solely 
determined by impulses and these impulses, in turn, by the desire for social acceptance. For 
this to happen, both the physiological development of the cognitive in the person is necessary 
and a cognitive change, which affects our sensitivity and attitudes. Kohlberg stresses that 
maturity is related to a kind of morality, which goes beyond our world of necessities, 
including our subconscious.  
Morality presupposes that we are social beings, since it makes no sense to talk about 
morality if we are isolated. Morality presupposes the sharing of assets and values which, 
according to Warnock, are timeless, encapsulated in stories, and accessible by human 
sympathy (imagination). Now it is interesting to analyze the opposite case. If the individual 
does not sympathize with their species or with a common set of values (this means an 
exaggerated individualism of a relativist nature), then the only way to organize the common 
good would be by the (external) imposition of law based in the fear of punishment. (This is 
a further confirmation of the intimate relationship between our imagination and our 
sensitivity.) Kohlberg would situate the moral state of that person’s practical imagination 
(morality) at level II, which does not correspond yet to the expected degree of human 
maturity. 
Finally, the importance of Warnock is that she considers the very human act of 
integrating time into our existence, as well as the fundamental value that language -- 
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particularly narration -- has in the constitution of a mature person. The person not only goes 
through stages, as we have seen in Freud, Erikson, and Kohlberg, but these stages leave 
images, kept in memory form, that transform our mental and emotional structures. Warnock 
comes to say that, depending on how the integration of lived historical experiences is, this 
will be our perception of reality and our disposition toward the living world. For Warnock, 
this integration is the present self-consciousness of our past and our future, effectively it is 
our identity. By narrating our identity (autobiography) we access the truth of ourselves which 
leaves us with a sapere (Lat. wisdom), a predominant emotion, namely: the desire to live and 
commit ourselves to either life or indifference, hope or hopelessness, and so on. Regardless 
of Erikson’s theory, we could say that through autobiography is revealed the degree of 
achievement of the original deployment of basic hope. 
In conclusion, the goal of a mature identity is the living world, which is to be able to 
lead us in life in a committed and hopeful way. We say that this has been achieved if a 
sufficient physiological development of the mind has been achieved; and particularly 
important are cognitive and language development. But this necessary condition is not 
enough to describe maturity, the following aspects should also be met: 
 Self-knowledge, including certain lucidity about the subconscious. Our 
autobiography will help in this regard (see below). 
 Level of morality, driven by principles, rather than by fear of punishment or social 
rewards. 
 Ability to communicate our person on two different levels: autobiographical (in a 
personal diary, in the form of a book, before the psychologist, or to a priest) and by 
our placement in intimate relationships (friendship, fraternity, marriage). The first 
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level refers to the capacity of truth about ourselves as well as to having access to the 
fundamental emotion and values of our history (what do we feel when we look 
authentically at our person? Hope, laziness, gratitude, pity ...?).134 But as we are study 
a good humanism we advocate for gratitude and hope.  
 The second level is related to the rupture of constitutive separation (cf. 
Psychoanalysis) and the intimate level of our affections. Our autobiography should 
not be just for telling to ourselves, but for telling to someone who cares for us; this is 
what love basically is about, friendship, brother/sisterhood, fraternity, or marriage. 
Thus, mature persons live the constituent separation healthily because they have 
“learned” to establish a bridge with the other. Or according to Warnock, a mature 
person has learned to live peacefully what the human being is in this world, an 
intelligible and historical continuum that, without losing his/her autonomy, accepts 
his/her dependence on others, nature, culture, and history.135 
 The above believing in and hopeful disposition toward the living world must be 
visible and endorsed through our behavior. A person who has the ability to establish 
stable and trusting relationships as well as is committed to a life working in a reliable 
manner. 
The next image (see Figure 1) envisions what we have deployed and will be helpful 
later on. This rectangle has a good base width to height ratio which prevents it from tipping 
over when “winds” (challenges or misfortunes) come. The composition is rubber, which has 
some flexibility and is shock resistant, which means a good resilience (capacity to absorb the 
                                                          
134 This reveals that joy is not a moment but a story.  
135 Cf. Warnock, Imagination and Time, 170. 
45 
 
energy of impacts). Because of flexibility, the rectangle re-shapes after each blow. We 
imagine here the capacity of this (rubber rectangle) person to acknowledge his errors (even 
sins) and recover from them in a reconciled way. The dashed line represents the stability of 
emotions. This subject does have emotions, neither too high nor too low, but they oscillate 
under control. His resilience (flexibility combined with resistance) makes him less friable. 
The area represents the contact surface with the world which is related to the capacity for 
intimacy and stable relationships. This subject can share his story and be responsible. 
 
 
 
2.2. On Modern and Postmodern Identity 
So far we have discussed the notion of identity in order to identify the elements which 
make up a mature person. Now, we study the state of identity in the West and where its 
weakness may be located. 
2.2.1. Status of Individual Identity 
One of the key factors that characterizes the current subject is the depersonalization 
of responsibility which, from another point of view, is the loss of one’s awareness of sin. We 
are not going to opt for an explanation of secularization nor are we going to adopt a direct 
theological perspective; although both are good options, rather we will take a philosophical 
and sociological view of the reality of the postmodern subject. 
The beginning point of the postmodern era is a subject of discussion. While some 
authors like Zygmunt Bauman and Johann B. Metz say that a second modernity started in the 
Figure 1: Ideal Identity 
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1960’s, others like Michael Paul Gallagher and Nicholas Boyle place postmodernity in 1989 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The former has references the crisis of humanity of World 
War II, the Holocaust, and the subsequent revolutions of May ‘68, the hippie movement, and 
the sexual liberation movement.136 The latter references the end of the last empire, the USSR, 
opening the way to the era of globalization, which in turn was made possible by the boom of 
the Internet. Rather than choose one or the other, we can combine both into understanding 
the contemporary individual. The Holocaust will undermine the moral framework and the 
Internet will provoke a speed and an interconnectedness in economy, politics, and human 
interactions that will affect our consumption and our perception of time. 
The Polish-American sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman (1925 – 2017),137 grounds his 
horizon of the interpretation of reality on the Holocaust, Modernity and the Holocaust.138 For 
Bauman, “the experience of the Holocaust contains crucial information about the society of 
which we are members.”139 Bauman argues that the Holocaust cannot be explained as one 
more war in the history of human evil, nor as the fruit of Christian anti-Semitism in modern 
and Christian Europe (“Six million Jews were among more than 20 million people annihilated 
at Hitler’s behest”140). Nor does Bauman accept to say that “the Holocaust was a failure [of 
modernity],” but he argues that it was “a product, of [it].”141  
                                                          
136 Peter Beilharz, The Bauman Reader (Oxford--Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Bauman 
responding to Beilharz says that he [Bauman] analyzes the shift from an ethical point of view whereas the other 
stream is focused on the aesthetic perspective. Cf. Ibid. 18-24, 21. See also Peter Beilharz, ed., “From the Work 
Ethic to the Aesthetic of Consumption (1998)” (Oxford--Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 311–33.  
137 An introduction to Bauman’s thought can be found in Beilharz, The Bauman Reader, 1-29. This book 
organizes Bauman’s diverse and non-systematic teaching by themes.   
138 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
139 Ibid., XIV. 
140 Ibid., X. 
141 Ibid., 5. “I [Bauman] also suggest that it was the spirit of instrumental rationality, and its modern, 
bureaucratic form of institutionalization, which made Holocaust-style solutions not only possible, but eminently 
‘reasonable’ -- and increased the probability of their choice.” Ibid., 18. 
47 
 
The “Final solution”142 was not thought through from the beginning; the Holocaust 
happened gradually as a process of political and military engineering under the sense of 
rationality, efficiency, science, and progress -- which were the goals of Modernity.143 
Bauman having as interlocutors Raul Hilberg, Helen Fein, Hannah Arendt, Stanley Milgram, 
Max Weber, and Immanuel Levinas, among others, identifies the so called “holocaust-
style”144 as an organized bureaucratic system (“bureaucratization of rationality”) that 
universalizes rationality in a way that manages to avoid alternative irrational or mythical 
judgment on public social life, because they do not meet modern scientific rational criteria. 
In addition, in that system violence is a “rational calculus.”145 Therefore, people are involved 
in a chain of bureaucracy and a chain of obedience, which depersonalize their liability under 
the rules of that game -- the distance from the final object frees the individual from any moral 
responsibility. 
Among societal achievements in the sphere of the management of morality one needs to 
name: social production of distance, which either annuls or weakens the pressure of moral 
responsibility; substitution of technical for moral responsibility, which effectively conceals 
the moral significance of the action; and the technology of segregation and separation, which 
promotes indifference to the plight of the Other which otherwise would be subject to moral 
evaluation and morally motivated response.146 
When analyzing human identity in the era of globalization, Bauman refers to “liquid 
life” in the “modern liquid society.” He wants to highlight the brevity of options, encounters, 
jobs, ... of things in general. “Liquid life means constant self-scrutiny, self-criticism and self-
                                                          
142 “[The ‘Final solution’] was a product of routine bureaucratic procedures: means-ends calculus, budget 
balancing, universal rule application.” Ibid., 17. 
143 As we have already said, modernity is a project of the Enlightenment: progress through the use of reason; 
scientific-technical advances to demythologize the understanding of reality, including morality; a break with 
the tradition, which mainly meant liberation from the teaching of the Catholic Church. Regardless of the 
Holocaust, it is no longer nature, history, or armament that is the object of study, shaping naturalism, 
encyclopaedism, or war, but the human being itself who is the object of selection and improvement of race. 
144 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 28. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., 199. 
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censorship.”147 A continuously changing culture that appears to our sensibility as a “hybrid 
culture,” because we are sought “in not belonging: in freedom to defy and neglect the borders 
that bind the movements and choices of lesser, inferior people.”148 In that culture “[more and 
more people] live to survive (as long as possible) and to get satisfaction (as much of it as 
possible). Since the world is not their home ground and nor their property (having relieved 
themselves from the burdens of heritage ...).”149 In that world and in this way of living, 
Bauman presents identity “as a problem and as a task,”150 a task of self-realization and 
personal discovery.151 The marketing of consumption constantly appeals to us to exercise our 
freedom to be authentic in our desperate search for individuality.152 Thus, the game of self-
assertion is basically satisfied in consumption; which makes us feel “emancipated.”153  
There are two factors at stake in every identity: “the desire for freedom and the need 
for security.”154 Liquid society does not feed the “communal” dimension of security, but the 
“societal” one of sharing common goods. This may form a “false confidence”155 which can 
be maintained only by living in a permanent state of change, living as “homo eligens -- the 
‘man of choosing’ (though not the ‘man who has chosen’!), a permanently impermanent 
self.”156 Thus, there is little left of those elements that offered security such as routine, links 
to each other, loyalty to a store and a familiar schedule, etc. 
                                                          
147 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Life (Cambridge--Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 11. 
148 Zygmunt Bauman, “The Individual under Siege,” in Liquid Life (Cambridge--Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2005), 15–38, 29. 
149 Ibid., 7. 
150 Ibid., 30. 
151 “As a task, individuality is an end product of societal transformation disguised as a personal discovery.” 
Ibid., 19. 
152 “The struggle for uniqueness has now become the main engine of mass consumption.” Ibid., 24. 
153 Ibid., 26. 
154 Ibid., 30. 
155 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and Its Discontents (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 127-
47, 130. 
156 Bauman, “The Individual under Siege,” 33. 
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Surrender to the pressures of globalization tends these days to be claimed in the name of 
individual autonomy and freedom of self-assertion; but more freedom does not seem to the 
victims and collaterals casualties of globalization to be a cure for their troubles – they would 
rather trace them back to the crumbling or the forceful dismantling of the life routines and 
networks of human bonds and mutual commitments that used to support them and make them 
feel secure.157 
The same twofold previous ideas have been argued in a less dramatic and more 
organized way by the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor (1931 —): the loss of the moral 
framework that culture must offer for the formation of the subject and thus, its effects on 
identity. Taylor takes a philosophical, political, and cultural journey for the causes of this 
phenomenon, beginning in the Protestant Reformation. In his acclaimed book A Secular Age, 
he focuses on the cultural aspect in order to explain the new conditions of belief “not just in 
terms of creeds, but also in terms of differences of experience and sensibility.”158 In Sources 
of the Self he makes a thorough study of the displacement which occurred in the modern 
subject. The conclusions of this book, alleviating the weight of its technical explanations, are 
found in The Ethics of Authenticity.159 
Modern society has discovered the value of self-interest and the individual. Each 
individual has the principal and first right to self-fulfillment, in order to be happy. In fact, in 
a democracy of equality each individual has value because everyone has the same rights. 
This, which is a good in itself, has resulted in a soft relativism or a moral subjectivism. 
Respect and tolerance for the other, in which there seems to be no certainties and where all 
opinions have equal value (of course, none that come from an authority), establishes a moral 
                                                          
157 Ibid., 38. 
158 “And on this latter level [experience and sensibility], we have to take account of two important differences: 
first, there is the massive change in the whole background of belief or unbelief, that is, the passing of the earlier 
‘naïve’ framework, and the rise of our ‘reflective’ one. And secondly, we have to be aware of how believers 
and unbelievers can experience their world very differently.” Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 14. 
159 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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neutrality.160 What in another time was irrefutable (“feeling can’t determine what is 
significant”)161 appears today old-fashioned, namely a universal ethic. This excessive 
atomization of judgments takes away, therefore, part of the “heroic dimension of life,”162 
hinders the universality of the word (relationships), and leads to a social passivity that 
translates into survival and compliance with the norms.163 
Nevertheless, the previous position causes an uncertainty in our identity that makes 
us lose sympathy with others, centers us in excess (potential narcissism), and makes us 
dependent on other forms of “authority,” “shrouded with the prestige of science or some 
exotic spirituality,”164 for instance, self-help books, websites, or social-media news. There is 
an atomization and psychologization of the individual’s life as well as a fragmentation and 
instrumentalization of the society, which is no longer understood as a community but as a 
market and a bureaucratic state.165 In such a society, individuals know that they need others 
for self-fulfillment, but this is achieved through market relationships, leaving little space to 
transcend. “It is the primacy of the instrumental reason.”166 
But Taylor proposes a different understanding of individuality and authenticity. “I 
think of authenticity ... as an ideal moral.”167  
Authenticity is a facet of modern individualism, and it is a feature of all forms of 
individualism that they don’t just emphasize the freedom of the individual but also propose 
                                                          
160 Cf. Ibid., 14-5. 
161 Ibid., 37. (Italics in the original.) 
162 Ibid., 4. 
163 “Survivalism has taken the place of heroism as the admired quality.” Ibid., 16 
164 Ibid., 15 
165 “A fragmented society is one whose members find it harder and harder to identify with their political society 
as a community.” Ibid., 117. 
166 Ibid., 5, which immediately echoes Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason. 
167 Ibid., 22-3. 
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models of society … But individualism as a moral principle or ideal must offer some view on 
how the individual should live with others.168 
Accordingly, a good understanding of individualism is one that stands apart from “an 
atomism that did not recognize the ties of the community.”169 The human being needs others, 
not only instrumentally, but in the field of sentient and moral affinity (sympathy). People 
need to have others’ recognition and to share a common horizon. Recognition means that 
“my own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.”170 Seeking 
significance in life and trying to define ourselves have to happen in a background and horizon 
of things that matter. 
Horizons are given. … But more: this minimum degree of givenness, which underpins the 
importance of choice, is not sufficient as a horizon … It may be important that my life be 
chosen … but unless some options are more significant than others, the very idea of self-
choice falls into triviality and hence incoherence. Self-choice as an ideal makes sense only 
because some issues are more significant than others.171 
In conclusion, we find an identity which lacks security, but which exercises freedom 
in an ever-present attempt at fulfilment in a culture of globalization and marketization, which 
promises experiences and intimacy, but which does not provide with either the stable or 
communal elements that used to support the individual. 
Similarly, the French sociologist Gille Lipovetsky (1944 —) refers to this time as 
second modernity, characterized by consumption, leisure, and mass welfare.172 Personal 
liberation has already been achieved, so the battle of the self consists in fulfilling the right of 
happiness. Hyperconsumerist logic wants to satisfy that human longing. However, the 
relationship between happiness and ordinary life is not so easy. Two emotions characterize 
                                                          
168 Ibid., 44-5. 
169 Ibid., 25. 
170 Ibid., 48. 
171 Ibid., 39. (Italics in the original.) 
172 Here we sum up Lipovetsky from Gille Lipovetsky, La Sociedad de la Decepción. Entrevista con Bertrand 
Richard (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2008). 
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this society: deception and uncertainty. (1) Culture promises us many emotions to consume, 
but ordinary life cannot enjoy them all, so life may become tedious and disappointing. Also, 
the loss of religion as a structural element of society has provoked that the feelings of 
frustration and envy were neglected, so the referred ordinary-life deception has increased 
negativity. In fact, liberating humility no longer appears in our cultural imaginary of 
virtues.173 (2) Employment uncertainty is combined with the pressure for well-being. 
Professions change according to the logic of the market’s renewal, which in turn demands 
personal continual training and adaptability. Moreover, persons suffer from the pressure of 
productivity and efficiency, according to the hyperconsumerist logic. Finally, Lipovetsky 
emphasizes the “presentism” of the experience. The fleeting nature of news, communication 
and social media conveys emptiness when we are alone. Thus, the perception of solitude has 
increased along with the difficulty to narrate those experiences as one personal story.  
On the one hand, the three thinkers, Bauman, Taylor, and Lipovetsky converge in the 
idea that, as a result of Modernity, subjectivist morality has lost the empathy of belonging to 
a community. Also, technocentrism and hyperconsumerist logic head toward a new 
perception of time, which we may be not integrating it successfully. On the other hand, while 
                                                          
173 When we refer to humility as a source of liberation we refer to a virtue that leads us to an appreciation of 
life. The one who never has enough, the one who wants everything today, the one who does not accept or 
understand the value of self-sacrifice and others’ sacrifice, does not easily find rest for their anxieties and live 
in a “race against the world.” (Similarly, Lynch speaks about “Gnostic imagination,” see Section 3.2.) What 
surrounds that person lacks value beyond being a source of material resources. The non-humble does not find 
many reasons to live in community that promotes humanism. For the non-humble, the only debt to history and 
society is the payment of taxes and compliance with laws, with the intention of avoiding problems. However, 
the humble person is free from that “race against the world” and he/she appreciates what one has and what 
surrounds oneself. This person values the days, the self-sacrifice, and what others do for him/her. That person 
knows how to receive and, with the pleasure of gratitude, feels a debt greater than him/herself. The humble 
finds in reality, in history and society, a motive, a worthy and beautiful motive to continue with the commitment 
to exalt ordinary life. Humility, therefore, is not foolish -- it knows well the ambiguity of the world, the 
difficulties and confronts them -- but freedom predominates in it. 
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they depict the situation, they do not find the anthropological weakness in order to be able to 
propose something to rehabilitate the human being. This is what we study next. 
2.2.2. The Place of Weakness 
According to the Irish thinker, Michael P. Gallagher (1939 — 2015), current 
anthropological confusion entails a “postmodern crisis of imagination, disposition or 
sensibility,” because a culture of images has been educating people more powerfully than at 
any previous time in history.174 
Gallagher distinguishes between society and culture. Culture is less measurable, 
visible, and conscious than society.175 Culture is related to “meaning, value, and … 
imagination,”176 whereas society is related to “urbanization, work patterns, external religious 
practices and so on.”177 For Gallagher it is crucial to make this distinction because his 
approach is anthropological rather than sociological.178 He thinks locally in terms of post-
modern culture (street lived culture, community, nation, and Western culture) and worldly in 
terms of globalization.179  
For Gallagher, modernity led the individual into a sort of “isolation, fragmentation, 
and narcissism, where life is an indifferent game and individual options are merely aesthetic 
and provisional.”180 As a reaction, a post-modern sensibility -- still focused on the subject -- 
asks for liberation and turns into a humbler understanding of authenticity.181 “The 
                                                          
174 Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 152-3. 
175 In line with Geertz: “Society’s forms are culture’s substance.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of 
Cultures; Selected Essays (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973), 28.  
176 Michael P. Gallagher, “Imagination Gone Secular?,” The Furrow 57, no. 10 (November 2006): 589–93, 591. 
See also, Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 5. 
177 Gallagher, “Imagination Gone Secular?,” 591. 
178 Ibid., 590. Cf. M. P. Gallagher, “University and Culture: Towards a Retrieval of Humanism,” Gregorianum 
85, no. 1 (2004): 149–71, 160. 
179 Cf. Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 4-5. 
180 Cf. Ibid., 104. 
181 Cf. Ibid., 104-6. 
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postmodern is not only a current thought [‘post-modernism’] but … a wider cultural context 
that includes ways of life as well as forms of thinking, and which can be viewed more as a 
‘sensibility.’”182 Thus, there is potentially room to discern from past excesses.183 
Yet Gallagher uses the term secularization to think of the issue of faith,184 although 
secularization no longer means a sociological perspective that studies the number of 
believers, belongings, and leavings from a religious point of view.185 Now, Gallagher refers 
to another level of the sensibility, mentality, and dispositions, which is placed in our 
imagination as a fruit of the protest after modernism.186 This approach is similar to what 
Taylor says: “a deeper and more significant secularization happens on the level of our self-
images and dispositions, in those less conscious zones that constitute our ‘social 
imaginary,’”187 a social imaginary that involves an “inarticulate understanding of our whole 
situation.”188 
                                                          
182 Ibid., 99. 
183 Cf. Ibid., 106-14. Behind Gallagher’s hope are also the results of Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word, 3rd ed. (London--New York: Routledge, 2012). This book studies, from a 
philological point of view, how the shift from an oral culture to a writing (technological) culture has reshaped 
human consciousness. It has three major statements: First, a human is a self-conscious being, thus its presence 
introduces artificiality; moreover, this consciousness takes time to grow (cf. Ibid. 26, 82, 104). Second, “the 
interaction between the orality that all human beings are born into and the technology of writing, which no one 
is born into, touches the depths of the psyche,” [this interaction is called ‘orality-literacy’], cf. Ibid. 175. Third, 
“secondary orality” by contrast with “primary orality,” is the current orality in this “high-technology culture, in 
which orality is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices that depend for their 
existence and functioning on writing and print.” Ibid. 11. Gallagher states that this secondary orality brings us 
a new breath of hope because it “has retrieved the lost dimension of voice” and, thus, “a new contact with 
personal interiority and mystery.” Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 36-38. 
184 For instance, in Gallagher, “University and Culture” and Gallagher, “Imagination Gone Secular.” 
185 “It involves not just a measurable problem of belonging and believing [‘quantitative secularization’] but also 
crisis of ultimate identity [‘qualitative secularization’].” Gallagher, “Imagination Gone Secular?” 592. 
186 Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 100-6. 
187 Michael P. Gallagher, “Translating Taylor: Pastoral and Theological Horizons,” in The Taylor Effect: 
Responding to a Secular Age (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 113–24, 116. The 
concept social imaginary is connected Taylor to talk about “new [common] ways of existing both in and out of 
relation with God,” Taylor, A Secular Age, 437, quoted by Gallagher, “Translating Taylor: Pastoral and 
Theological Horizons,” 116.  
188 Taylor, A Secular Age, 173. Note that this concept is different from the sociological imagination of C. Wright 
Mills, The Sociological Imagination. (See note #5 in our work.) 
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Gallagher defines imagination as “an area of pre-conceptual sensibility that shapes 
our horizons and worldviews.”189 For Gallagher, imagination is the “key battleground[s] for 
meaning, values, and in particular for religious faith.”190  
In stating this, he keeps in mind a scientific point of view of the cerebral hemispheres: 
the left-hand analytic functions (logic, mathematics, grammar, planning) and the right-hand 
holistic functions (creativity, imagination, aesthetic).191 However, our man of letters and 
theology cites several authors. First, Emily Dickinson who understood imagination as a 
crucial capacity “to experience the world, interpreting it and responding to it.”192 Second, 
Gallagher admires J. H. Newman to whom “imagination could foster experience of personal 
synthesis, linking intellect and heart, doctrine and feelings.”193 Finally, P. Ricoeur who states 
that imagination has “a projective function” and there can be “no action without 
imagination.”194 Ricoeur’s statement is more than a metaphor: “the metaphor is like a spark 
that ignites new meaning and that extends our rationality. But imagination is more than 
linguistic play.” He continues, “It is a vehicle of potential ethical transformation, including 
redemption from the isolated ego and an entry into the horizon of others.”195  
The individual is a conscious being, however, this consciousness, along with its 
identity, grows throughout time in a cultural context and belongs to a tradition/narrative. 
                                                          
189 Michael P. Gallagher, “Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” accessed May 1, 2017, 
http://www.ibero.mx/shapingthefuture/files/3-Topics-Identity/Identity-Mission-Gallagher-EU.pdf, 3. 
190 Gallagher, “Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” 3. 
191 “Sociological modernity involved … the dominant logic of the left-hand brain, postmodernism protests in 
the name of randomness, aesthetic play, and a range of liberations associated with the right-hand brain,” 
Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 130. 
192 Gallagher, “Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” 6. 
193 Ibid., 7. 
194 Paul Ricoeur, Du texte à l’action: essais d’herméneutique, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), 224, quoted by Gallagher, 
“Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” 8. 
195 Ibid. 
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Following the teaching of the educational psychologist Jerome Bruner, culture “provides us 
with the toolkit by which we construct not only our worlds, but our very conception of 
ourselves and our powers,”196 thus identity is nourished by culture. Moreover, it should be 
consider also the other way, we need to appropriate peacefully and meaningfully people’s 
ordinary life: “it is only in the narrative story model that one can construct an identity and 
find a place in one’s culture.”197 This personal narrative enactment should be done through 
intersubjectivity within and belonging to a community.198 But communities do not play a 
mere instrumental function (do ut des, according to a superficial marketing relationship), 
because without self-transcendence imagination is simply aestheticism and fetishism that 
does not have the power to accomplish the healthy cycle of nurturing our humanity.199 
Communities are, thus, the places where the reality and the quality of our life exist. Our 
imagination should, therefore, consider this cycle not as a dangerous game but as a 
provocative possibility:  
Imagination is where the quality of our lives is shaped and where we shape our vision of 
everything. Imagination is the location both of our crisis and of our potential healing. It is 
crucial for the quality of our seeing, because it can save us from superficiality and torpor and 
awaken us to larger hopes and possibilities.200 
But “who is imaging your life for you?” Gallagher’s question echoes the New York 
theologian M. Warren.201 In these technological and globalized times where capitalism 
dominates, there is a special link between images and the economy. Gallagher, among others, 
describes this culture as the culture of image.202 The market and particularly the advertising 
                                                          
196 Jerome S. Bruner, The Culture of Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), X, quoted 
by Gallagher, “Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” 5. 
197 Bruner, The Culture of Education, 42. 
198 Ibid., 5. 
199 “[Because] work is replaced by shopping and the fetish of style.” Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 103.  
200 Gallagher, “Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” 7. 
201 Ibid., 4. 
202 Cf. Gallagher, Clashing Symbols, 152. 
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industry are the visible image of an ideology that nourishes our imagination.203 Furthermore, 
according to the British Hegelian philosopher, Nicholas Boyle, the status of economic and 
political interconnectivity has no turning back and we are understanding ourselves more and 
more as consumer-producers in a global civilization.  
Boyle studies the political economic roots of globalization. Looking at recent history 
and according to the current technological development, Boyle states that a free market and 
minimal protectionist policies are the way to lead the planet into the future.204 After 1989, 
when the Soviet bloc fell and ended the time of empires, the scale of the market became again 
global.205 Internet, TV, radio, and instant smartphone communication  have been bringing 
the global market “into the economic, technical and cultural relations.”206 This is what Boyle 
calls the increasing role of the public sphere.   
Moreover, Boyle claims that politics and the market were understood separately as 
an underlying assumption so that, when the economic system fails, the government can 
intervene to save it. But Boyle states differently: market and state are not simply 
complementary spheres under the logic that government will intervene when the market fails, 
                                                          
203 We are mainly thinking about the negative influence of advertising, but we can also provide two positive 
examples of its ability to change mentalities and sensibilities. First, William Leiss, et. Alt., “Consumer Cultures 
and Mediated Markets,” in Social Communication in Advertising Consumption in the Mediated Marketplace, 
3rd ed. (New York; London: Routledge, 2005), 263–94, tells how television advertising \was used during the 
World War II to encourage population growth in order to overcome the casualties. The second analyzes how 
advertising played an important role throughout the 50’s and 60’s to convey the mentality of autonomy and 
independence to Italian women and help them to overcome fixed gender roles by the 70’s. See Adam Arvidsson, 
“The Therapy of Consumption Motivation Research and the New Italian House Wife, 1958-62,” Journal of 
Material Culture 5, no. 3 (2000): 251–74.  
204 Nicholas Boyle, 2014: How to Survive the Next World Crisis (London--New York: Continuum, 2010), 12. 
“If any historical thesis can be disproved, it is the claim that the extension and liberalization of world trade has 
been productive of extreme poverty.” 
205 Cf. Nicholas Boyle, Who Are We Now?: Christian Humanism and the Global Market from Hegel to Heaney 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 115-20.  
206 Boyle, 2014, 17. 
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market and state are related at the level of dependence.207 Boyle’s thesis needs the “political 
economy,” a term that underscores that politics and economics are not separated. 208 
According to his theory, the individual is a collective identity belonging to the state, 
to the market, and to society. The first two are faceless relationships whereas society implies 
potentially the possibility of knowing the other through associations, schools, or family. The 
state and the market are superstructures that determine and are conditioned by social 
behavior. However, economy and politics have not crossed any state frontier and just as there 
is no world-state, there is no world-institution able to provide an ethic.209 Therefore, the crisis 
of identity happens -- he gives an example through his neologism “Thacherism” and the 
phenomenon of recession.210  
Global society has been gradually perceiving itself as a “we” with an increasing 
awareness of the limited natural resources and, perhaps from self-interest, the need to 
rebalance global inequality. This manifests that, although there is no global political 
institution, “there is something [a global economy] like a shared order or expectation of 
order.”211 This external tendency involves us in committing to universal rights or global 
community.212 Accordingly, as well as following Hegel, we are not born with freedom, but 
we build it.213 “The freedom we are encouraged to have today is the freedom merely to 
                                                          
207 Cf. Ibid., 103. 
208 “Only a version of political economy that can detach itself from the fiction of pre-social individuality and 
can rise to rethinking the relation of state and market, in terms of global institutions, will be adequate to the 
demands of the twenty-first century and of the Great Event that inaugurate it,” Ibid., 124. 
209 Ibid., 133. 
210 Thacherism failed to assume two contrary dynamics, namely free market and patriotism. Free market without 
regulation weakens national borders and so gradually blurs national identity. Cf. Boyle, Who Are We Now?, 13-
68, 37. With regard to recession, see note #215. 
211 Boyle, 2014, 146. 
212 Cf. Ibid., 149. 
213 Boyle, Who Are We Now?, 9. 
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choose, as consumers, from whatever the market offers -- while a veil is drawn over what is 
in a closed system the necessary symmetrical complement of this freedom.”214 Boyle sees 
the interconnectivity and dependence of needs and satisfactions among people from different 
countries and thereby their economic systems, especially when there is recession215. Thus, 
we understand ourselves as consumers and producers -- the past as a product produced by 
others and consumed by us, and the future as a product produced by us -- “in an act of 
historical interpretation” through the word, namely through narratives and mainly 
literature.216 
2.3. Conclusion 
The West, based on instrumental reason, has lost the capability to nurture a moral 
individual. Rather it nourishes an identity which lacks security but which exercises freedom 
in an ever-present attempt of fulfillment in a culture of globalization and the market that 
promises potential experiences and intimacy, but does not provide it with either stable or 
communal elements that used to support the individual. Moreover, this crisis of identity 
cannot be explained through a mere sociological perspective, but rather through an 
anthropological one; a perspective that Michael P. Gallagher encodes at the level of our 
imagination (sensibility, disposition, and horizon). Finally, analyzing the economic roots of 
                                                          
214 Ibid., 116. 
215 The phenomenon of recession shows us that we have internalized the idea of wishing be employed. First, it 
can be noticed that “consumerism seems designed to conceal what we may call the proletarianization of the 
British people.” Then when the economy grows, we have a job. Thus, we can gradually spend money on 
increasing consumption gaining the perception of being freer and confident. The idea that we can be “flexible” 
consumers has been transmitted. Finally, when the recession comes, we measure our expenses better because 
of the feeling of fear and we can notice how dependent we are on other producers and consumers = “individuals 
whose needs are serviced by an anonymous market but are dependent for much of the content of our lives on 
our ability to work for others who in turn work for us.” Cf. Ibid., 38-9. 
216 Ibid., 318. 
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the current globalization with Nicholas Boyle, it seems that the principal image “imprinted” 
(nourishes) in our imagination is the impoverished consumer-producer mentality. 
In order to compare these results with the Ideal identity (see Figure 1 in # 2.1.5), let 
us imagine the current Western identity that we have just described as a tall and narrow 
cylinder, shown in Figure 2. This cylinder has a large height to diameter ratio and distance 
represents the emotional eccentricity between two extremes: the highest, called “the feeling 
of all-powerful,” and the deepest, called “the feeling of worthless.”  This is why we call it 
“Emotional identity.” This subject is more emotional than the Ideal one (see Figure 1) and 
oscillates sharply between these two emotions.  
The Emotional identity is promoted by the market and advertising industry which are 
closer and closer to the person, the “consumer/producer.” The world of possibilities enabled 
by globalization gives this individual the taste of freedom, and power and, accordingly, this 
individual will try desperately to avoid experiencing negative emotions, because he/she also 
knows the taste of the dramatic change into worthlessness. To do so, the person will try to 
maintain the high peaks of emotions and another strategy will be defensiveness and 
aggressiveness to avoid feeling less or despised. (Here is where Lipovetsky and Bauman 
would have placed the idea of the false confident self.) But by doing so, the individual avoids 
     Figure 2: Emotional Identity 
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nourishing the ideal identity because it denies part of its nature and prevents itself from 
accepting and educating its sensibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, looking at the two oscillation graphics (Figure 3) we can see that the 
timings of the drama differs. In Emotional identity, everything happens quickly, so the same 
event has a different impact on the self (compare both slopes). This constitutes a crucial factor 
in our  perception of life. The Ideal identity integrates existential time better within the 
confines of historical time, while the Emotional identity lives within an ever-present 
expectation of experiences and emotions. In other words, whereas what for an Ideal identity 
will constitute part of its ordinary life, for an Emotional identity this may become a drama. 
That is what also points out the comparison of the two bases: the cylinder has a smaller base 
and so is more easily overturned by a “wind” (challenge or misfortune). 
The cylinder’s material is crystal, flat, and rigid; which means low resilience and it is 
easily broken in case of shocks. That is why the Emotional identity reacts with defensiveness 
and self-assertiveness, because he/she wants to avoid being harmed. Thus, it is not a 
coincidence that the surface is round and the human contact surface is tiny (compare the 
yellow marks, see Figure 4). Roundness represents how the person avoids addressing 
conflicts in a mature way, namely: conflicts are only businesses that do not tell us anything 
Figure 3: Oscillation Graph Comparison Figure 4: Contact-World Surface Comparison 
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about entering into relationships with the world. Also, the cylinder’s yellow line, which 
signifies the contact surface at the level of harmony, is scarcer than the rectangular one. This 
contrast tells us that, despite having the current Western identity of greater emotionality, his 
capacity for intimacy and for stable relationships is low. Both roundness and scarce contact 
surfaces speak about the lack of wisdom and imagination necessary to deal with conflicts and 
achieve reconciliation which social life involves. 
Finally, it is worth saying that being an emotional being can be positive because of 
its potential empathy and the resource of energy it implies. However, this energy should be 
well-oriented and well organized within the self. It must be clear what constitutes the self, its 
resources, and illnesses, in order to build a person which fully integrates the truth of 
belonging to mankind in society, without falling into hopelessness or mental sickness. The 
resolution of this crisis is the subject of the next chapter. We argue that the virtue of hope 
and its activation in the human subject will result in a rehabilitation that is both personal and 
communal. 
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Chapter 3: The Role of Hope in Metz and Lynch’s Theological Anthropology 
In what follows, we study the theological anthropology of J. B. Metz and W. F. Lynch 
in order to explore the place of hope in their work. 
On the one hand, Metz’s theology integrates the whole of reality (not just one part of 
history, namely those who succeed and survive) to consider an individual who has worth also 
for his liability upon unjust suffering. Metz, rooted in biblical traditions, suggests a 
spirituality based on an apocalyptic hope. In comparison, Lynch also develops an 
anthropology rooted in human vulnerability but with focus on the human disposition to trust 
the world, to receive grace. Lynch deploys a phenomenology of hope by analyzing symptoms 
of hopelessness with psychoanalysis as a reference.  
On the other hand, Metz is sometimes criticized for being too pessimistic or for 
proposing a stoic, ascetic Christianity. These criticisms may be due to the fact that he does 
not fully describe the elements of that spirituality. Metz does not deal with the psychological 
features of hope. Therefore, it will be interesting to explore Lynch’s psychology of hope. 
3.1. Johann B. Metz: The Place of Hope in His Theological Anthropology 
In the Auschwitz concentration camp, the prisoners received a ration of bread, water, butter, 
and something else. A Jewish family used to use the butter on Saturday for the prayer. One 
Saturday afternoon, the daughter asks her father: “Why do we waste the butter in making it 
burn like a candle if we do not have more to eat?” The father nods: “It’s true, we cannot live 
without food, but neither can we live without hope.”217 
The German theologian, Johann Baptist Metz (1928 —)218 confronts the problem of 
identity crisis when a subject is threatened by superficiality due to techno-scientific 
                                                          
217 This story was attributed by Fr. Jaime Tatay to an American rabbi in the homily of a Mass in Madrid, 2015. 
218 Metz is known as the founder of the new “political theology,” a term associated with the work of Carl 
Schmitt, which essentially becomes a political, legal, or social theory. Metz, by adding the adjective “new” 
political theology avoids, from now on having to put quotes to the other Schmitt theology and it is already clear 
that it is a discourse on God. Cf. Johann B. Metz, Dios y Tiempo. Nueva Teología Política (Madrid: Trotta, 
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reductionism, by moral relativism, by the obsession of innocence (inability to recognize its 
sin), by self-help spiritualities, and by the oblivion of unjust victims throughout history -- all 
these points will be developed in this chapter. In this postmodern context, for Metz the 
religious adjective is not a simple addition for a few people but will be understood as 
“natural” because of the question of theodicy for those who want to resist the disappearance 
of the human being -- as an ethical-religious subject -- and of its historical world.219 Hence, 
his theological work appears as a practically-oriented political theology or a mystical-
political theology which emerges as a correction to other more analogical discourses.220 Metz 
roots his theology in the category of experience that becomes autobiography221; in particular, 
in the experience of the suffering of the just who, in the light of the event of Jesus Christ, 
                                                          
2002), 9. The very first of his works devoted to “political theology” is Johann B. Metz, Teología del Mundo, 
Segunda, Verdad e Imagen 18 (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1971), 139-164. He himself recognizes that “a new 
political theology was born when we asked ourselves about the possibility of a ‘theology of the world’ [he 
alludes to his work] in the circumstances of the modern world, with its processes of enlightenment, 
secularization and emancipation.” Metz, Dios y Tiempo, 85. This political theology is not a regional theology 
on politics, as it can be on music, football, etc., but it is systematic. Cf. Ibid., 39-70, 50. (Spanish into English 
translations are ours.) 
219 “The appeal to God is not directed to any of the invented (‘postmodern’) images of God ... but to the image 
of God of the Biblical traditions. Do we really take the unavoidable and painful dialectic of this image of God 
seriously? This is what I ask myself when I see how pathetically positive metaphors of God are used today in 
preaching that only speak about divine ‘love.’ However, this is also what I ask myself when I read how those 
who are critical of the Church accuse it of having been the only one responsible for creating a dark image of 
God, driven as it was by the desire to frighten and humiliate human beings. No, life itself will place us before 
such an image of God. And a mature faith, far from limiting itself only to covering this up, must confront it -- 
even if only with the sigh of the creature.” Johann B. Metz, Memoria Passionis. Una Evocación Provocadora 
en una Sociedad Pluralista, Presencia Teológica 154 (Santander: Sal Terrae, 2007), 21. 
220 Cf. Johann B. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad (Madrid: Cristiandad, 1979), 2-44. “This is not to 
say that, in modern theology, the theologians were not -- or are not -- pious people. Here it is not about this 
private reconciliation between doctrine and biography, but about the fact that such reconciliation was not made 
into theology; that, in a certain way, it did not reach public-communicative character; that it had too little 
importance for the fate of the faith in Modernity.” Metz, Memoria Passionis, 123. 
221 In line with the philosophy and theology of the decade 1950-60s, it is the time of existentialism (J.-P. Sartre, 
G. Marcel), phenomenology (E. Husserl, E. Stein), and personalism (R. Guardini, J. Maritain, E. Mounier). Cf. 
Johann B. Metz, A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity (New York: Paulist Press, 
1998), 54-55.  
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will have the power to affect (pathos) and, thus, liberate our indifference to historical 
transformation.222 
Our theoretical assumption here is that the anthropology of Metz is an anthropology 
in which the individual builds his identity (and that of the community) by sharing in solidarity 
the history of humanity, of his people. This constitutive factor lies in the reverse (Metz 
prioritizes the apophatic aspect given by our condition as creatures) of our anamnestic 
rationality (memory and the use of narration) that functions as a unifying and integrating 
element of ourselves in relation with human history and with God. This function is encoded 
by his understanding on hope. 
In what follows we try to systematize Metz’s theological anthropology -- Metz has 
not been a systematic author, he must be understood based on many articles, conferences, 
and collections.223 Initially, as an introduction, we present the basic lines of his political 
                                                          
222 Suffering is not something that must be pathologically desired (masochism), nor something that must be 
neurotically avoided (in clear controversy with Modernity), nor something that depersonalizes us from guilt (in 
clear allusion to the psychoanalysis of S. Freud). It is an unavoidable fact of reality that happens in history and 
that cannot be forgotten. On the contrary, suffering is human, insofar as it is constitutive of our struggle to 
survive when we need food or suffer from disease. Likewise, suffering can be a personal choice, such as the 
generous devotion of a parent to their children. Also, suffering can make us self-centered and selfish, but it can 
conversely make us more human and grateful when we allow ourselves to be affected by the suffering of others. 
In the latter mystical acceptance of suffering, Metz bases his anthropology. 
223 Cf. Metz, A Passion for God, 8-9. J.M. Ashley suggests three stages in the itinerary of Metz’ thought: 1950-
1963; 1963-1968; 1968 up to today. Cf. James M. Ashley, Interruptions: Mysticism, Politics and Theology in 
the Work of Johann Baptist Metz (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 52-58, 57; Metz, A 
Passion for God, 11-17. Matías O. Ruz, Guillermo Rosolino, and Carlos Schickendantz, “La Fuerza Subversiva 
del Sufrimiento Evocado. Recepción de Walter Benjamin en la Teología de Johann Baptist Metz,” Revista 
Teología XLVI, no. 100 (December 2009): 397–420, agree with that. Ashley’s framework is: 
1950-1963: during his studies in Münich and Innsbruck, Metz still tries to apply the transcendental Thomistic 
paradigm, in particular Rahner’s transcendental method. This can be recognized in the first part of his work 
Theology of the World. His Christian anthropocentrism is strongly influenced by Rahner’s understanding of 
experience, however, Metz’s dialectic of progress (secularization theory) is still too positive in considering the 
contribution of Modernity to the future of humanity.  
1963-1968: during these years the category “dangerous memory” emerges. Here Metz incorporates elements of 
Judaism and definitively leaves behind the transcendental method. The convulsive sixties and his dissatisfaction 
with Rahner’s method make him interested in reviewing Marxist thought through the eyes of the Jewish scholar 
E. Bolch and the positivism of the Frankfurt School. Likewise, Metz will dialogue with the also Jew W. 
Benjamin. This change can be seen in the second part of Theology of the World, where he incorporates the 
eschatology and a more negative view of the direction that comes from Modernity. He considers that the latter 
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theology with which to address the subsequent understanding of the human being. Then we 
present his anthropology following a classical structure224: First, the human being in creation; 
second, the specificity of the human being, that is, to be human with oneself; and finally, the 
human being in relation to others.  
3.1.1. Mystical-Political Theology or Practically-Oriented Fundamental Theology 
For Metz, the current crisis of Christianity does not lie in the substance of faith, but 
in the frequent forgetfulness of its eminently practical orientation on the part of Christians 
and their institutions which, in this way, prevent that that faith is well understood.225 He 
himself acknowledges that his intellectual journey changed after the experience of World 
War II, when he saw, among other things, a whole village die during his military service.226 
The War and the Holocaust confused him so much that his discourse on God could no longer 
be the same as that inscribed in the faith he received in his hometown.227 His impotence to 
fully respond to suffering transforms his discourse into an apophatic theology: “Suffering 
leads into a void unless it be suffering unto God.”228 Hence, he found intellectual resources 
in J. Moltmann, E. Bloch, and W. Benjamin. As a consequence, in one of the great changes 
                                                          
is intimately connected with Catholic theology and Church’s attitude, when faced with the human dramas of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
1968 – present: Metz introduces cultural polycentrism and makes a definitive shift in the theodicy question. In 
the fall of 1968, the Conference of the Latin American Episcopate met in Medellin, which represented another 
step in the theology of liberation, and Metz sympathized with this theological perspective. This can be seen in 
his work Faith in History and Society, written between 1968-76. Here there is a greater structuring of the 
subject, a final option for the memoria passionis et resurrectionis and narratives, and an apocalyptic eschatology 
development. Since then, there have been no new themes but a deepening of them: memory of Jesu Christi 
unfolds as universal ethics under the category of compassio, as well as a more exhaustive analysis of time. All 
this is reflected in his work Memoria Passionis. 
224 Here we are following Gabriel Amengual, Antropología Filosófica, Sapientia Fidei (Madrid: BAC, 2007). 
225 “The historical crisis of Christianity is not properly a crisis of its message and its contents of faith but a crisis 
of its subjects and institutions, which are unconcerned in excess of the unavoidable practical sense of these 
contents.” Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 178. 
226 Cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 99-102. 
227 Cf. Metz, A Passion for God, 54-55. 
228 Ekkehard Schuster, Hope against Hope: Johann Baptist Metz and Elie Wiesel Speak out on the Holocaust, 
Studies in Judaism and Christianity (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 48. 
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that took place, Metz definitively abandoned Rahner’s neo-Kantian transcendental method 
and turned to a dialectical critique of history with a practical orientation.229 For Metz the 
transcendental method or any other idealism that uproots the being (Ger. Dasein) from 
history (referring to Hegel) or that de-subjectivizes the individual (in a clear reference to 
Marxism) is invalid.230  
A theology that takes root in the scope of the questions directed to God that spring 
from an attentive look at the suffering of humanity throughout history; questions that do not 
want to agree with the status quo, and that therefore are uncomfortable and risky at times, 
but real and that affect the hope of living; profane or religious questions, depending on how 
we look at them, but that overcome any dichotomy between life and doctrine, and mysticism 
and ordinary life.231 Accordingly, Metz has two key points: first, apophatic theology prevails, 
which means that he does not accept any abstract myth that resolves and accommodates the 
human being in his capacity to intellectually justify God before the evil of the world (he will 
call that abstract theology separated from reality), nor any pseudo-Christian myth that 
emphasizes in such a way the triumph of Christ on Easter Sunday that it becomes a pacifying 
therapy for omitting commitment to the sufferings of the just. Second, hope is crucial in his 
notion of the human being; it will be an eschatology of an apocalyptic nature (rooted in 
biblical tradition) contrary to any purely intellectual historicism or any hamartologies 
(understanding history of humanity as a mere history of sin). There are therefore no 
                                                          
229 Cf. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 72-76. See also, Ashley, Interruptions, 166. 
230 Ashley, Interruptions, 73-95. 
231 Cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 115. 
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“intellectual” (a-historical) solutions, but only practical paths that begin in the suffering of 
others and end, unfinished, in the commitment to transform them.232  
The subject of this theology is one who has experienced “liberation” (understood as 
liberated to liberate others). A subject who is not going to correspond either with the one 
suggested by E. Kant, or by Modernity, or by F. Nietzsche, or by K. Rahner (see below). It 
is a human being who bears a historical-critical reason and comes of age when, through 
narrations of the memoria passionis et resurrectionis Jesu Christi (understanding the reality 
of the suffering of the just from the perspective of the life, passion, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ) is committed in solidarity with the suffering of others. 
3.1.2. Theological Anthropology: Memory, Narratives, and Compassio in Hope 
The anthropology of J.B. Metz is definitely a theological anthropology in which the 
concepts of history and human being are not separable. It has a central tenant in the dialogical 
character of the human being that is constituted through language and in searching for 
rationality about reality. Rationality and language are intimately related by the idea of doing 
or self-doing experience: the human being is not discovered, in the sense of the theory of 
reminiscence of Plato (for example in Phaedo), nor is it an experiment of oneself, it must be 
acted-created. He/she is formed fundamentally through praxis, which means to transform 
what we live and what we decide to live into a personal and communitarian history. 
Incorporating mystically into our biography the unjust suffering of people which we can see 
in this historical world, which we want to understand with clamor and prayer, but which we 
cannot fully explain unless before the paschal mystery of God, is the horizon that should 
guide and build the being/self-doing of the individual. It will be a painful silent, accepted and 
                                                          
232 Cf. Metz, A Passion for God, 54-55; Metz, Memoria Passionis, 99-102. 
69 
 
even loved, that by listening that divine veil (“si comprehendis non est Deus”233) configures 
a human subject who then takes charge of the history of humanity from God and toward God 
(“for God”).234 
The following words by Metz lead us through his theological anthropology which is 
not far from being a biography of humanity before God: 
The thread that runs through this biographical journey can be considered the memoria 
passionis, -- or, in other words, the question of theodicy, assumed in a new way with the 
signatures of the time and dramatized as social criticism, a question, moreover, that, in my 
case, is not simply silenced or satisfied by the Christian message of salvation. In all there is 
still a resounding and mute cry.235 
3.1.2.1. The human being and Creation: World, History, and Rationality in the World 
Metz at the beginning of his work Theology of the World,236 elaborates a theology of 
secularization, which different from secularism,237 is the project wanted by God that 
underlies the future of humanity. Thus, the truly religious subject is the one who does not 
allow itself to be alienated from the world, either by ideologies or by mythologies, and 
manages to understand the world in a committed way. In this context, Christianity is not 
disappearing, but has become historically effective, and the task of theology is to show the 
process of secularization.  
This secularization of the world -- an irreversible secularization and one we would never take 
too seriously -- how does this still fall under the “law of Christ”? (1 Cor 9:21). ... How does 
it proceed historically, in its projection toward the future, from the “hour of Christ”? ... The 
secular world, in which we find ourselves today, is nothing but the expression, exacerbated 
on a global scale, of that secular “contradiction” against the sacred, … which has always been 
foreseen in Christianity’s project of history.238 
                                                          
233 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 107, where Metz refers to the famous Saint Augustine’s adagio. 
234 Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 23-26, 24. Metz condenses this “in the formula ‘suffering from 
God’ (Leiden an Gott).” Metz, Memoria Passionis, 109. 
235 Metz, Dios y Tiempo, 239. 
236 Johann B. Metz, Theology of the World (London--New York: Herder and Herder, 1969). 
237 Cf. Metz, Teología del Mundo, 51. 
238 Ibid., 17-18. 
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There were two theological arguments: the principle of Incarnation and, as its 
corollary, the “hominized world”239 (Metz’s neologism). In the Incarnation, the human was 
not an apparent and provisional instrument (contrary to Docetist heresy), much less a 
“despite” becoming flesh (contrary to Gnosticism) but God in Jesus Christ -- truly God and 
truly human -- accepted and assumed the world. He does not degrade the human-worldly but 
endows it with an unsuspected singularity. In the Incarnation, God assumes “the other,” what 
is different from Him, without spoiling what the other is. On the contrary, because God is 
Love, he assumes humanity and secularity (worldliness) as it is, allowing it to be autonomous. 
Even in recognizing sin in the world, it cannot be said that the world was not assumed by 
God in its totality, because in the style of the God of Jesus Christ, in his “passivity” during 
the Passion (see Phil 2: 6-11), becomes visible gradually and increasingly God’s love in its 
eschatological and consummate form. This is what Metz develops and condenses with the 
later concept “eschatological reserve;”240 a concept which encodes the biblical promise of 
freedom, peace, justice, and reconciliation.241 In this sense, he says that Incarnation is the 
horizon of the eschatological understanding of history and thus, the whole future is still 
                                                          
239 Johann B. Metz, “Future of Faith in a Hominized World,” Philosophy Today 10, no. 4 (1966): 289–299, 
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday196610425. 
240 The term “eschatological reserve” is received from Erik Peterson and it has two meanings, one biblical, 
linked to Saint Paul (Rom 8:19-22), and another political. Regarding the latter, Metz gives it a negative and a 
positive dimension. Regarding the negative: “we refer to the qualification of the Christian message as an 
‘eschatological message.’ … Christian theology affirms negatively (‘eschatological reserve’) that ‘there is no 
total subject of history within this world’ … The Christian hope will have to express itself against those 
[‘historical-social messianisms’ that erect themselves as a total subject].” G. Angellini, “El Desarrollo de La 
Teología Católica En El Siglo XX,” Diccionario de Teología Interdisciplinar (Salamanca: Sigueme, 1983), 
808, quoted by Gabino Uríbarri, “La Reserva Escatológica: un Estudio Originario de Erik Peterson (1890-
1960),” Estudios Eclesiásticos 78 (2003): 29–105, 38-9. As for the positive dimension: “the promises toward 
which this reserve is oriented are not an empty horizon of religious expectation, they are not simply a regulative 
idea, but a critically liberating imperative for our present. They are a stimulus and an assignment because these 
promises are effective in the historical conditions of the present, and ‘confirming them’ (= ‘making them 
become true’) in this way. Because truth must be done.” Angellini, “El Desarrollo de La Teología.” 808, quoted 
by Uríbarri, “La Reserva Escatológica,” 39. 
241 Cf. Metz, Teología del Mundo, 202-3. 
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dependent on the “hour of Christ” (1 Cor 11:11, Eph 1:10, 1 Pe 4:7).242 Future is always 
future and, therefore, unknown. We should go forward groping, confident in faith and its 
promise. That forward existence consists in a deepening of what was the origin, that is, the 
world assumed by God.243 
As a consequence of the theology of secularization and the hermeneutical principle 
of incarnation, Metz develops the notion of “hominized world.” The world, what is not God 
but oriented toward the human, is not only nature but also human history. Since Modernity, 
with the development of modern sciences and the process of Enlightenment, the human being 
no longer finds in nature “vestigia Dei,” as St. Augustine wrote, but instead “vestigia 
hominis.” That is to say, the person no longer experiences the world as a natural pre-
established order (teleology) with an imposed fate in which people discover the numinous 
majesty of God.244 In comparison, the human being experiences the world as in its hands: the 
person is homo creator/manipulator and through technology and social engineering can alter 
the individual and the human community.245 With this Metz approaches the history of the 
world by making history of the continuous progress of God in humanity. “Does the world, 
from a Christian point of view, not appear precisely as the ‘materiality’ of salvation, as the 
beginning of the universal cosmic liturgy?”246  
                                                          
242 Cf. Ibid., 22-39. 
243 Cf. Ibid., 105-26. “The word of revelation in the Old Testament is not primarily a word that states, but a 
word of speech ... a word of promise. ... Its proclamation is an announcement of what is coming, and therefore 
denounces what exists.” Ibid., 113. 
244 The disenchantment of the world carried by Max Weber. Cf. Ibid., 192. Also, he refers to Bultmann’s 
demythologizing program Cf. Ibid., 52, 113. 
245 Cf. Metz, Teología del Mundo, 185-206. 
246 Ibid., 22. 
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But the Auschwitz experience changed all of his theology: he had been too optimistic. 
Metz abandons the dialectic of progress (the theology of secularization)247 and since then he 
becomes a “theologian after Auschwitz.”248 Also, he opts for the dialectical-critical method 
of doing history.249 Since then, the principle of responsibility of the human being with history 
and society will no longer be the experience of having received a world given by God in the 
hands of the human demiurge, but the suffering of the just. Metz says: “Suffering is what 
resists any theory that claims reconciliation between man and nature. Any attempt at 
conciliation eventually degenerates into a mere ontologization of man’s passion. Suffering 
confronts nature with history, theology with eschatology.”250 
The reflection on the relationship between nature and history must come through 
dialectics and not teleology. Throughout the history of philosophy there have been 
interpretations of history and time which have suggested mythological cycles and 
evolutionary utopias. However, Metz criticizing Nietzsche, says that the human being cannot 
be reduced to mere nature, just as history cannot be a mere description of the evolution of 
nature.251 Suffering breaks any teleology intrinsic within nature and makes that history face 
nature. Therefore, we must interpret time not as a natural time but as an accumulation of 
years and years of human suffering; as “inflation time” (influenced by Walter Benjamin).252 
History does not develop without the subject, without the subjects of history, but on the 
contrary it will be the history of their passion.253 “The essential dynamic of history resides in 
                                                          
247 Cf. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 111-128. Here he engages in an interesting critical dialogue 
with the dialectics of progress. 
248 Cf. Metz, Dios y Tiempo, 235-40 where he has a brief autobiographical account about “How I changed my 
very self.” 
249 Cf. Ashley, Interruptions, 166. 
250 Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 118. 
251 Cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 92-94. 
252 Ruz, Rosolino, and Schickendantz, “La Fuerza Subversiva.” 
253 Cf. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 117-9. 
73 
 
the memory of passion as a negative awareness of future freedom for the overcoming of 
suffering.”254 Thus, God is not going to be an annex to this task, but the memory of the 
victims in the hermeneutic horizon of Christ constitutes the memory of the freedom of the 
human being. 
3.1.2.2. The Human Being and Its Mystical Character: Rationality, Language, and Prayer 
As we have already said, for the theologian after Auschwitz, “the potential of the 
meaning of history is not linked only to the survivors, to those who succeeded and broke 
through! ‘Meaning’ is not a category reserved for the victors!”255 But for the whole story. 
For Metz, those lives which were prematurely taken away by injustice have not been failures 
nor do they lack meaning because they still have the power to awaken and liberate the 
morality of other people: in the light of God’s paschal mystery they are “dangerous 
memories.” In fact, something has happened to the individual who can peacefully endure 
looking at Auschwitz, or is so anesthetized as to have already forgotten. As Metz says, “not 
only the human individual, but the ideas of being human and of humanity are deeply 
vulnerable. Because, in addition to a superficial history, there is a deep history of the human 
species.”256 In particular, Metz focuses his criticism on the individual in three elements: the 
“bourgeois subject” that comes from the Enlightenment,257 the one-dimensional technical 
                                                          
254 Ibid., 119 
255 Ibid., 124. 
256 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 18-20, 20. (Italics ours.) 
257 The “bourgeois subject” who breaks with tradition and authority, and is oriented by models geared to 
controlling nature and satisfying needs. The new bourgeois human being who has achieved autonomy for reason 
establishes the difference between public and private in the development of political and economic systems, the 
law of markets (do ut des), and the instrumental reason. In turn, he/she falls into a cult of abstract reason that 
leads him to defend a tradition as knowledge without a subject (for example, Schelling’s historicism or Diderot’s 
encyclopedism) capable of relativizing the history of human suffering. Accordingly, the religion of bourgeois-
reason is privatized and liturgies become ornaments for Christians’ celebrations. Metz reckons this in the ability 
to live peacefully in a society in which only individual righteousness matters. It is therefore an elitist religion, 
reserved for intellectuals which, if it does not belittle the rude, treats them paternally as inferior. Cf. Metz, La 
Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 45-61. 
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subject,258 and the critique of the Übermensch (superior-man) of Nietzsche.259 Beyond that 
criticism, what he proposes is the way to build the authentic subject through dangerous 
memories and their narrative. 
The category of dangerous memory refers to the notes of experience as a theological 
place, namely: it is a phenomenon of immediacy insofar as it affects the whole person in its 
relation to reality, not only to reason; it is mediated and interpreted in a cultural context; and 
it is finite before a reality impossible to encompass with our experience and that is why we 
say that it opens us to transcendence (“it gives us what to think,” echoing P. Ricoeur). Saying 
this about personal unity, Metz likewise affirms the experience of non-identity or the 
experience of feeling divided: “the historical life inevitably involves the experience of non-
identity, the experience of duality, the experience that everything is not good, just as it is and 
it appears.”260 These two realities, the essential unity and the experience of feeling divided 
by suffering, are not contradictory for Metz, they are the place for the construction of the 
                                                          
258 Metz makes the encounter with the Marxist dialectic through the Frankfurt School. Cf. Ashley, Interruptions, 
108-115. The notion of a one-dimensional technical subject refers to the Frankfurt School, particularly the 
Horkheimer and Adorno critique of instrumental reason. Adorno argues that the human being is negatively 
affected by an exaggeration of the role of techno-science in its life. This tends to reduce the person to a single 
dimension given by technical reason. Cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 87-91. The techno-scientific world leads 
the human being to a technical rationality without dilemmas; to superficiality, or to a “second minority of age,” 
according to Metz echoing Kant. For Metz, this “second minority” is more dangerous than the first because it 
is voluntary, while the one that Kant pointed out was a cultural inheritance. A “computerized mind” apparently 
free of contradictions is interested in forgetting any sensitivity that makes us suffer guilt. The disaffection of 
this subject to other “reasons” is found in the lack of meaning (crisis); and a crisis that can be endured only by 
increasing indifference and insensibility, that is, avoiding suffering in solidarity. Cf. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia 
y la Sociedad, 62-95. 
259 For Nietzsche, God is an invented term under which religious traditions, particularly Christianity, has erected 
a repressive morality for the human being. The human being must get rid of, forget, and overcome that morality 
by releasing his “will to power” to become the “superior-man” (Ger. Übermensch). Nietzsche thus formulates 
the argument of the death of God, as “cultural amnesia” -- in Metz’s terminology -- and the myth of the eternal 
return for “love of life and this world.” In comparison, Metz notes that what Nietzsche had predicted has 
happened, God has died and with “cultural amnesia” the human being has also “died” (i.e. being led into an 
amoral superficiality). However, this fact of reality serves for Metz to formulate the “argument of the inverse 
conclusion,” namely: cultural amnesia involves the loss or dissolution of the condition of being human and its 
historical world. That is why Metz is apologetically convinced of the need for a subject with an anamnestic 
rationality. Cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 78-97, 92-94. 
260 Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 87. 
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authentic moral-religious subject. That place is rationality (not understood as a simple 
technical reason, supra) due to its capacity to make a threefold relationship with past, present, 
and future. Which in turn is possible because of language.261  
Members of the Frankfurt School, W. Benjamin and Th. Adorno. … But also E. Bloch, H. 
Jonas, F. Rosenzweig and E. Levinas, who, in spite of their differences and antagonisms, 
seem to agree on the idea that thought is remembrance, and that undivided reason possesses 
a deep structure of an anamnestic nature.262 
It is an anamnestic rationality that finds spiritual resources in the narratives of biblical 
traditions263 to activate, spur, and resist any future that was already determined scientifically 
or ideologically. The narrative of dangerous memories wants us to experience something 
(pathos) in order to heal and liberate our experience of duality. Metz seeks to interrupt human 
indifference, accommodation, or the oblivion to which the bourgeois superficial subject 
tends. “The subject is the man implied in his own experiences and histories from which he 
obtains once and again an identification with himself.”264 Furthermore, this rationality is a 
heteronomous reason because it recognizes the authority of those who suffer (see more 
below), “this one makes [our rationality] ‘attentive.’”265 That heteronymous reason is not 
                                                          
261 Memory plays a double role: one for the constitution of the subject in terms of its practical and critical 
reason; another in relation to Christianize its concrete historical and social context. Cf. Metz, Dios y Tiempo. 
Metz in Por una Cultura de la Memoria explains his notion of memory and its role in the constitution of the 
subject. He assumes the complexity of this common term and goes beyond the psychological faculty. Metz 
states that memory (Ger. Erinnerung) is not the memory of data (Ger. Gedächtnis) and evokes Gadamer: 
“liberate the memory as mere psychological faculty and recognize it as a human essential feature of its infinite 
and historical being.” For Metz memory becomes a key notion of a discourse “that understands itself as a 
theoretical function of that reason that, as a freedom, wants to become practical.” Cf. Johann B. Metz, Por una 
Cultura de la Memoria, vol. 111, Filosofía de la Religión (Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial, 1999).  
262 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 236, note 365. 
263 Cf. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 213-27. It is necessary to combine the two functions, 
argumentative and narrative (anamnestic), so that the reason is not split. This connects the subject with the past, 
present, and future of history, without separating that individual with any metaphysical flight. Cf.  Metz, 
Memoria Passionis, 231-238. 
264 Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 229. 
265 Metz, Dios y Tiempo, 95; cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 211-221. 
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reconstructed with information and arguments but wrapped in stories, once it is identified 
with the story and its narrative. 
This strengthened sense of history -- not as “historiography,” but as a kind of normative 
transmission of action -- it is and remains immanent to the reason that becomes the practice 
of liberating criticism. This concept, which is similar to the point of view of hermeneutics, of 
the inseparable relationship between reason and history, is not applied to the Enlightenment 
as a complement.266 
 
With this Metz does not pretend in any way to sacralize suffering. On the contrary, 
suffering is not desirable and only makes sense before God under practical commitment that 
works for its transformation. Although on the other hand, unjust suffering is a fact of 
reality267: 
Historical life carries with it the painful experience of non-identity due to violence and 
oppression, injustice and inequality but also the experience of non-identity due to guilt, due 
to the fatality of finitude and death. In this sense, history is always a history of suffering in a 
broad sense.268    
Suffering is therefore a theological category that is understood in an ascetic and 
mystical way. “As a passion for God and a suffering unto God, but … not as a suffering of 
God.”269 Unjust suffering or the memory of those who have suffered unjustly leads the person 
in searching for understanding to cry out (to God) “why?”270 This clamor is the most 
particular and most universal of human languages: “a language that would have no name if 
                                                          
266 Metz, Por una Cultura de la Memoria, 9. 
267 In the following quotation expressed by “danger”: “To take history seriously means understanding that 
nothing, not the highest, not the best, exists without danger, that everything is surrounded by danger, and that 
the meaning of history is always in danger wherever it is sought or thought of as something unendangered … 
Christian faith, if I understand it correctly, is just the capacity to affirm and live an endangered identity. 
Precisely in this are faith and history bound to one another.” J.B. Metz, “Politische Theologie und die 
Herausforderung des Marxismus,” 181, quoted by Ashley, Interruptions, 163-4. 
268 Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 220. 
269 Schuster, Hope against Hope, 48; Metz, A Passion for God, 58. On the recovery of sensitivity to suffering 
instead of an excessive emphasis on sin, Metz frequently refers to the synodal Unsere Hoffnung [“Our Hope”] 
(1977) Cf. Metz, Memoria Passionis, 178, note 275. 
270 “Theodicy questions Hope ... for the inscrutable history of suffering in the world.” Metz, Memoria Passionis, 
31. 
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the word ‘prayer’ did not exist.”271 Here Metz, by thinking of prayer, does not firstly refer to 
a believing dialogue with God, but to the internal cry of the human condition that demands 
explanation and alleviation of suffering. This implies that Metz affirms “natural theology” 
and, consequently, the human being cannot be a-theo. Again, it is decidedly a theological 
anthropology: “Prayer does not require the dissolution of the human being in its condition as 
subject in a relationship between God and God, but rather bases a final dignity of the human 
being as a subject, a subject before God.”272 The language of the experience of prayer is 
therefore prior to faith (in God) but inevitably ends in God if  the constitution of the authentic 
subject is involved.273 Metz condenses this “in the formula ‘suffering from God’ (Leiden an 
Gott).”274  
[Milan] Machovec recalled Adorno’s aforementioned observation -- “after Auschwitz it is no 
longer possible to write poetry” -- and so asked me if Christians could continue praying after 
Auschwitz. I answered the same thing I would answer today: we can pray after Auschwitz 
because there was praying in Auschwitz: in the songs and in the clamor of the Jewish 
prisoners.275  
                                                          
271 Ibid., 104. 
272 Ibid., 95. 
273 Conversely to any kind of “secondary nominalism,” cf. Ibid., 55-58. It is should be noted that both, Metz 
and Lynch (see #3.2), discuss a fundamental theology from a naturally-theological perspective. Although Lynch 
will say that he does not want to discuss natural theology, he does. The main issue of that natural perspective 
consists of a potential fall in pantheism and a narcissistic spirituality. Walter Kasper faces that issue in Walter 
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, New ed. (London: Continuum, 2012), 356-7. He argues that the person can 
be aware of a kind of pre-conceptual experience of transcendence by recognizing its limits, or by an aesthetic 
experience (e.g. the beauty of the sea, the complexity of genetics, the vulnerability of the homeless, or the 
majesty of wildlife), but this is not enough. Kasper claims that this therapeutic and anthropocentric vision of 
speaking to God may be followed by egocentric attitudes or “eco-idolatries” -- one might acknowledge here 
some postmodern religiosities. Kasper calls this “modest monotheism,” “modest” because it responds to natural 
theology; and “monotheism” because it responds to a diffused experience of being human, when the individual 
questions itself in front of “one God” for the unity, for the meaning of reality, and for one’s own life. (We can 
equate this to what has been popularized as a mere “seeking meaning.”) But this experience of transcendence -
- “modest monotheism” -- must be articulate through the constitutive human skill, words and language. That is 
why he advocates for a “concrete monotheism” which orients that experience, the Trinitarian God. In Him and 
his people (note the communitarian dimension) the experience of transcendence can be named, and nourished 
as conversion, sin, redemption, and love. 
274 Ibid., 109. 
275 Ibid., 48. 
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Throughout some magnificent pages of prayers of petition in the Bible (Psalms, 
Lamentations, Job, the Our Father Mt 6: 9-13), Metz supports the apocalyptic orientation of 
the human question to the meaning of life before suffering in eschatological terms: “ask God 
for God.”276 Metz, as we have already mentioned, suggests constructing the subject by 
remembering the victims in the line of memoria passionis et resurretionis Jesu Christi. To 
do this, he proposes the path of mysticism, of learning and suffering from a new language, a 
language which has no written rules (one learns by going through it). Also, since it is a 
communication (the very thing of language between personal beings) with the Other, this 
dialogue has no answer comparable to any human relationship. Thus, in the cry, in that groan 
(Rom 8:26),277 we are invited to listen and let ourselves be led by the reverse of our 
complaints and our sobs (notice Metz’s apophatic perspective). This inadequacy of 
transcendence (Metz uses the term “pathos of distance”278), which means accepting the limit 
of our creaturality and the limit of time as being unfinished, but with an end (longing for God 
as fullness), involves learning from suffering by “not being answered” in a regular way.279 
In prayer, the subject asks God for God and is informed, taught, and shaped by the personal 
presence of God who is “beyond” human language and feelings. 
Prayer can and should become a beginning of the renewal of that hope, a clamor against the 
increasingly widespread hopelessness and the insidious destruction of every unprofitable 
commitment. Well, that is precisely what the earliest prayer of Christianity is about, which is 
at the same time still extremely relevant: “Come, Lord Jesus!” (Rev 22:20). “We should not 
                                                          
276 Cf. Ibid., 99-112. 
277 Rom 8:26: “the Spirit helps us in our weakness. We do not know what we ought to pray for, but the Spirit 
himself intercedes for us through wordless groans.” 
278 This term refers to Nietzsche and, according to Metz, has no neutralizing function. Cf. Metz, Memoria 
Passionis, 105, 110. 
279 This suffering of “the veil” of the difference reminds St. John of the Cross in his famous poem “Llama de 
Amor Viva.” The experience of closeness-presence, but of distance-difference. Also, note the poem “Qué Bien 
Sé Yo la Fonte” which was written during John of the Cross’ painful and unjust captivity (note the apocalyptic 
context) in Toledo. Cf. http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/la-experiencia-del-deseo-abisal-en-san-
juan-de-la-cruz-qu-bien-s-yo-la-fonte-que-mana-y-corre-0/html/021b8cd6-82b2-11dfacc700218 
5ce6064_8.html. (Consulted, February 2017.) 
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simply believe, but watch; we should not simply love, but watch; not simply obey, but watch. 
But watch for what? For that great event that is the coming of Christ” (John H. Newman). It 
is not a coming “to” time, but the end of the temporality of time.280 
This learning that entails entering more and more into the depths of human existence 
is done through faith in God. But which God? What faith? How is this trip-learning made so 
as to effect the construction of the human subject? Metz at this point connects again with the 
apocalyptic, eschatological, and biblical inspiration: faith in God does not endure only until 
suffering, but is in hope. Do we believe only what we believe we believe, or believe in 
God?281 
“[A dying man to Metz] Let me say just a few words: if I die, my God will die with me.” My 
answer, after a certain time, was: “According to what you say, will my God also die? For you 
are dictating against him a death sentence, if my assumption is correct. Which comes to be: 
if your God is really God, then he is only your God if he is also my God, that is, if he is also 
the God of others, the God of all men. And only if you deprivatize God in this sense, can your 
God also be more for you -- can be other things apart from your own projection, from your 
private dream, which will be buried with you. So I keep my objection then for you and me.”282 
God is not indeed a timeless, a-historical, or ontological concept close to the ideas of 
Plato, nor is God a mythological discourse about Easter Sunday, which triumphantly 
exaggerates the resurrection and dilutes the unity of the paschal event -- passion and 
resurrection -- with therapeutic purposes or false pastoral accommodations.  
Therein lies the distance between theology and mythology. Myth forgets that question to 
which pain confers a special tension; hence, perhaps it is more therapeutic, more quelling of 
fear, even more appropriate for “assuming the contingency” of life than the Christian faith.283 
“Hope against hope” (cf. Rom 4:18) is the Christian mysticism of suffering based on 
acceptance and consolation. Acceptance (which does not mean cowardly submission) and 
consolation should not be confused with being happy or calm before anxiety -- there is peace 
                                                          
280 Johann B. Metz, Por una Mística de Ojos Abiertos. Cuando Irrumpe la Espiritualidad (Barcelona: Herder, 
2013), 102-17. Metz writes on prayer with its notes, solidarity, memory, resistance, longing, and expectation. 
281 Cf. Schuster, Hope against Hope, 76. 
282 Metz, Por una Mística, 39. 
283 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 21. 
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where injustice dwells sometimes. It consists of “the mysticism of suffering toward God.”284 
Metz condenses this attitude of acceptance and consolation into the formula “poverty of 
spirit” of Judeo-Christian inspiration.285 In effect, the Hebrew people did not allow 
themselves to be consoled by any ideology or myth and they remained faithful to Yahweh in 
the desert (see Ex 24) and in exile (see 2 Kgs 24:20). Catastrophes and suffering did not 
destroy their faith but instead opened them toward God and made them rethink and deepen 
the revelation.286 This attitude also appears in the New Testament: Jesus invokes God on the 
Cross, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Mt 27:46), as well as in the Sermon 
on the Mount, “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven” (Mt 3:5). 
The faithfulness of God illuminates our discourse on God during resistance to painful 
circumstances (see Ju 2:11-19). “[Hebrew mysticism] is not repression but the acceptance of 
fear, complaint, and pain.”287 
In addition, the crucial affirmation “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8) must also be conceivable 
in Auschwitz. Metz translates “God is love” into “God impassions us.”288 That is to say, we 
do not affirm the memory of a historical event but the memory of our updated identity. God 
was crucified in Auschwitz and now we use that updated memory to forge ourselves. 
                                                          
284 Cf. Metz, A Passion for God, 63-9. 
285 Johann B. Metz, Poverty of Spirit (New York, NY: Newman Press, 1968). 
286 This is noticed in the Deuteronomist history of the exile: the Hebrew people broke with the theology of the 
temple, with the theology of the earth, and with the theology of the king, and deepened in the understanding of 
God as creator and father who had fed them through the desert and had grown the crops and sprouted life in the 
wombs of their women. Cf. Antonio González Lamadrid, Las Tradiciones Históricas de Israel (Estella: EVD, 
1993), 1‐206. 
287 Cf. Schuster, Hope against Hope, 45-6. 
288 Ibid., 48. 
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3.1.2.3. The Human Being and the Others: Political Character of the Subject (Ethic of Compassio 
and the Homo Peccator) 
For Metz the subject is not constructed for itself but has a practical-political 
orientation where its truth is tested against any kind of conformism. Praxis understood “as a 
solidary and liberating action so that all people can become subjects.”289 This, the praxis of 
the ethic-religious subject because of its freedom, is not an a priori aspect of the subject; 
rather it seems that “one does not have it” and it must be attained as “a willingness to assume 
a change of perspective.”290 Freedom is reached when the subject is awakened from the lack 
of interest (echoing E. Levinas) through narrations of dangerous memories (memoria Jesu 
Christi). Once freedom has been achieved, it must be exercised in solidarity with the moral 
and political transformation of those who suffer or need to be freed. It is a freedom for, a 
freedom that frees others, a freedom to love.  
That change of perspective to which the Biblical traditions (and especially the stories of 
Jesus) continually exhort us; namely, to look at ourselves and evaluate ourselves with the 
eyes of others, especially with the eyes of those who suffer and are threatened, and expose 
ourselves to that look at least a tiny fraction longer than our spontaneous reflexes for self-
affirmation allow.291 
This disposition and attention to the suffering of the other, “compassio” according to 
Metz,292 has the pretension of being a universal ethic because its authority does not lie in any 
ideology, but in the very authority of the others’ suffering.293 
A consensus is not what establishes the authority of this ethic, but rather it is the prior and 
intrinsic authority of ethics that enables and establishes a universal consensus, the approval 
of all. But what grounds this authority, making it capable of being invoked today in all the 
great religions and cultures of humanity? It is, to put it very briefly, the authority of those 
who suffer unjustly and undeservedly.294 
                                                          
289 Cf. Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 72-73. 
290 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 167. 
291 Ibid.. 
292 Ibid., 110-12. He develops this further in Ibid., 160-77. 
293 Ibid., 160-77. Here Metz discusses compassio as a universal ethic. 
294 Ibid., 173. 
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For Christianity the ethics of compassio comes from its origins as a community that 
remembers and narrates the following of Jesus: love of God and love of neighbor (e.g. in the 
story of the Good Samaritan, Lk 10:25-37); “passion for God” as com-passio. And if com-
passio expresses our “passion for God,” it must have consequences.295 
Whoever wants to resist the disappearance of the human being and his historical world, as 
well as the dissolution of memory into pure experiment, who wishes to save his identity as a 
subject, his language with pretensions of truth, his possibilities of communication, his 
insatiable hunger and thirst for justice, can do so by allying with the pathos that unfolds in 
the biblical traditions. And that pathos is rooted in the interlinking and reciprocity of the 
remembrance of God with the remembrance of human suffering. ... I hope that this has shown 
that Christian theology, considered more closely, is not only “political theology” in a 
circumstantial way, but is essentially so.296 
In addition, the subject who has been liberated will live time in an apocalyptic way.   
This means to live in the spirit of Good Friday when Jesus quoting the messianic Psalm 22 
(“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” Mt 27:46) relies upon the fidelity and 
promise of God the Father. The tension between his commitment and his hope is historically 
experienced as a relationship with God. In this sense, the mystique of Christian abandonment 
does not consist in diluting the subject in an ocean where we can silence our difficulties, as 
New Age and some oriental philosophies suggest. Christian abandonment is not egocentric, 
but centered on others; it consists of “an increasingly deeper incorporation into an alliance, 
into the mystical alliance between God and the human being.”297 As the eschatological 
discourse states, “I assure you: Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers or 
sisters of Mine, you did for Me” (Mt 25). 
                                                          
295 Cf. Ibid., 160-178, 211-221. 
296 Ibid., 92. (Italics in the original.) 
297 Ibid., 168. See also Pontifical Council for Culture Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, ed., “Jesus 
Christ the Bearer of the Water of Life: A Christian Reflection on the ‘New Age,’” February 2003, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/index.htm. This document clarifies the 
difference between Christian and post-modern spirituality. (Consulted, March 2018.) 
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Something similar happens with the struggle between the technical and the political, between 
purely technological-economic planning and the political project of the future. Political 
fantasy will not allow itself to be absorbed definitively by technological pressures as long as 
it retains that religious-moral fantasy and that capacity for resistance that emanates from the 
memory of the accumulated suffering in history. [Considering this, he suggests another 
notion of politics that will use technological and economic processes in a different way.] This 
conception inspires a new form of solidarity, of responsibility with those who are most 
distant, because the history of suffering unites all men as our “second nature.”298 
For Metz, the human being is more than a world of needs (drinking, sleeping, etc.), 
more than nature, against any neurological determinism or cultures that promote exculpatory 
rationalizations -- “anthropologies of modernity,”299 he claims. To say more, the human being 
is worthy not only because of his ability to analyze and achieve success, but also because of 
his sensitivity to unjust suffering or the acceptance of responsibility. “To the dignity of being 
a human also belongs the possibility of becoming guilty.”300 For that reason, once again, the 
religious adjective is not an addition to the subject. 
Metz argues this with the biblical tradition. The Old Testament shows us that the 
relationship between the people and God does not consist of humiliation and obligation, but 
is a relationship that leads to becoming subject in the midst of fear and the complexity of 
historical conditioning. The subject is shaped as such belonging to the people, not in isolation, 
by sharing their experiences of struggle, suffering, and liberation. In other words, in the 
Scriptures the “idea” of God is not a superstructure that controls the already well-formed 
identity -- as Freud could state, but the fundament of our existence and our identity as people 
upon which to recognize our achievements and their failures in the midst of the historical 
complexity. By taking responsibility for the guilt of the unjust suffering of our people and 
sharing their fate in solidarity, we are not performing mere charity but also an irreplaceable 
                                                          
298 Metz, La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad, 115-6. 
299 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 181. 
300 Ibid. 
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part of the process of becoming a subject; the “homo peccator,”301 according to Metz. But 
the homo peccator “passioned” for God, capable of experiencing the mercy of God when 
he/she is committed to his/her people (society), does not live a sad and pitiful life, but is 
assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation; as God who in Jesus Christ assumed the world. 
“’By asking God to God,’ as Jesus explains the elementary meaning of prayer, does he 
likewise point to the forgiveness of sins.”302 
In conclusion, according to Metz, we are social beings but not in the sense of a 
particular skill (e.g. being more or less shy), rather in the sense of people who are with others. 
This living-with (are-to-be) implies the following: at the level of nature, we are among others 
who share the same goods in interconnected stories (sic), throughout time and with whom 
we need to fulfill our psychosocial needs. But we are more than nature, suffering clashes our 
rationality when it tries to fully comprehend “why?” beyond an instrumental mind; suffering 
leads into a void unless it makes the human being to differ nature from history as suffering 
unto God.303 Thus, at the level of history, the narratives of those who have suffered unjustly, 
within the hermeneutic of the Incarnation -- ex memoria passionis et resurrectionis Jesu 
Christi, have the power to awaken our sensibility. This pathos orients us toward the true 
humanness which provokes a historical-dialectal understanding of reality by confronting 
nature and history. This liberation involves leaving behind a mere adaptation to a prefigured 
ideological future as well as not fulfilling our psychosocial needs with market relationships 
(do ut des). Therefore, we, despite being contingent and finite, can act and create our identity 
                                                          
301 Johann B. Metz, “Redención y Emancipación,” in La Fe, En La Historia y La Sociedad (Madrid: Cristiandad, 
1997), 129–45, 136. 
302 Metz, Memoria Passionis, 183. “To ask God; to ask God for the Holy Spirit; so to ask God for giving us 
himself; to ask God to God: this is what Jesus teaches us about prayer.” Ibid., 101.  
303 Here we are paraphrasing “suffering leads into a void unless it be suffering unto God.” Schuster, Hope 
against Hope, 49. 
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by belonging to a people and a history which is bigger than ourselves and which matters to 
us at the constitutive level. By committing to transform the history we shape our identity.  
Hope pays a crucial role in this anthropology by being intimately related to the 
exercise of our memory. Hope is not only individual, it is not only in times of “my” despair, 
but it encompasses solidary and can be a source of personal and community transformation; 
transformation of history. It is an apocalyptic hope rooted in the Biblical tradition which 
seeks to end injustice. Thus, although hope energizes the person toward the future, people 
must look at the past and at dangerous memory to construct an always threatened subjectivity 
of disinterestedness and nonsense. This voluntarily mystical “suffering toward God” 
constitutes an ethical and a religious “imperative” (according to the natural theology of the 
cry -- to God). Which should not be a mere option to prove our moral perfection but that 
compromises our freedom endowing our existence with “hope [even] against hope.” 
We have explained Metz’s anthropological theology which goes along with a 
politically-oriented fundamental theology. Hope is the eschatological milieu for those who 
are committed to life, society, and history ex memoria Jesu Christi. However, we need to 
deploy a psychology of hope to complete our attempt to provide a spirituality which first 
awakens human beings and then leads them to build “the city of man,” echoing Lynch.  
Lynch’s starting point is, once again in our two authors, the verification of a crisis of 
humanity. For Lynch, some behaviors, such as drug abuse, alcoholism, depression, divorce, 
greed, and irresponsible consumerism, can be interpreted as signs of hopelessness. This could 
drag the person towards fatal consequences. 
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3.2. William F. Lynch: Imagination as Grace to Go through the Human Valley 
The American thinker, William F. Lynch, S.J. (1908 – 1987) is one of those authors 
whose biography and education is evident throughout his writings. Lynch obtained a B.A. in 
Classics and received a Ph.D. from Fordham University with the thesis The Central Problem 
in Aeschylus’ “Eumenides.”304 We refer to the way he brings images from Greek mythology 
such as Zeus, Apollo, Dionysus, Orestes, Aeschylus, as well as from universal literature such 
as Dante, Don Quixote, and Sancho Panza, the poetry of Thomas S. Eliot, etc., into the faith 
arena. This reflects his vast culture, his passion for literature and the arts in general, and 
particularly theater. In addition, his theological anthropology is elaborated from a 
psychological perspective open to the Christian God and modern sciences. In such an 
anthropology, the centrality of hope takes more prominence when we know that he himself 
went through the experience of depression.305 In this way, both the new images and the 
incorporation of science into his thought represent his intention to create a language that 
allows a new approach to today’s man and thus, breaks with a theological jargon that is 
proving unsuccessful in the transmission of Christian vitality and hope.306  
Lynch is persuaded that images and imagination are crucial means to transform a 
person, society, and culture, “the city of man,” according to his terminology.307 This is why 
                                                          
304 John F. Kane, Building the Human City. William F. Lynch’s Ignatian Spirituality for Public Life (Eugene, 
OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016), 24-59. Here the author, following Lynch’s life chronology, deploys Lynch’s 
evolution’s thought by making reference to his writings and conferences. A complete bibliography of Lynch’s 
writings can be found at Ibid., 251-3. 
305 Cf. Kane, Building the Human City, 46-9, 46. He suffers a mental crisis in 1956 and after going back to his 
teaching position at Georgetown University he decides to devote his life to research, writing and public 
speaking. 
306 Cf. William F. Lynch, Images of Faith. An Exploration of the Ironic Imagination (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 3. 
307 William F. Lynch, “The City of Man,” in Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless (London-
-Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 21–27, 27. It corresponds to the introduction. Kane 
understands the term “city” in Lynch to mean “the entire interwoven social, cultural, economic, and political 
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imagination is a constant in all his writings and has a relevant role in his theological 
anthropology.308 Lynch, however, does not make a theory of knowledge, as we have seen in 
Mary Warnock (see Section #2.4), nor does try to describe the function of imagination in our 
mind, but he does make a phenomenology of hope/hopelessness that allows him to associate 
hope and imagination in order to offer a spirituality and sensitivity to modern people.  
Our working hypothesis is that a human disposition toward a realistic trust in the 
world, through a realistic imagination, is the foundation of a life (an identity) in which the 
color of hope predominates. This disposition widens our conception of human nature and the 
world. 
On the one hand, Lynch discusses those lives (identities) which are grey and colored 
with hopelessness. The rate of depression and addiction, consumerism, asocial 
aggressiveness, severe individualism, and so on make a case for considering them symptoms 
of hopelessness in people. Furthermore, he argues that the life of hope is equated with the 
life of imagination and in turn, the life of imagination with the life of wishing and waiting.  
Lynch states that hope and hopelessness do not appear alternatively -- one after the 
other -- but coexist in the human experience of living. Distinguishing these two areas and 
preventing the absolutization of our desires and dreams (“absolutizing instincts” that separate 
                                                          
dimension of human community, whether in a large city or a small town or village. Lynch images “the city” as 
an embodiment of faith or unfaith.” Kane, Building the Human City, 247. 
308 Lynch defines imagination as follows: “By imagination I do not mean fantasy, but the total set of forces in 
man which contributes to the formation of the full contextual image of an object.” William F. Lynch, Images 
of Hope. Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1974), 149. Here he refers to Northrop Frye, “The Imaginative and the Imaginary,” American Journal of 
Psychiatry 119 (1962): 289–98, to clarify the difference between neurotic fantasy and imagination. See also, 
William F. Lynch, Christ and Prometheus. A New Image of the Secular (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1970), 23-5. Kane sums up the concept of imagination in Lynch as “not a single ‘creative’ faculty, 
but all the resources of thought, perception, feeling, and understanding by which we receive from culture and 
develop through experience the images whereby we perceive and experience reality.” Kane, Building the 
Human City, 248. 
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us from the human and humanizing rhythm) averts hopelessness from darkening the areas of 
hope. Otherwise, the individual will gradually manifest some of these symptoms: disaffection 
for the project of humanity and a distorted individualism, ideological rigidity and aggressive 
defensiveness, very short-term visions close to mere concern for survival or a cheerful-
superficial consumerism, reduced understanding of the human, lack of wishing, and lack of 
imagination. Depression, schizophrenia, and suicide may be considered the human sickness 
of those symptoms when they have become heavy and severe. In fact, the case of the mentally 
ill provides a good image to explain what happens to a hopeless person.  
On the other hand, considering the mentally ill, the aid of an external imagination (i.e. 
a doctor) can activate the wish of the ill to again fully want to belong to the human city. 
Trusting the doctor (or another kind of “doctor” such as a friend, an economic aid, or a 
clinical intervention) constitutes the critical moment to rehabilitate the internal resources of 
hope and to commit to the recovery process. Until then, the mentally sick person is not ready 
to go through the healing process that will reintroduce him into the human rhythm and the 
real world of possibilities; “the valley of the human” or “the city of man,” according to 
Lynch.309 In this regard, the images of faith provide us with sources to approach true 
humanness, Jesus Christ. 
In what follows we explain Lynch’s theological anthropology. Initially, as an 
introduction, we present the basic outlines of his writings and then we present his 
anthropology, which is rooted in a phenomenology of hope. 
                                                          
309 Lynch, Images of Hope, 117. See also William F. Lynch, “The Definite,” in Christ and Apollo. The 
Dimensions of the Literary Imagination (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 9–45. And Lynch, Christ and 
Prometheus, 39-72. In both Lynch writes about the human limitations and possibilities in this world, but through 
which and within which life itself takes place. 
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3.2.1. Christian Realism: A New Sensibility and Spirituality to Build the Human City 
Lynch writes between the 50’s and the mid 80’s,310 a period of conflicts and 
polarizations between traditionalists and activists, religion and secularization, liberalism and 
socialism, just war and nonviolence, nationalism and globalization, good and evil.311 In that 
context, Lynch wants to speak to the saeculum from a Christian perspective. He suggests a 
theology of secularization which he will understand differently from the early Metz (as 
historical progress in the first part of Theology of the World), rather than a theology of culture 
that offers a spirituality for a modern, complex world. (That is why we see that, when the 
topic of nature and grace appears, the necessary division between natural and supernatural 
grace is blurred.)312 The theology of secularization is the central theme in his book Christ 
and Prometheus where Lynch seeks to integrate all human, cultural, and political reality, 
with its limitations and conflicts, so that faith has a social and political dimension capable of 
generating hope. In his last published book, Images of Faith,313 he says: “I am intent on 
creating, and in a very imaginable way, a body for faith and, very specially, a political and 
social embodiment of faith,… the concrete movement of faith and the imagination through 
experience, through time, through definite, through the human, through the actual life of 
Christ.”314 
On the one hand, Lynch’s thought may be located in the stream of the “religious 
realism” of Douglas C. Macinthosh and Walter M. Horton (1930’s), and the later Christian 
                                                          
310 Cf. Kane, Building the Human City, 1-23. Here can be found a framework for Lynch’s intellectual life. 
311 Cf. Lynch, Christ and Prometheus, vii. See also, William F. Lynch, “The Structure of the Irony of Faith,” 
in Images of Faith. An Exploration of the Ironic Imagination (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1973), 77–108. 
312 Cf. Lynch, Images of Hope, 111-4, 157-63, 211-28. 
313 Lynch, Images of Faith. After this book he does not publish any more books but writes articles until 1986. 
314 Ibid., 80-1. 
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Realism of the famous Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.315 Christian Realist authors 
face that complexity by embracing three different realisms: political, moral, and 
theological.316 However, Lynch has a particular way to deal with the moral dimension 
because he does not face it directly, as Niebuhr does.317 In comparison, Lynch leaves aside 
moral principles as a personal achievement of the experience of faith.318 He acknowledges 
that he will not study moral issues319 but encourage cultural agents to create images and 
narratives toward the good, so that those narratives in turn have a positive influence on social 
imaginary. For example, in The Image Industries Lynch appeals to the responsibility of 
artists, writers, theologians, and academia overall in order to promote a more human 
society.320  
On the other hand, Lynch follows the line of Vatican Council II (1962 – 1965).321 He 
takes the complexity of the human being and of reality seriously by fully considering the 
human and cultural shadows and lights as a starting point.322 He accepts the autonomy of 
                                                          
315 Kane sees similar endeavors between R. Niebuhr and Lynch although the latter was less well known. Kane, 
Building the Human City, 4. Christian realism is an approach (an undetermined theory) to understand politics 
in order to provide society with tools to deal with the complexity of the world. Cf. Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Christian Realism (Cambridge [England]--New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). This 
book updates Christian realism’s perspective on the basis of Reinhold Niebuhr’s thought.  
316 Cf. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, 241. 
317 Niebuhr suggests, in light of the Kingdom of God, that human beings find regulative principles to guide 
political decisions, including the resort to war. Eventually he needs the aid of myth to integrate human 
sinfulness, and political and cultural contradictions. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, “Coherence, Incoherence, and 
Christian Faith,” in The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr. Selected Essays and Addresses (New Haven; London: 
Yale University Press, 1986), 218–36. In comparison, Lynch uses irony to embrace human and cultural 
ambiguity. 
318 To see the basis of moral realism cf. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, 11-18. 
319 “I have been unable to analyze nearly enough, to analyze [the psychological damnation and loss] in such a 
way as to distinguish it from the moral implications of ontological damnation and loss.” Lynch, Images of Hope, 
224. 
320 William F. Lynch, The Image Industries (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959). In the same vein: “If the 
intellectual does not master these crucial, these central ironies, if he does not solve the problem of the creation 
of the right irony,…” Lynch, Images of Faith, 107. (Italics ours.) 
321 Vatican Council, Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Northport, NY, 
Collegeville, MI: Costello PubCo, The Liturgical Press, 1975). 
322 “The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or 
in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, 
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reality as well as the autonomy of science, which nevertheless can work complementarily on 
building the city of man.323 Lynch also assumes the ecclesiological shift of Vatican II by 
thinking that we should transform people and culture rather than bring people into the 
homogeneous walls of a Societas perfecta.324 And last but not least, for Lynch it is clear that 
the person of Jesus Christ is the criterion of discernment and perfect humanness.325 
For Lynch faith allows us to look at the world in order to become more human. A 
good Christian spirituality does not oppress people -- as some streams claim, but frees us.326 
Lynch defines “faith [as] a form of experience and imagination, itself a way of imagining 
and experiencing the world.”327 Accordingly, he had elsewhere said, “there is an equation 
between the imagination and experience.”328 This is why he seeks to enable and revitalize 
the images of faith, so that the person comes freely to the faith and then will want to live in 
faith, in the same line as John Henry Newman’s Grammar of Assent.329 Nonetheless, Lynch 
                                                          
nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts.” “Pastoral Constitution on The Church in the 
Modern World Gaudium et Spes,” (hereafter, GS) in Vatican Council II, GS #1. 
323 “If by the autonomy of earthly affairs we mean that created things and societies themselves enjoy their own 
laws and values which must be gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men, then it is entirely right 
to demand that autonomy. Such is not merely required by modern man, but harmonizes also with the will of the 
Creator,” GS #36. Related to science autonomy see “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum,” 
(hereafter, DV) in Vatican Council II. “To search out the intention of the sacred writers, attention should be 
given, among other things, to ‘literary forms.’ For truth is set forth and expressed differently in texts which are 
variously historical, prophetic, poetic, or of other forms of discourse. The interpreter must investigate what 
meaning the sacred writer intended to express and actually expressed in particular circumstances by using 
contemporary literary forms in accordance with the situation of his own time and culture,” DV #12. 
324 See Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium (hereafter LG) and “Constitution on the Sacred 
Liturgy Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter SC) in Vatican Council II. The Church is mystery (see LG #1), the 
Church as people of God on the way (see LG #3-4), and the Church as sign for the world -- rather than a wall 
(see SC #2). 
325 “The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, 
the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the 
revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme 
calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their 
crown,” GS #22. 
326 Lynch, Images of Faith, 4. 
327 Ibid., 6. 
328 Ibid., 7. 
329 Cf. John H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 5th ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 1881). 
This book is divided into two parts which, grosso modo, correspond with the referred two movements: to arrive 
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does not make a theoretical development of the act of faith (as Newman did), but for him the 
focus of study is how the secular, the horizontal, leads us to God, to the vertical (which will 
not mean abandoning reality, nor to transcend it, but rather to deepen it). Because, in turn, 
the vertical contributes to the transformation of the world as a consequence of our moral 
decisions in political actions.330 There are two fundamental principles for this dialogue with 
the world. (1) The literary imagination allows us to analyze reality which entails a 
metaphysical experience.331 This is the main conclusion in Christ and Apollo. (2) As a 
corollary of the previous, the literary imagination can enlighten faith; and in this way 
revitalize the believer. (We have already mentioned Lynch’s intention in the use of figures 
such as Apollo, Prometheus, Don Quixote, etc.)  
One of the metaphysical experiences is irony; another will be hope. The irony (not 
anyone, of course) of the imagination captured through images and narratives is what allows 
the human being to integrate the multiple setbacks of reality.332 Through irony we establish 
a low and a high without simplifying too soon the complexity of the world.333 In this sense 
metaphysics (here the irony of the imagination) is a propaedeutic of theology, consistent with 
                                                          
at faith, entitled “Assent and Apprehension,” and to live in faith, entitled “Assent and Inference.” Lynch refers 
to it in his writings; for instance, see William F. Lynch, Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary 
Imagination (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 13  
330 Cf. Kane, Building the Human City, 2-3, note 4. 
331 Lynch states that “metaphysics has always been more deeply engaged than any other science of man in 
getting at existence as existence and reality as reality.” Lynch, Images of Hope, 190. 
332 “Irony—the dramatic contrasting, both in literature or theater and in life, of opposed realities, typically of 
something ‘high,’ exalted or supposedly special, with something ‘low’ or ordinary and even supposedly 
degraded, so that the contrast upends or overturns their expected relationship. Ironies of contempt typically 
mock the pretensions of the ‘high’, as when the emperor has no clothes. Deeper ironies help us see that the 
‘low’ is the way to the ‘high,’ as when Socrates’ ignorance leads to real truth.” Kane, Building the Human City, 
249. (Italics in the original.) A further explanation Ibid., 149-58. 
333 Cf. Lynch, “The Structure of the Irony of Faith.” “The usual quality of irony is the unexpected coexistence, 
to the point of identity, of certain contraries.” Ibid., 84.  
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Lynch’s plan to examine the person, and therefore the culture, according to God’s 
imagination upon the world.334 
Finally, while Lynch does not systematically develop any theological anthropology, 
we can extrapolate it by the way he refers to life and to the human being. In particular, he 
roots his anthropology in a phenomenology of hope. He includes the perception of hope and 
hopelessness which connect with the question of identity (note the relation with the narrative 
character of identity in Mary Warnock -- see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4). 
Lynch directly associates hope with imagination, that is, a theological virtue with a 
human capacity. A mental capacity that, as we have already said (see Gallagher referring to 
Ricoeur at Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2), corresponds to the holistic function of the human brain; 
it becomes integral to experience. For Lynch, imagination meaningfully incorporates in our 
identity a part of what we live. Nonetheless, it can happen that this imagination converts 
problematically a part into a whole, thus making it a false absolute that leads us into rigid 
identities. For example, it can entrap us into past solutions looking for certainties and thus 
prevent us from imagining new possibilities. But what we want to highlight is that, by making 
the correlation hope/imagination, Lynch works from a more psychological perspective and 
focuses on the mental, emotional, and behavioral dynamisms of the person who lives and 
imagines the world in hope (or despair). 
                                                          
334Cf. William F. Lynch, “The Theological Imagination,” in Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary 
Imagination (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 217–47. Also Dominic Doyle would argue that secular hope 
not only is a mean toward eschatological hope but participates in it. Cf. Doyle, The Promise of Christian 
Humanism, 133-140. This book studies Aquinas’s transcendent understanding of hope. Within the Thomistic 
theological framework, exitus–reditus, Doyle explains how grace does not compete with nature. He emphasizes 
the unfinished aspect of being human in a dynamic society which can be sustained (perfected) by the auxilium 
of God. The human being longs for a kind of happiness and fulfillment which only God can fulfill in Heaven. 
But charity is the doable and workable path to journey in hope toward God. 
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3.2.2. Anthropological Theology: Imagination to Go through the Human Valley 
We can find Lynch’s anthropology of hope mainly in his book Images of Hope.335 
Here Lynch studies the phenomenon of hope and proposes elements to restore the life of the 
hopeless person, particularly through the image of the mentally ill. But, why the mentally ill 
and not the cancer patient or the myopic? This apparent trivial question directs us to a 
fundamental point: hope does not deal with merely a purely biological question, but rather 
with a constitutive one at the level of ideas, sensitivity, and identity.  
Lynch’s perspective grounds the vulnerable side of the human being. He assumes that 
we are all somewhat sick and in need of help (here will be placed Lynch’s understanding of 
grace).336 The human being experiences tensions and contrasts (dependence and 
independence, the self and the world, the past and the future) which he/she must learn to 
manage. When we fail to deal with them, a point of divergence from the “normal” may be 
reached such that the person loses contact with reality and becomes socially difficult, 
potentially, mentally ill in need of medical help. Therefore, by studying the clinical patient 
Lynch shows us the dynamism of getting sick and, since some ill people have recovered, he 
discusses the strategies to get out of our apathy and the lack of wishing. 
From a psychological point of view, Lynch’s thought is rooted in psychoanalysis. 
Notwithstanding, despite beginning writing in the 50’s, he does not stay locked in the first 
psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud but moves to the psychosocial current of Erik Erikson.337 
This displacement is crucial in his understanding of the human being. Lynch understands the 
                                                          
335 This book has three parts. (1) Lynch carefully analyzes the phenomenon of hope and despair. (2) He explains 
the necessary elements to build a psychology in which attitudes toward hope predominate. (3) He points out 
how this psychological disposition can be understood metaphysically. 
336 Cf. Lynch, Images of Hope, 15. 
337 See for instance his notion of mutuality which refers to Erikson’s studies, cf. Ibid., 168, 209. 
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principle of individuation under the assumption of being-in-relation. An individual who 
receives “graces” from outside -- at least when we speak about a mature health identity -- to 
be constituted as an autonomous and free being. But not the inverse, namely, a being with an 
interiority who tries to adapt to the outside world to compensate their anxieties and 
frustrations. 
Lynch assumes that the human being is relational, historical, and able to wish.338 And 
this is why the question of identity can be resolved at the level of the context and related to 
our relationship with time.339 
In what follows we present his phenomenology of hope and then we explain Lynch’s 
proposal to recover and nurture a hopeless subject.   
3.2.2.1. The individual as a hoping being: On Hope, Hopelessness, and the Absolutizing Instinct 
Once he said, “one of the great hopes of all men is that they shall be human and belong 
to the city of man -- and one of the great sources of our hopelessness will come from these 
rigid and absolutized, these non-human constructions that lead to the self-enclosure of 
despair.”340 From a psychiatric point of view, Lynch refers to the schizophrenic who loses 
contact with reality and his/her self,  and to one who suffers a crisis of anxiety which leads 
to despair, depression, and apathy. 
For Lynch, it is not imagination that makes us ill, but a lack of imagination that 
encloses us in fantasies and false hopes that take us away from a possible reality not yet 
                                                          
338 “Man is a temporal, historical being who is to be understood and defined in relation to the internal time 
scheme he occupies, from his birth to his death ... And it is by travelling back and forth in certain highly 
developed ways along the lines of human and Christ time that he lives the life of faith, by memory, by action, 
and by hope.” Lynch, Images of Faith, 109. 
339 Lynch, Images of Hope, 37. 
340 Ibid., 27. 
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created. If the individual does not imagine possibilities, then he will not pursue them. In 
effect, the future does not exist in an updated way; we imagine it and project it from our 
desires and needs. This internal dynamic also involves hope: wishing, waiting, and applying 
all means to move forward despite any difficulty. 
On hope. Saint Paul’s doctrine of hope inspires Lynch: “hope that is seen is not hope; 
for who hopes for what he already sees?” (Rom 8:24).341 Hope is the reference or the image 
that indicates the horizon toward which we want to journey in our life. However, Lynch is 
cautious in thinking of hope as an ideal that can never be achieved, that always leaves us 
unsatisfied. Because of one or the other, either we will abandon hope or become obsessive, 
rigid, ideological persecutors of a ghost. “If hope is eternally beyond the evidence, if it is 
always stretching beyond the observable facts, then it is a completely romantic and non-
scientific idea,” Lynch affirms.342  
Lynch is concerned because our nature tends to build ideals, idols, or fantasies that 
separate us from achievable reality. Lynch calls this tendency an  “absolutizing instinct”343 
and considers it the main root of our despair.344 That is why he develops in Images of Hope 
a psychology to enlighten our sensitivity to this struggling.345 Lynch makes a stronger 
                                                          
341 Ibid., 22, 124. To find an introduction to the Pauline doctrine on hope see Thomas D. Stegman, “‘That You 
May Abound in Hope’: St. Paul and Hope,” in Hope. Promise, Possibility, and Fulfillment (New York--
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2013), 28–41. 
342 Lynch, Images of Hope, 23.  
343 Ibid., 27. “By absolutizing instinct ... I mean the instinct in human being that tends to absolutize everything, 
to make an absolute out of everything he touches. [... It is] world of false hope which counterfeits the reality of 
hope. … But above all, everything assumes greater weight than it has, and becomes a greater burden. … The 
absolutizing instinct is not really an action of the imagination. Rather, it is a creator of fantasy, distortion, 
magnification.” William F. Lynch, “The Absolutizing Instinct,” in Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer of 
the Hopeless (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 105–25, 105-6. 
344 This is the warning made in Christ and Prometheus. Prometheus differs from prometheism: Prometheus is 
the image of one who leads us through realistic ways, through human and humanizing rhythms. While 
prometheism leads us through dreams and false hopes which eroded our life. 
345 Lynch does not speak of original sin at any time, but this certainly refers to it.  
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statement with the pretention to sum up Saint Paul’s doctrine on hope: “We live by hope.”346 
Which in fact will be Lynch’s anthropological belief.  
Hope is not an extraordinary thing applicable only in case of emergency or 
catastrophe, which would immutably link it to despair, that is when there is no solution, rather 
link it to a life-giving disposition which nourishes regular life. “The sense of hope is: there 
is a way out.”347 Hope is a gift that allows us to face difficulties on a daily basis. Lynch 
emphasizes that hope is not a form of transcendence that would let us evade, or deny what 
really happens in our life. On the contrary, hope has to do with biology, with psychology, 
with our inner resources to achieve what we want to create. Indeed, hope is related to a 
mentality and sensitivity that allows us to build the truly human: “Hope comes close to being 
the very heart and center of a human being.”348 
Hope is indeed the closest interior resource but is not only internal,349 In fact, hope 
comes from outside (see below). For example, in the case of the mentally ill, a doctor who is 
able to introduce a new possibility into the horizon of the patient’s imagination brings 
hope.350 That is why hope is not an individual exercise (nor is it a Gnostic individualism, nor 
an impossible voluntarism), but rather it has to do with help, with preparation, and with 
time.351 “Hope not only images; it images with”352 and in this sense hope cannot be achieved 
alone. “Hope is an act of the city of man, an act of what I call the public order, not in the 
external sense of that word but in the sense that it must occur between persons, whether they 
                                                          
346 Lynch, Images of Hope, 34. (Original in italics.) 
347 Ibid., 35. 
348 Ibid., 31. 
349 Cf. Ibid., 32. 
350 Cf. Ibid., 122-4. 
351 Cf. Ibid., 119-21. 
352 Ibid., 24. (Italics in the original.) 
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be man or God.” Lynch adds, “as it occurs among human beings it represents or forges the 
very bonds of human society, meaning nothing less than that men can depend on one 
another.”353 
On hopelessness. Lynch notes from the beginning that hopelessness is a human 
emotion and so it does constitute a problem by definition; it can appear alongside hope and 
even be part of the healing process, as we will explain later.354 
We are limited beings who live the contradiction of our volitions and contexts: we 
experience hatred and love; we want to be free but need others company; we desire harmony 
and social peace but we often find tensions, aggressiveness, and maybe social violence. 
Lynch often depicts this ambiguity with the image of Dionysus and Prometheus, where 
Dionysus represents our irrational and volitional nature and Prometheus the other side, 
rational and temperance.355 That is why it is normal and even logical that, for example, in the 
face of a grave misfortune we experience hopelessness. This in itself is not a problem, but it 
is when hopelessness contaminates the areas of hope. Therefore, it is crucial to learn how to 
differentiate these two areas and to educate our sensibility.356  
In addition, there is a hopelessness that is positive. This appears when the patient has 
realized that he/she was trapped inside a fantasy that separated him/her from reality and then 
                                                          
353 Ibid., 24. 
354 Cf. Ibid., 54. 
355 Lynch uses these two images in of his major writings. See for instance, Christ and Apollo. 
356 “There is nothing wrong with hopelessness as long as it does not get into our hope.” Lynch, Images of Hope, 
47. 
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decides to undertake the arduous process of healing. This hopelessness can be a healer which 
purifies us from false hope: “it is a valley of peace guarded by a purgatory of fire.”357  
Beyond that, Lynch explains the mindset and the sensibility of a mentally sick person 
saying, “the sense of hopelessness is: there is no way out, no exit.”358 The person begins to 
function with the mechanism of “constant cancellation.”359 His internal discourse may say: 
the world is too complicated, I have not enough internal resources to deal with this life, it is 
impossible; so why do I try it? Bit by bit futility erodes the area of hope and overcomes 
human will falling into apathy.360 In some cases, he may dramatically think that the only way 
to be free again is by committing suicide.361 
The more futility, the more hopelessness and thus, the person refuses to imagine 
possibilities. Paradoxically, the human being, who was born to wish for creating their future 
reality, has cancelled this ability. Then, the individual retreats into its private imagination, 
avoids feeling involved, and no longer wants to be disturbed by the human project. He moves 
forward hardened and, thereby, the hopeless will manage hopelessness in advance.362  
We should know the flavor and the origin of our despair. Also, we should learn that 
not everything can be expected; in a double sense: be aware of our absolutizing instinct and 
learn to distinguish the possible from the impossible. Finally, we must learn to keep the 
sources of despair at bay so that hope does not drown.363 
                                                          
357 “The path to this ambivalence is through hopelessness to hope. Because, when it is surmounted and accepted, 
the sick leave the nightmare world of unqualified, absolute feelings to revel in the valley of the human.” Ibid., 
117. (Italics ours.) 
358 Ibid., 35. 
359 Ibid., 49. 
360 Cf. Ibid. 
361 Cf. Ibid., 97. 
362 Cf. Ibid., 51-2. “There is a good deal of this among the well,” in Lynch’s words. Ibid. 
363 Cf. Ibid., 60-2. 
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On Hope and Hopelessness: Two Dimensions of Ending the Endlessness. For Lynch, 
one of hope’s feature is freedom. Hope perceives that there is a future, so it is active, creative, 
and flexible. On the contrary, to the mentally ill person the future appears as a dizzying and 
interminable task; he fears the future and becomes rigid. He seeks reassurance, certainty in 
the repetition of past patterns by saying internally: “on another occasion I got out of trouble 
by doing so,” or “it has always been done that way,” thus he loses flexibility and creativity, 
and becomes stuck in the past. Complexity, the different, and uncertainty generate anxiety 
and confusion and he may react with anger or aggression in order to try to regain control over 
reality.364 The past becomes endless and, although it was painful and did not bring great 
results, it is his only source of imagination. Bit by bit, deeper and deeper, he internalizes that 
he has a mental/spiritual lack and, eventually, cay come to feel that he does not have enough 
resources to live. A division between his mind and his will has become clear: on the one 
hand, the feeling of helplessness; on the other hand, “he has lost the taste of the human.”365 
 Lynch feels badly that the person remains in that loop while continuing to compare 
him/herself to the cultural canons for the ideal human and, by making that comparison, feels 
unworthy and less than human.366 Lynch reminds us that mental diseases happen in society 
and, therefore, have a context that we all have participated in constructing. Thus, society 
                                                          
364 Lynch casts doubt on Paul Tillich. Tillich argued that the individual experiences anxiety when he becomes 
aware of his finitude. Lynch, conversely, believes that the person is pacified when he recognizes and accepts 
his finitude. Cf. Ibid., 58. See also “Hopelessness and Confusion,” in Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer 
of the Hopeless (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 81–104. 
365 Lynch, Images of Hope, 57-79, 71. Here Lynch strongly criticizes self-help philosophies or theologies which 
transmits that nobody is saved except through the use of their inner resources. “There has been a deep cynicism 
behind the use of the saying, ‘God helps those who help themselves,’ and that has reflected a deep distrust of 
the surrounding world,” Ibid. 78. 
366 Lynch thinks about neurosis in general, not in relation to good and evil -- moral perfection -- but in relation 
to any canon of the human that provokes (self-)exclusion. That said, it is worth noticing that Lynch’s Catholic 
reference is the work of the Dominican friar Moore. Sebastian Moore, “A Catholic Neurosis,” The Clergy 
Review XLVI (1961): 641–47.  
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must break down narrow understandings of the human being and broaden the notion of our 
nature. Because the mentally ill one is indeed a sick person as well as one worthy of being, 
who challenges our narrow mentality.367  
Therefore, there are two tasks: (1) As the patient is unable to imagine, an external 
imagination must be applied to provide new possibilities for the future. (2) Hope is not merely 
an individual concern; it is up to all of us to create environments and cities that still believe 
in human nature. Mutuality, waiting, and trust are the elements with which Lynch colors a 
life with hope.368  
3.2.2.1. A Hopeful Sensibility: Imagination as Grace to Go Through 
In proposing his psychology of hope, Lynch takes inspiration from children as well 
as the patient-doctor relationship. First, the child begins with blind trust in adults, looking 
with hope to them (continually) for help with nearly all aspects of life. This shows us that 
hope is somehow dependent on outside sources; something is given. However, this child-
hope is not yet mature enough since it has no temporal continuity; each action is perceived 
as isolated and does not constitute properly a journey, an identity.  
Now considering the patient-doctor relationship,369 whereby the patient seeks a 
doctor’s insight to contrast their own rigid and impoverished images related to his self-
                                                          
367 Cf. Lynch, Images of Hope, 55. “Mental illness occurs only in society, not apart from it. We must face the 
fact that society is not an abstract: we are society.” Ibid. 97-8. 
368 “No one is going to come up with a cure-all for the dense and manifold ills of the mind. But we can add, 
however slightly, to the weight and number of ideas that are counter-agents to the forces of illness. One of my 
recurring questions, accordingly, will be: what gives pause, or boundary, or end, to the sick forms of the 
infinitude? What are some of the absolute (but no rigid) points at which the human spirit can rest? In finding 
answers to those questions, one of them that we will uncover is what might be called the psychology of the 
immediate ... By psychology of the immediate I mean simply that here and now the sick person has the right 
and the need to conceive of himself as human and as permitted to act positively and creatively.” Ibid., 79-80. 
(Italics in the original.) 
369 “The relationship between the patient and the doctor (or his equivalent) reaches a point that is transforming. 
It is a moment of trust. ... Before the moment of trust, evidence suggested that an attack was on” Ibid., 122-3. 
Lynch supports this argument with Freud’s study: “[not because of the use of the intellect ‘but slowly by his 
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concept and potentialities. The mentally ill patient needs to expand his imagination with the 
aid of an external imagination but this help will not be received unless the patient, in an 
integral, non-intellectual act of his sensitivity (including the subconscious), decides to trust 
the doctor. Until this fiat happens, the patient thinks that his problem is spiritual or that there 
is no solution. This assent (echoing the already mentioned Cardinal John H. Newman) is the 
last remaining and, at the same time, the first sign of hope. It supposes a brightness of light 
although it had occurred in the absolute darkness and confusion. 
In that fiat, in that trust is where Lynch places the principle of hope: the wish to start 
something, to continue it (in the case of the well), or to recover (in the case of the ill).370 
Something imagined is wished, otherwise, where there is no wish, there is no imagination, 
and vice versa. Lynch argues that to be a person of hope is correlated with being able to wish 
as an unconditional absolute. Let us investigate this assertion’s nuances:  
The intense wish differs from wishing absolutes or imagining hallucinations. When 
hallucinations happen, false imagination and an absolutizing instinct work together subtlety, 
and the subject seeks gratification from an object that does not exist.371  
                                                          
relationship to the physician’] faith repeats the history of its own origin; it is a derivation of love and at first it 
needed no arguments. Not until later does it admit them so far as to take them into critical consideration if they 
have been offered by someone who is loved. Without this support arguments have no weight with the patient, 
never do they have any with most people in life.” Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 
(New York, NY: Liverwright, 1935), 387, quoted by Lynch, Images of Hope, 123. 
370 Lynch defines wish as “a tendency or a movement toward something; the movement or tendency includes 
the qualities of affirmation, acceptance, approval of the thing toward which I move. … An ideal wish is an 
absolute fact. It is not something rising out of the substratum of the self. It is myself. If it is half a wish it is half 
me.” Lynch, Images of Hope, 148. It should be noted that Lynch is in contrast to Freud’s idea, which 
depersonalized the libido as a psychosexual thing. 
371 Cf. Ibid., 143-4. 
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Moreover, Lynch identifies three enemies of the life of wishing and hoping: first, not 
to wish at all; second, wishing but not knowing for what we wish; and  others do what we 
wish.372 Boredom, conformity, good-boy attitude, and apathy characterizes them.373  
Wishing differs from egotism, narcissism, or an altogether a willful act. An ideal wish 
does not need an audience nor is it the result of defiance; it is a neat and “self-contained 
absolute.”374 To be so, there must be a right relationship between the object and the person: 
to grasp the meaning which demands. (A wrong relationship would be conformity or 
defiance.) Lynch, based on the book The Rebel by Albert Camus, presents the example of a 
dandy who plays with life and the world.375 He needs to feel special because he cannot stand 
reality as it is; nor to be alone, nor to be the same as others, that is, to be normal. Being 
normal does not mean renouncing our abilities or our desires, just the opposite! It supposes 
positioning ourselves adequately in the world in order to realistically imagine it and enjoy it. 
It is a paradox, the dandy goes out of his way for an emotion (if possible a relationship) but 
he feels totally strange to this world, and collapses when he is without mirrors; he has no 
trust in regular life. On the contrary, if what we want is the real object, we do not need an 
audience, neither to defy it, nor to please it. In sum, an ideal wish is the basis of hope and 
this why the feature of hope is freedom. 
                                                          
372 Cf. Ibid., 130. 
373 Interesting is the interpretation of the boredom. “A person who is ‘bored,’ in the strict sense of the word, is 
searching for an object, not in order to act upon it with his instinctual impulses, but rather to be helped by it to 
find an instinctual aim which he lacks…” Otto Fenichel, Collected Papers, vol. I (New York, NY: W. W. 
Norton, 1954), 297, quoted by Lynch, Images of Hope, 133. 
374 Lynch, Images of Hope, 151. 
375 “He [a dandy] plays at life because he is unable to live it. He plays at it until he dies, except for the moments 
when he is alone and without a mirror. For the dandy, to be alone is not to exist. The romantics talked so grandly 
about solitude only because it was their real horror, the one thing they could not bear.” Albert Camus, The Rebel 
(New York, NY: Vintage, 1956), 51-2, quoted by Lynch, Images of Hope, 154. 
104 
 
Finally, consistent with learning to distinguish the possible from the impossible, the 
areas of hope from the areas of hopelessness, Lynch suggests that wishes must be educated. 
Beyond that, Lynch explains the elements of hope: waiting, mutuality, imagining, and “the 
taking of help.”376 Let us explain them: 
Waiting. “There is a strong bond, almost to the point of identity, between waiting and 
hoping.”377 It is a wish that knows how to wait and go through a painful path -- if necessary. 
It is an active wait, rather than a passive product of apathy, of willfulness, or of despair. In 
this wait there is no anxiety or hurry because it is not dominated by the subconscious. This 
wait is able to live in time without getting out of control.378 
In the notion of waiting Lynch introduces the experience of time.379 Lynch goes so 
far as to say that our perception of life toward the definite is based on how our attitude toward 
time is, “either strain against it or to accept it.”380 For Lynch, the human being is always 
between a past and a future. Life goes through different stages and phases, it has moments of 
drama, comedy, tragedy, and epilogue. Time is what constantly teaches us because it is a 
source of irony. Lynch suggests living it as Aeschylus: advancing two leagues in good times 
and going back a league in difficult times, but always becoming wiser.  
                                                          
376 Lynch, Images of Hope, 129. 
377 Ibid., 178. 
378 Cf. Ibid., 190-4. 
379 It was curious that Lynch did not further develop the question of time in Images of Hope, given its existential 
value. However, he treats it in William F. Lynch, “Time,” in Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary 
Imagination (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 47–90, and William F. Lynch, “The Images of Faith and 
Human Time” (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 109–75. In the former, the main theme 
is that not only did God ignite creation in time, so it is good, but also God fully lived human time in Christ. 
Thus, God continues leading the creation and the fulfilling of his pledge. In the latter, Lynch depicts the stages 
through which the human being passes (childhood, the unexpected, building a present moment, the moment 
through infinite possibility, the passage through the curse, the tragic, death, and nothingness). Consistent with 
the rest of the book he remarks the need of images of birth, life, and death.  
380 Lynch, “Time,” 50. 
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Mutuality. Lynch understands mutuality as “an interacting relationship, an interacting 
contribution that occurs between man and the world, or between person and person, or 
between man and God, from which something new and free is born.”381 Lynch goes so far as 
to affirm that the loss of mutuality is the biggest cause of mental illness today.382  
Today we tend to distrust the world based on an exaltation of independence. (We 
make ourselves believe that by accepting our dependence we are sacrificing our autonomy.) 
The world is perceived as hostile so we no longer breathe in unison with the world as Lynch 
signifies poetically.383 Lynch calls this mentality “gnostic imagination” because it works 
from ideas, underestimating worldliness, and by not allowing part of our sensitivity to be 
affected. Lynch claims that gnostic people deny our impulse to possess (object) and to want 
to be (self).384 They simplify and dichotomize reality and, accordingly, they expect a single 
word, maybe a magic word (religious or not), to deal with the issue.  
The Gnostic mentality is based on internal confusion and the battle between love and 
hatred, the desire for freedom and the need for others. In fact, Gnostics do not know how to 
love in such confusion. In comparison, the mature person has sufficient clarity regarding its 
identity and sufficient confidence in being a separate identity to experience closeness without 
mingling suffocation.385 That is why Lynch says that part of the healing process lies in 
reaching or reestablishing relationships with others and with the world.386  
                                                          
381 Lynch, Images of Hope, 169. 
382 “The breakdown of many forms of relationship, and of the hope it invariably creates, is probably a source of 
the waves of mental illness and anxiety that flourish among us. We become increasingly aware of this.” Ibid., 
170. 
383 Cf. Ibid., 160. 
384 Ibid., 113. 
385 Ibid., 92. 
386 Cf. Ibid., 170. 
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The Gnostic imagination tends to question everything and give a personal response 
and as a result, the person lives in an indefatigable and endless moralism and 
psychologism.387 If ordinary life is a permanent battle of “oneself” against the world, then 
one perceives the other as separate from oneself, being affected by one’s belonging to the 
human race. Which reminds us of the dynamics of despair (supra). But there is something 
else, the Gnostic mentality has put morality in the wrong place, namely: one has placed 
morality in self-sufficiency and pride, instead of in the truth and the construction of a society. 
Because of one’s subjective moralism, because one does not trust the world, this subject may 
have disregarded the notion of sin and reconciliation (quite characteristic for Christian 
interiority), but it does experience social and labor expectations which keep one alert as if it 
were a trial.388  
The taking of help. For Lynch is clear that the one who lives open to hope and trusts 
the world sees stories and comprehends reality completely differently from the one who lives 
in hopelessness and distrust.389 He makes the case when he discusses a metaphysics of hope. 
Lynch argues that inwardness and imagination were given by God. 
In effect, by accepting our dependence on the world (including the others), we are not 
constraining our freedom but guaranteeing it. We are tolerating our ambiguous nature with 
the premise that negativity and hopelessness do not reign.390 We do not seek to deny part of 
reality but we want to know and distinguish it in order to reach some “definiteness,” and 
                                                          
387 Ibid., 169. 
388 Ibid., 174. 
389 Cf. Ibid., 124. 
390 From another point of view, we can argue that fantasy and negativity are two ways of facing reality. The 
former by avoiding it and the latter by partially facing it. Cf. Ibid. 
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“rest” and to love well.391 Without this accomplishment we are only apparently autonomous. 
We need grace, namely: everything that comes from outside to constitute our inwardness, to 
sustain our identity, and enlighten our autonomy. But we have the power to recognize, accept, 
and wisely integrate those gifts; without this there is no such hope.392 “Reality is healing for 
those who are without hope, and it is the separation from reality that causes despair.”393 And 
this is so, because, for Lynch, God does not become less by leaving autonomy to reality, 
allowing grace to be “mundane”; on the contrary, by giving up his power over reality, that 
is, by granting autonomy to his creatures, God demonstrates all his powerful goodness.394 
In conclusion, Lynch’s anthropology is an anthropology of hope. The fundamental 
elements of hope are wishing, waiting, mutuality, and “the taking of help.” If the person trusts 
the world, then it will be easier for him to establish a relationship between his interiority and 
that which surrounds him. When the opposite becomes a habit, then mental distortions 
appear. 
We tend to absolutize desires which gradually separates us from the world that 
constitutes a humanizing place for life, “the human valley.” The absolutizing instinct makes 
the wishing, the waiting, and mutuality become atrophied little by little. That is the way 
hopelessness contaminates hope. In effect, if there is no wish, or the wishing is distorted, 
then there will be nothing to wait for, nothing to hope for. Likewise, our imagination and our 
                                                          
391 Ibid., 175.  
392 Recalling Lynch’s dialectical irony, we see two poles which are internally organized with different priorities. 
The very first is our disposition to trust and receive, so dependency. “Religious obedience requires persons 
more mature than usual to accomplish its ends and to avoid its potential risks.” Ibid., 205. 
393 Cf. Ibid., 191, 209. 
394 “I would like to talk of a God who does not make things impotent, or annihilate their resources and their 
identity, by entering so deeply into them. The final test of his powers, as of all healthy human relations, is that 
he communicates autonomy: he does not destroy but creates by entering in. If, therefore, we really wish to 
imitate God, let us make men free.” Ibid., 112. In the Thomistic line “grace perfects nature.” 
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ability to imagine is stiffened because it tramped in past events. Apathy, or boredom, and 
negative identity are two phenomena of the process of hopelessness. That is why Lynch 
makes the case that depression, addictions, and aggressiveness are symptoms of 
hopelessness.  
Imagination creates possibilities of the future; imagination makes reality expectable. 
Thus, if a desperate person receives an external imagination he/she may start wishing again 
for the taste of being human. This imagination activates him to reestablish his relationship 
with the world again. The way to nurture hopeful sensitivity/sensibility consists in trusting 
the “doctor” (be it a professor, a relative, a surgery, or an economic aid, etc.). In this fiat is 
where Lynch places the human condition for hope: a genuine disposition toward receiving 
help from any kind of autonomous thing of the world; a dependence that actually frees us 
and rehabilitates our autonomy. Without this disposition help cannot be received as a 
nourishing gift and internal confusion will tend to misunderstand it. That is why everyone 
(especially adults) can and must be part of this process of creating hope in the city of man 
for those who tramp in shadow. 
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Chapter 4: Rethinking Identity in Hope 
In this chapter we put Metz and Lynch into dialogue in order to consider the role of 
hope in the crisis of identity and its rehabilitation. At the end of each conclusion we contrast 
the result with characteristics of the ideal mature identity we have developed in Chapter Two. 
4.1. Hope a Fundamental Element of a Vulnerable Human Being: Disposition to Trust 
and the Communitarian Dimension of Hope 
As we have seen, both Metz and Lynch find hope foundational for the human person. 
In their view, hope is not simply a happy feeling or mere optimism (poor self-help 
psychologies); nor is it easy. Hope must take account of the very difficult realities that human 
beings face: apathy, boredom, negative identities, depression. In the face of such factors, 
Metz argues that persons often become apathetic (individualism), harden their sensitivity 
(techno-scientific rationalism), or turn religion into “an ornament for their celebrations” 
(bourgeois religiosity). He believes this happens when we forget the suffering of the just fruit 
of psychologies, philosophies or theologies that interpret progress as a history of those who 
have won. Similarly, Lynch speaks about apathy, boredom, or being separated from the world 
(“losing the taste of the human”). In the face of such realities, an absolutizing instinct can 
furtively lead us to unreal fantasies that, paradoxically, constrict a healthy, realistic 
imagination (and wishing) in such a way that we gradually lose contact with what must be 
enough to humanize us. Both theologians indicate ways of being that depict impoverished, 
even sick, versions of the human, as in the case of depression, negative identity, or 
schizophrenia. In such cases, the human subject may be in a crisis of hope without knowing 
it. One’s freedom is not as free as one believes and, as a result, one suffers from a distorted 
humanity, and can inflict suffering on others. 
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Beyond that, Lynch’s phenomenology of hope helps us re-read what Metz has 
analyzed with his critical dialectic of history: the person has reduced reason to instrumental 
reason and so has devalued anamnestic reason; the person is fundamentally memory. In 
comparison, Lynch explains to us the inner process that has led the Western subject to that 
damaged subjectivity: an absolutizing instinct gradually alienates us from the world by an 
exaltation of our independence -- exaltation of the self -- leading us into a state of 
hopelessness. The result is a person who struggles in living ordinary life, preferring always 
“to be somewhere else,” always trying to imagine the world differently from its real demands 
in order to satisfy a longing to “be happy.”  
With pride such a person does not consider the possibility of having been trapped by 
an absolutizing instinct which takes one away from the real world. That is, one is not able to 
imagine how to peacefully live with the ambiguity of one’s emotions: love and hate, 
dependence and independence, etc. One has simplified the complexity of the world, believing 
that the happiness longed for will be obtained by pursuing gratifying and positive emotions, 
and avoiding, or disregarding the value and truth of (apparently) negative emotions. Such a 
person wants to be independent and is afraid to experience dependency, as if the latter were 
going to take away one’s autonomy. In the end, one has denied that one is a vulnerable being 
at one’s core because vulnerability is considered something negative or humiliating.395  One 
has lost the capability to imagine internal conflicts. That is why Western identity struggles 
                                                          
395 We have already mentioned that Lynch does not discuss the moral character of hatred, rage, or ideology 
(idolatry). That issue becomes even more controversial when we discuss about a mentally ill. In comparison, 
Metz approaches this question from an anthropological point of view. He believes that recovery of the true 
human entails the realization that a person’s life is worthwhile, not only because of the feelings of joy, but 
because of being able to experience compassion and thus sadness. Hence, the person is not only worthy for his 
intellectual ability or success, but also for his ability to recognize his sin. Metz sums it up in the ethics of 
compassio and the homo peccator concept.  
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with confusion: ambiguity has been hidden or neglected, so one cannot properly imagine 
ways to reconcile internal conflicts. From the perspective of faith, one can say that 
understanding vulnerability/dependence in a negative way has led the individual to lose 
consciousness of sin.  
In order to recover, Lynch suggests that we need to activate our wishing again and 
widen our imaginations. Our recovery involves accepting the fact that we are dependent 
beings and that our vulnerability is not negative, it need not humiliate us. (Remember the 
image of the patient-doctor relationship: only when the patient in a non-intellectual act 
decides to trust the doctor, can the patient receive the external imagination that the doctor 
wants to provide; then the patient recovers his internal resources and becomes properly 
autonomous.) Our nature was designed to be originally dependent, to experience mutuality, 
and to receive help from the aid/grace that surrounds us; otherwise “we get sick.”396 If there 
is a willingness to trust the world, we can learn to distinguish and order the ambiguity of our 
interiority. Then the internal confusion no longer reigns within us and we can access the 
world with freedom and autonomy, with an “ideal wish” capable of wishing the world well; 
that is, according to how things demand to be treated.397 
                                                          
396 It is worth noting that one for whom sensitivity and sensibility is oriented towards being primarily a receiver 
and a vulnerable person, will perceive the world with gratitude. On the contrary, the one who has retired its 
sensitivity because the world appears hostile to him, will perceive it with domination and justification. For the 
former it is easier (“natural”) to stablish relationships between the interior and the outside, whereas for the 
former it is an engineering task. 
397 Lynch even says that where there is inner confusion there is a difficulty to love. “Where there is maturity in 
and love between two people, there is no confusion… There is indeed self-acceptance and a minimum of envy… 
There is a degree of confidence in their separate identities which gives them a certain ease in allowing a close 
relation to grow.” Lynch, Images of Hope, 92. Neither Lynch nor we have defined what we assume by “how 
things demand to be treated” but we have made some references with which embrace that idea: the hermeneutics 
of the Incarnation and the poverty of spirit in Metz, the education of our sensibility in Lynch, the role of the 
narratives in transmitting common values to be able to experience us as belonging to the humans in Mary 
Warnock, the non-domination Biblical mindset referred by Johnson in her study on Darwinism theory, Ask the 
Best. All of them have been made in order to reach a common understanding of the world as humans -- and 
common here does not mean uniformity, rather truth; true humanity.  
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Based on the above, Lynch imagines “the city of man” and calls upon all to be active 
in building spaces where human beings grow in mutual trust. For this he claims two things: 
we must expand our notion of the human (e.g. those who are mentally ill are indeed sick, but 
still human); and we must understand ourselves as potential help-beings for others.398 In this 
project the images of faith help us, since Lynch considers Jesus Christ as the model of being 
human. (In our next thesis we will see how Metz argues Lynch’s exhortation to the human 
project.)  
What is clear is that no one will commit to the world if he/she does not trust it, if the 
person “trusts” the world only as a way to get material resources from it. For example, if we 
have no interest in delivering the world to future generations. 
Finally, we will contrast the above with the results of our investigation of Chapter 
Two on the ideal mature identity. 
Mary Warnock’s theology of knowledge described imagination as a function of the 
mind which allowed us to access the world and break our solipsism. For example, because 
of our imagination and human empathy we can understand what “she has a headache” means. 
Likewise, we must share common values transmitted through narratives, including 
autobiography (i.e. identity). For Warnock a poor imagination of the human has important 
consequences. For example, she argues that moral relativism isolates us and dismantles us as 
members of the human species, so it destroys empathy and the possibility of values. To make 
                                                          
398 Remember that for Lynch God granted autonomy to creation. This implies that God conceded the creation 
to be his agents, particularly to the person because of his capability to imagine what can become world (see 
note #394). 
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a direct connection with Lynch, we become alienated from a sensibility for the human and 
thus we lose our common ground of understanding the world. 
Moreover, the psychosocial theory of Erikson affirmed that the development of the 
person goes through different stages, each of which involves the resolution of certain tension. 
For instance, in infancy the tension trust-distrust is resolved as hope. However, this hope is 
not definitive, but rather it unfolds according to the epigenetic principle throughout the other 
stages and tensions. Hence hope continues to develop in the early childhood stage, the 
adolescent stage and so on. 
In conclusion, we have the ability and autonomy to adopt a fundamental stance of 
mistrust vis-à-vis the world, but if we do, we are going against our very nature and risk mental 
illness. If, on the contrary, are able to adopt a fundamental stance of trust vis-à-vis the world, 
it will be easier for us to make the bridge between interiority and the world and humanity.  
4.2. Hope a Dynamism to Endure in Life (and History): through Hopelessness to Hope 
Metz speaks about an eschatological hope with apocalyptic character; some criticize 
him for suggesting a pessimistic spirituality or a pure asceticism. Lynch proposes a criterion 
of discernment based on the taste of humanity and hope. 
We fall into ideologies and apathy when we consciously or unconsciously understand 
life as a story of success, happy feelings, and merit. But that is not the whole truth of life and 
history, says Metz. When we look at the suffering of the just (as, for example, at Auschwitz), 
the question of meaning breaks us down. Victims of unjust violence reveal the deficiencies 
of our monochromatic image of a successful life. Unjust suffering confronts us with a 
dilemma: apparent meaninglessness -- the perfect justification for alienation, hopelessness, 
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and struggling for survival, or the incomprehensible Mystery (Metz quotes Augustine: “si 
comprehendis non est Deus”). He argues that the suffering of the just opens our eyes and 
frees our capacity for compassion and commitment. Narratives of the victims have saving 
power since the rational faculty of the person is anamnestic. If that memory has as its 
hermeneutical principle the paschal mystery of Christ then dangerous memories can be 
redeeming. 
Metz allows us to differentiate three types of suffering: physiological suffering (e.g. 
experiencing cold, heat, or lack of food), suffering as a result of sin (i.e. injustice), and the 
optional exercise of our freedom (i.e. service, agape, love). The latter, which refers to pathos, 
is the one Metz adduces in his “open-eyed mysticism,” in his “poverty of spirit.” Once our 
sensibility has been liberated, those narratives will exercise, through prayer, our pathos in 
order to build the true moral and religious subject. The exercise of our pathos also has a 
practical-political dimension, namely commitment to the world and its history. This 
commitment lies in jointly seeking the end of oppression and preserving a memory so as to 
awaken/liberate others. Metz sums it up in the liturgical formulas “do this ex memoria Jesu 
Christi” and “Maranatha! (Come Lord!).”  
On the one hand, since we seek the end of oppression and liberation, hope in Metz is 
apocalyptic (-- that is to say, it reveals already now what is to come). On the other hand, since 
the final end will occur only in the eschaton of the second coming of Christ, hope in Metz is 
eschatological. Therefore, we can conclude that we not only discover our true humanness but 
build it in relation to the suffering of the just. Our identity is built on this twofold hope. 
Up to this point we can re-read Lynch with the understanding of prayer in Metz. 
Prayer, which is asking the Spirit of God for God, is not a mere spiritualism that would justify 
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escaping/avoiding/turning away from the world. It has a political dimension and works as 
follows with Lynch’s insight: the prayer of petition assumes a wish, and increases it to 
imagine a just future. 
 But Metz’ hope seems to be a bit obscure and stoic. Lynch can help us complete what 
Metz assumes in his spirituality. 
Lynch’s treatise on hope not only gives us guidelines for living in hope, but hope 
becomes a criterion of discernment399: by the effects, by the quality of our hope we will know 
if we are on the right path, or by being alienated from the world by fantasies where we want 
to obtain unreal gratifications. Lynch’s strong principle is that true hope introduces us to “the 
human valley.” When that happens we do not want to flee from that valley because we find 
to taste of the human and the wish to belong to humanity. 
Now for Lynch there is a hopelessness that is purifying. One way of perceiving that 
we are living a fantasy guided by the subconscious is when hopelessness appears; that is 
when the bay of hope is flooded with hopelessness. It may be sad and hopeless to journey 
through obscurity to the light signed by hope, but to desire that light by waiting actively and 
in a disposition of commitment to the real world becomes healing. Then we start re-
establishing right relationships with the world and feel the pleasure of being human again. 
Through correct relationship with the world our imagination restores existence to 
existence.400  
                                                          
399 Fr. Lynch was a Jesuit and this point reminded us of the rules of discernment of the Spiritual Exercise. We 
made this connection in conversation with our mentor Fr. Casey Beaumier, S.J. See also Kane, Building the 
Human City which explores Lynch’s thought from the Ignatian spirituality point of view. 
400 Noted here Lynch’s metaphysical notion of hope (see note #331). 
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Therefore, Lynch’s hope criterion of discernment offers a way to colorfully live 
Metz’s mystic-politic spirituality. 
Finally, we contrast the above with the results of our investigation of Chapter Two. 
Mary Warnock argues that human identity is memory linked to our biology. It should 
be narrated to fully grasp it, to enlighten the subconscious and to perceive the emotion that it 
leaves. That is so because of the critical role words play in human minds. As we are working 
on a Christian humanism we are deriving the benefit from the emotion of gratitude by living 
as a result of hope. 
Kohlberg explained the moral status of the human being with three levels and six 
stages. The third level corresponds to the moral principles stage. This is the level in which 
the human being not only makes adaptive decisions according to the mandate of its 
subconscious, but is liberated from it. (Note that it was not enough to know good principles, 
but that there had to be a cognitive change with regard to stage II). Therefore, on the one 
hand, we see that this is consistent with what Metz says about the liberation experience and 
remains in that state despite the adversities, “passion for God,” or “hope against hope.” On 
the other hand, we see that well-lived morality is not enslaving but, on the contrary, 
liberating. It makes us free to make decisions according to what is good, not according to our 
instinct of survival and mere gratification. 
In conclusion, hope constitutes a dynamism and a way of discernment to endure in 
life and history despite obscurities and obstacles 
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4.3. Hope Invites the Person to Integrate Time and History 
The experience of time is a crucial factor for hope. Metz and Lynch argue for two 
different emphases on the experience of time. On the one hand, Metz refers to the importance 
of historical time, due to the anamnestic character of our rationality. Not incorporating 
historical time leads us to cultural amnesia and problems to integrate and reconcile with the 
history of humanity (e.g. slavery, the Civil war, colonial memories, famine, etc.). Nowadays, 
we can see that this time is not sufficiently achieved in partisan ideologies which either forget 
or use history as a weapon rather than an instrument to enlighten humanness. On the other, 
Lynch refers to the importance of existential time and does so with the image of Aeschylus. 
Aeschylus accepts the contingencies, the passivities, and the different stages of life. Thereby 
time teaches us to learn as much from positive moments as from those which seem to delay 
us. Time and hope are related in the waiting process: not the waiting referred to by the 
(temporal) distance between now and the goal, but rather the learning process of deepening 
in existence. 
Finally, we contrast the above with the results of our investigation of Chapter Two. 
Mary Warnock argued that imagination finds one of its highest enemies in “a narrow 
and limited idea of the truth” and “a failure of historical sense … called ‘present-
mindedness.’”401 This is precisely what we notice today. The idea of the truth tends to be 
reduced to moral subjectivism or techno-scientific proof. This truth tends to meet with the 
well, the newly-modern, or the successful. Also, existential time is lived as an ever-present 
of expected emotions. Finally, regarding historical time, a gap between generations has 
                                                          
401 Warnock, Imagination and Time, 151. 
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emerged mainly because of technological reasons, while individualism has also ruptured the 
concern for future generations. 
To conclude, hope, which has individual and communitarian dimensions, provides us 
with a way to integrate the existential and the historical. Dependence on how we live time 
determines our perception of life. 
4.4. Conclusion 
We have studied the notion of an ideal mature identity from different perspectives in 
order to identify some areas of agreement on the question. Afterwards, we investigated the 
subject’s situation in the Western world. Next, we analyzed the theological anthropologies 
of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch with the aim of reflecting on the contribution of 
hope to the human being. 
Then, on the basis of the way in which natural sciences (in this work psychoanalytic 
currents, cognitive psychology, neuroscience) think of the mind and the self as well as the 
way the sciences of the spirit (in this work philosophy, sociology, theology) think about the 
self, we endeavored to show that the crisis of the modern subject is on the anthropological 
level of hope, historically-culturally inherited.402 Hope thus becomes a rehabilitating element 
of the subject, both individually and communally. 
The structure of the mind and the way the process of identity formation works suggest 
that we must intentionally invest our imagination with hope in a way that shapes our 
disposition. By doing this, we will image the real to create possibilities while our sensibility 
                                                          
402 Gallagher says through Eliot’s words: “The trouble of the modern age is not merely the inability to believe 
certain things about God which our forefathers believed, but the inability to feel towards God and man as they 
did.” Thomas S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets (London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1957), 25, quoted by M.P. 
Gallagher, “Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds,” 6. 
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(including our mind) is disposed positively for harder times, which will imply thereby 
strengthening resilience. Psychologically speaking, the aforementioned imagination may 
consist of trusting the world (which does not mean being naïve in ordinary “human 
transactions”), perceiving ourselves as members of a people, and incorporating time in our 
life through the “Aeschylean rhythm” as well as through the “inflation time.” To do this, we 
must have a familiar, healthy approach to suffering, which is an integral part of being human 
and acting morally. 
Hope is a theological virtue that is experienced personally. But this does not 
correspond to individualism, or the absence of suffering, or only a time of despair --“my” 
despair. At any time, in despair or not, the impoverishing human image of consumer-
producer can be interrupted by dangerous memories ex memoria Jesu Christi, and since a 
central quality of hope is freedom, our idea of the human can be widened through imagination 
by the act of hope. From that moment, we can commit ourselves to history and society 
(echoing Metz), to the human city (echoing Lynch), and create an atmosphere in which to 
hope; a hope to relieve others’ hopelessness and to dispel future despair. It is in an atmosphere 
of hope that true humanness rests: the wish to be truly human and belong to the human city.403 
  
                                                          
403 Cf. Lynch, Images of Hope, 27. 
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